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My research explores policy-making in the UK Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). I focus on the part of Defra that seeks to control 
exotic animal diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease and Avian Influenza. The 
research investigates how civil servants make policies to control animal disease, 
how scientific expertise is used in decision-making, and the differences in styles 
of policy-making that occur during disease outbreaks compared with 'peace-time'. 
In contrast with conventional policy analysis, my research takes an interpretive 
approach to the study of policy-making. The emphasis of my analysis is on the 
understandings that officials hold about aspects of policy-making and how these 
understandings influence their behaviour. I gathered accounts from Defra officials 
and their advisers, using participant observation and interviewing, about what it 
means to be a bureaucrat and to provide expertise. Drawing on insights from 
organizational sociology, I treat these accounts as stories about policy-making 
with not only explanatory but performative power. Using John Law's (1994b) 
concept of 'modes of ordering', I view policy-makers' stories as organizing 
narratives that structure interactions and generate' organizational materials and 
realities. I argue that three modes of ordering can be identified in Defra's exotic 
disease division: rationalism, bureaucracy, and expediency. These three modes 
interact, overlap and contradict one another as Defra staff seek to make sense of 
the organization and their role within it. 
I conclude that the differences between these three modes of ordering account for 
differences in the way that policy-making is organized over time and between 
policy contexts. During disease outbreaks, for example, Defra officials think of 
themselves as 'heroes' and act accordingly, while during 'peace-time; they 
consider themselves bureaucrats or rational decision-makers to justify their 
inability to achieve policy outcomes. 
3 
Contents 
Acronyms ~nd Abbreviations 5 
INTRODUCTION 7 
ONE: Battle Rhythms and Bird Tables, or A Day in the Life of a Policy- 17 
Maker 
Two: Policy-Making and the Politics of Disease 34 
THREE: Getting Beyond the Textbook: Competing Paradigms of Policy- 73 
Making 
FOUR: Interpreting Organizations 98 
FIVE: On Being the Bureaucracy: What it Means to Make Policy in 120 
Defra 
SIX: On Being 'Expert': What it Means to Give Advice 151 
SEVEN: Organizing Policy-Making in Defra 184 
CONCLUSION 218 
References 242 
Appendix One: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 267 
Appendix Two: Foot and Mouth Disease 272 
Appendix Three: Bovine Tuberculosis 277 
4 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ADPG Animal Disease Policy Group 
AI Avian Influenza 
BSE Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
BTB Bovine Tuberculosis 
BV A British Veterinary Association 
CSA Chief Scientific Adviser 
CSL Central Science Laboratory 
CVO Chief Veterinary Officer 
DCMS Department for Culture, Media and Sport 
Defra Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
EBP Evidence-based Policy 
EFRA Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee 
FMD Foot and Mouth Disease 
FSA Food Standards Agency 
HEO Higher Executive Officer 
5 
IAH Institute for Animal Health 
ISG Independent Scientific Group 
MAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
NAO National Audit Office 
NFU National Farmers Union 
NPM New Public Management 
OSI Office of Science and Innovation 
SAC Science Advisory Council 
SEAC Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee 
SEO Senior Executive Officer 
SVS State Veterinary Service 
TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy 
VLA Veterinary Laboratories Agency 
6 
Introduction 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is an 
organization where the complexities of evidence-based policy-making are 
negotiated on a daily basis. This is especially true of Defra's exotic disease 
division, which deals with Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Avian Influenza and 
other livestock diseases. Here, scientific and veterinary expertise is always 
needed: to prioritise funding and control measures, to decide on vaccination 
strategies, to inform the creation of protection zones, to decide whether or not to 
cull particular birds and livestock. The priorities of the division are to prevent 
disease from entering the UK, and to control disease outbreaks as quickly as 
possible when they occur. Consequently, the work of the officials in this division 
• /I 
IS not of the high-level, strategic kind, but involves dealing with specific, 
technical cases and finding practical solutions to problems with a large scientific 
component. Officials 1 in this division are more divorced, at least in terms of 
formal qualifications and first-hand experience, from their policy field than is true 
of most government departments. Policy-makers in the division rarely have 
scientific qualifications, or experience of working with livestock, or a deep 
understanding of the epidemiology of disease or'the efficacy of different control 
measures. Their reliance on expert advice is great. This is not a new phenomenon, 
however. Veterinary and scientific advice has been used to inform animal disease 
policy for over a hundred and fifty years, since the first inspectors were appointed 
to survey the state of the nation's livestock and report their findings to the Board 
of Agriculture. Although the techniques of disease detection, surveillance and 
prediction are vastly improved, the same fundamental dilemmas remain: how to 
combine science with politics, translate abstruse theories into effective 
implementation, and how to act proportionately and wisely in difficult 
circumstances. 
I In practice, the distinction between 'officials' and 'scientists' is difficult to maintain because 
many scientists and veterinary advisors are employed solely by Defra and are therefore civil 
servants in their own right. However, for'clarity I have used 'officials' throughout the thesis to 
mean policy staff, and 'scientists/ scientific advisers' to refer to both in-house and external 
scientific and veterinary staff. 
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While academics struggle with the theory of evidence-based policy-making, 
debating the extent to which policy can incorporate scie~ce, or science remain 
impervious to politics, Defra officials have worked out their own pragmatic 
solutions. They have created expert advisory groups, drawn up templates for 
decision-making, appointed chief scientific advisors and funded research, all with 
varying degrees of reflexivity about science and its place in the policy process. 
Every day, policy-makers call meetings with scientists, read summaries of 
research findings, telephone colleagues for advice and decide how to incorporate 
this information into their work on a case-by-case, context-dependent basis. They 
bring this scientific expertise together with their own expertise, which consists of 
knowledge about how decision-making works, where political will lies, and how 
the affected parties are likely to respond. It seems, then, that evidence-based 
policy-making is happening every day in Defra out of a simple need for expertise. 
It goes largely unnoticed by observers except when a high profile event like a 
disease outbreak draws attention to the actions of officials. However, we still 
know very little about the way in which these practical solutions to evidence-
based policy-making are reached. For example, what are the attitudes towards 
science that underpin the creation of experts' groups, and how does the creation of 
such groups impact on the way in which policy is ultimately made? To what 
extent are scientists aware of the political and policy context of their advice, and 
how able are policy staff to judge the merits of conflicting expert opinions? These 
deeper questions are difficult to answer because there is a fundamental disparity 
between the neat, bounded model of evidence-based policy-making and the way it 
is put into practice in Defra. This corresponds to a broader inconsistency between 
notions of a rational policy-making process and the reality of the activities 
performed by Defra officials, which are complex and unsystematic. There is a 
need for a better, more empirically grounded understanding of policy-making if 
we are to say anything meaningful about evidence and expertise. 
This became apparent at the outset of my research, when I undertook exploratory 
fieldwork in the exotic disease division, which involved several months of 
participant observation working alongside Defra officials. Without a closely 
formulated research agenda, my aim was to conduct a broad observation of the 
practicalities of policy-making, and to witness the ongoing activities of policy-
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makers within the Department. I realised very quickly that conventional 
approaches to policy analysis and the traditional language of political science 
were not able to answer the sort of questions ~aised by this fieldwork. Observing 
Defra officials, the complexity and unruliness of policy-making were immediately 
apparent, as well as the efforts made to regulate and utilise this labour. Working 
as a policy-maker in Defra means dealing with a continuous flow of information 
from myriad sources - commissioned reports, meetings of various kinds, gossip 
from the office 'grapevine', EU and central government directives, stakeholder 
consultations and informal conversations with colleagues. All of this information 
must be filtered, sorted, reordered, repackaged and disseminated as 'policy' but 
this process too is chaotic and conducted in a perpetually changing environment. 
At all stages, policy documents may be subject to a wide range of revisions, 
adaptations and distributions, the culmination of which is not determined in 
advance of the process' itself. Thoughts may be conveyed upwards to line 
managers, outwards to stakeholders, or sideways to colleagues; this is done 
through press releases, briefing documents, ministerial statements, web pages and 
further meetings. The simple sense of 'a policy-making process', ubiquitous in 
policy analysis, is not present in Defra. 
And yet, in the face of these disordered, ~onfusing and changeable circumstances, 
Defra officials find order. They find ways of understanding what is required of 
them, and are able to prioritise work based on their understanding of what their 
roles entail. They create goals to which their work is directed and construct a 
sense of who their policy 'customers' are. They are able to create hierarchies in 
which everyone has a place, and through which they are able to structure their 
interactions with experts. They create rules about how and why certain procedures 
should be followed and are able to give meaning to work that may seem 
meaningless: to justify why something needs doing when this is not immediately 
apparent, at least to the outsider. The fundamental question arising from this 
fieldwork is, therefore, how Defra officials find or make order in their work. I 
want to analyse what orders prevail in Defra, and where such orders come from. 
For example, what role do formal documents such as organization charts, policy-
making guides and departmental objectives play in shaping officials' 
understanding of their roles as policy-makers, and what role do informal factors 
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such as departmental culture and personal values play? The part of other actors 
must be acknowledged too. The second question to be explored concerns Defra's 
scientific and veterinary advisors. How are ~hey incorporated into the orders 
created by policy-makers, and to what extent do they shape these orders? I want to 
explore who achieves expert status, and how scientists and officials co-construct 
the notion of expertise. Finally, the influence of disease outbreaks must be 
considered. Is order created differently during 'peace-time' (when the country is 
free of disease) and 'war-time', when an outbreak occurs? To what extent do the 
relationships between officials and scientists change during these different states, 
and do officials view their roles and responsibilities differently? 
To begin to explore these questions, an alternative method of policy analysis is 
required. The prevailing approach to policy analysis sees policy-making as a more 
or less rational process, ~ith distinct phases of problem formulation, evidence-
gathering, decision-making and implementation. Whether this is seen by scholars 
as a simple linear process or a more iterative and circular one, the common 
assumption underpinning conventional policy analysis is that policy-making 
consists of discrete stages (problem formulation, evidence gathering etc) and that 
all policy-makers' activities are directed towards 'solving' the particular policy 
problem they are dealing with. Consequently, when analysing policy-making the 
dominant method is product-led and involves isolating a policy or decision and 
tracing its genealogy. The relevant documents are identified, consultation 
responses dissected and, in some cases, government officials (usually the most 
senior) are interviewed about what guided their decision-making. This approach 
imposes upon policy-makers a simple teleology and a pure rationality; their 
purpose is to make decisions, and they follow a logical sequence of steps to arrive 
at their outcomes. While these studies highlight instances where policy-making 
does not follow the expected pattern of action, and thus give insights into the roles 
of pressure groups and other forms of 'interference', they do not challenge the 
underlying assumptions of the nature of policy formation and consequently lack 
the means of making more radical critiques of the policy process. 
This model-based approach to policy analysis also assumes that policy-making is 
or should be structurally identical between departments. The peculiar constitution 
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of each individual department is rarely commented on and when it is noted it is 
cited as a reason for the failure of that department's policies. Studies of Defra 
frequently focus on the close relationship ~etween the Department and the 
National Farmers' Union, citing the historical influence of inter- and post-war 
policies of agricultural support as a reason why this close relationship developed 
and persists (see for example Winter 1996). These suppositions remain abstract, 
however, because few policy scholars go into Defra and ask officials about their 
relationship with pressure groups and whether this constructed history actually has 
an effect on the way they think and act. In addition, there is little work that 
systematically examines the contemporary culture of Defra and how this culture 
affects its staff. While in the field of organizational studies the notion of 
organizational culture has been accepted and developed for decades, this concept 
has not been fully adopted by political scientists, who continue to talk of the civil 
. . 
service and policy-making in terms of historical influences and structural design. 
Departmental specificity is considered to be an accident of history that in some 
way causes policy-making to deviate from the ideal type. Therefore, those studies 
of Defra that focus on pressure groups debate the extent to which they distort 
policy-making by exerting an influence over officials. The idea that a Department 
could develop a sophisticated and distinctive culture not shaped by structure and 
history alone but co-constructed by its s~aff, the nature of the work they do and 
their policy field has not yetbeen considered in the existing academic literature. 
Consequently, in this thesis I am proposing an approach that rejects the model 
policy-making process as the norm and 'policy' as the unit of analysis. Instead, 
the focus of this thesis is on the organizational and the personal aspects of policy-
making. In order to answer those questions set out above, about the ways in which 
order is found and created, this thesis develops an organizational sociology of 
Defra. This approach brings together individuals and their context without 
privileging one over the other. It attempts to understand how Defra staff interact 
as a group and how this group interacts with and constitutes the organization. My 
focus on the people who work in Defra stems from the simple, but, as I have 
argued, overlooked assumption that individuals in Defra have an influence over 
the way that policy is made, and do not blindly try to implement a rational model 
of policy-making. A focus on people, rather than processes or products, 
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immediately introduces a new perspective because people hold beliefs that they 
act upon; create and share interpretations of events and rules; and vary in their 
ability and desire to conform to expectations <?f the way in which they carry out 
their duties. 
In conventional studies, policy-makers remain 'black boxes' of the policy-making 
process. It may be ascertained that a piece of evidence was given to officials and 
that the subsequent policy seemed to be based on that evidence, but the actual 
decision-making process at the individual or small group level through which 
evidence becomes policy remains poorly understood. Analyses of evidence-based 
policy-making look for instances where advice has been incorporated into 
decision-making and when evidence is not used often argue that it is the result of 
interference or incompetence of some kind, whether deliberate obfuscation by 
. . 
civil servants (as critics of bureaucracy might suggest) or the lobbying of pressure 
groups, as interest group theorists might propose, and so on. What is universal is 
that this activity is generally speculated upon after the fact - rationality or intent is 
imputed when a decision emerges - and the actual policy-makers concerned are 
rarely asked to comment on their thoughts and actions. If documenting the 
complexity of policy-making is the chief empirical problem in this thesis, and 
developing a sociology of the organization is the predominant theoretical 
challenge, then this desire'to bring the voices of policy-makers back in to the 
analysis of policy is the methodological puzzle which it seeks to solve. 
To do so, I embarked upon a second phase of fieldwork. While the first phase, 
participant observation, gave me great insight into the atmosphere of Defra and 
the structure of the working day and so on, conversations with policy-makers 
were opportunistic and biased towards the groups and individuals with whom I 
had had the most regular contact. I subsequently interviewed a range of actors 
working in or with Defra's exotic disease division. I chose policy~makers of 
differing seniority to gain a spectrum of perspectives on working in Defra, and 
then people from pressure groups, scientific advisers, veterinary officers, 
consultants and members of scrutinising bodies to cover the broader range of 
actors who in one way or another have contact with, or input into, policy-making. 
My primary concern was to understand how the participants interpret their duties, 
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relate to others and bring their own beliefs and values to bear on their actions. 
This interpretive approach has a relatively long history in sociology and 
anthropology but is very new to political science. Pioneering qualitative policy 
analysis can be found in McPherson and Raab (1988) and Page and Jenkins 
(2005), both of which provide extensive data from interviews with civil servants, 
but truly interpretive studies of British government are confined to studies of 
government ministers such as Rhodes (2005), Rhodes et al (2007b) and Bevir and 
Rhodes (2003, 2006) and work on local government by Gains (2009), Durose 
(2007) and others. Interpretivism demands an understanding of participants' 
stories not as mere accounts but as exercising performative power. The 
epistemology of interpretivism does not treat such stories as distinct from facts; 
policy-makers are not describing the world when they tell stories but are helping 
to bring it into being. They do this in a number of ways, including communicating 
, I 
historical experiences and providing individuals with a way to weave this 
experience into discussions of current activities, socialising new members, 
documenting successes and failures and drawing conclusions (or morals) from 
them, stereotyping other organizations, and indirectly communicating information 
to individuals about issues which are too threatening or sensitive to discuss 
directly (Schwartzman 1993). My interest in collecting policy-makers' and 
advisors' stories about their work was not to gain descriptions of life in Defra but 
to understand how, through'their interpretations and talk, they order and organize 
the business of policy-making. 
Structure of the thesis 
To meet the empirical, theoretical and methodological challenges arising from the 
research aims I have used a number of strategies for presenting data and analysis. 
The thesis begins with a vignette depicting one day in the working life of an 
official in Defra's exotic disease division. The vignette in Chapter One is set 
during a small disease outbreak to give an impression of the changes, both subtle 
and drastic, which take place when the presence of an exotic disease is confirmed. 
It gives a sense of the many different types of interaction that take place from the 
perspective of a middle-ranking official (Le. at a level between the senior civil 
service and the administrative/secretarial staff). Contrary to descriptions that 
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follow the course of a policy from inception to implementation, looking at policy· 
making from the perspective of an official illustrates the great variety of the work 
they do and shows that they may only infrequently come into the realm of a 
particular decision that needs to be made. The aim of the vignette is both to give 
the reader a sense of the experience of working in the division, and also to 
introduce themes and ideas (such as the use of expertise, or the constraints of 
bureaucracy) that recur throughout the thesis. 
Chapters Two and Three deal with the theoretical challenges raised by the 
complex nature of policy-making in Defra and my desire to provide an alternative 
account. Chapter Two comprises a survey of what the existing literature tells us 
about policy-making in Defra and its predecessor, the Ministry for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF). The chapter is structured around three major themes 
" . 
that can be identified in the literature: pressure groups and problem-framing, the 
use of expertise, and the problems associated with bureaucratic government. The 
purpose of this chapter is thus to set out existing knowledge about policy-making 
in the Department and to highlight the aspects of policy-making that remain 
under-theorised. 
Chapter Three takes up the discussion that I have begun in this introduction 
about the utility of conventional approaches to policy-making and the alternative 
view that I am proposing in this thesis. This chapter situates the analysis of animal 
disease policy as described in Chapter Two within the broader context of literature 
on policy-making in the UK. I describe the rational model of policy-making most 
frequently used in policy analysis and contrast this with the interpretive approach 
I am taking. 
The research methods and the methodology of the thesis are discussed in Chapter 
Four. The chapter also covers the data collection methods used -" participant 
observation and in-depth interviewing - and reflexively discusses the efficacy and 
implications of using these methods. The chapter draws upon common 
observations made about qualitative research (including issues of access, 
researcher identity, and so on) and relates them to my specific experiences of 
researching the civil service in a politically sensitive policy field. The chapter also 
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explains the epistemological justification for the interpretive approach, and deals 
with criticisms of interpretive political science. 
Chapters Five and Six begin to describe and analyse the stories told by Defra 
officials and their advisers. Chapter Five details the experiences of policy-
makers, and discusses their interpretations of their roles within the division. The 
chapter begins by discussing public conceptions of bureaucracy and popular 
stereotypes of civil servants. It then goes on to explore the extent to which Defra's 
civil servants recognise these stereotypes in their own experiences of being 
bureaucrats, and considers whether there is such as thing as 'bureaucratic culture' 
and a 'bureaucratic personality'. The chapter recounts the stories told by policy-
makers of the challenges they face in their working lives, ranging from the endless 
meetings they must attend to the misguided attempts by Defra management to 
. . 
interfere in the organization of the division. Finally, the chapter discusses how 
disease outbreaks affect policy-makers' behaviour and feelings towards their roles 
within the bureaucracy. 
Chapter Six explores how scientific advisors feel about their contributions to the 
policy-making process and takes a similar approach to the previous chapter in 
order to provide a 'mirror image' account of life as a scientific adviser. This 
chapter outlines the ways In which scientific advisory committees are perceived, 
and summarises the literature that argues that government advisors are generally 
politicised and liable to give biased advice. The chapter then allows Defra's 
scientists to describe how they give advice and how they feel it is used. It 
discusses the notion that expertise is not denoted purely by academic 
qualifications but requires the scientists to play the part of advisers and gain 
acceptance by Defra's policy-makers. To explain how this happens, the chapter 
discusses the role of informal organization, networks of communication and the 
use of meetings as sites of negotiation to determine which advice is used and 
which advisers are accepted. 
In Chapter Seven, I return to the research questions that this thesis seeks to 
answer, and consider how Defra officials order their activities. The stories told in 
the previous two chapters are analysed in connection with John Law's (1994b) 
15 
concept of "modes of ordering". In this chapter I argue that the stories told by 
staff in the division are ordering devices which structure the interactions between 
staff and, ultimately, the way that policy is ,made. The chapter identifies three 
distinct modes of ordering - rationalism, bureaucracy, and expediency - and 
explains how policy-makers and their advisers constitute, and are constituted by, 
these ordering patterns. The three modes of ordering occasionally contradict one 
another and occasionally overlap, thereby enabling policy-makers to interpret 
their actions and context when other modes of ordering fail. The thesis concludes 
by revisiting the original aims of the research and assessing the benefits of my 
approach as a means of offering a new perspective on policy-making in Defra. 
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Chapter One 
Battle Rhythms and Bird Tables, or A Day in the Life of a Policy-
Maker 
Monday, 08.30: Arrival 
Liz2 arrives at the Defra building, sc~nning her identity card to open the glass 
door into the foyer, and walking past the security guards. There is a noticeboard 
that shows the level of 'security alert' for the building; today it is black, the lowest 
level of alert. She takes one of the lifts to the third floor where she works, and 
walks through the large, 'open plan office to her desk. There are not many others 
in at this time, because most people start at 9 am. Employees have some flexibility 
in their working hours, and Liz chooses to come in early and leave early, because 
she has a long commute from her home on the outskirts of London. Liz used to 
work in Defra's Guildford office, but about two years ago most of the staff were 
asked to move to the Westminster offices as a cost-cutting move. Liz would have 
preferred to stay in Guildford because it was a nicer place to live, and she could 
walk to work, but if she had stayed she would never have been promoted to a 
Grade 6, which she is now. She stops to put her sandwiches in one of the 
communal fridges on her floor, which involves quite a bit of rearranging to fit her 
plastic tub in amongst the many individual milk cartons labelled with names. 
After throwing away one of the more disgusting looking old cartons, Liz 
continues to her area of the office. Lights with a motion-sensor switch flick on as 
she walks across the floor. The Department is very big on energy saving, as the 
lights and the posters reminding everyone to switch their computer monitors off at 
night shows. It does mean, however, that if you sit at your desk for more than ten 
minutes without moving much then the lights go off. An irritated colleague 
waving their arms in the air to tum the lights back on is a common sight most 
afternoons. 
2 This chapter is based on my fieldwo'rk diary, kept during a period of participant observation. 
Although it is based on real events, names and minor details have been changed to preserve the 
anonymity of the staff involved. 
17 
Liz reaches her desk and switches on her computer. The computer at the next desk 
along is also switched on, so Liz knows that her line manager, Jonathon, is 
already here. The desks are arranged in small clusters, with signs hanging from 
the ceiling marking out each individual area. All of Liz's division, Exotic Disease 
Prevention and Control or EDPC, works on this floor; the scientists and vets 
occupy two floors, and other divisions (such as endemic diseases and international 
trade) also have floors in the building. It wasn't always open plan, and in fact 
when Liz first moved to London she had her own individual office. Management 
decided that it would encourage better working because people would be able to 
see who was in the office and locate colleagues more easily, plus team leaders 
would be working alongside their junior team members. Liz doesn't mind it much, 
except that there aren't many communal spaces any more; there is a "tea point" 
. , 
rather than a kitchen, which is just a boiler and a fridge to keep milk and 
sandwiches in. People sit at their desks during their breaks and there isn't much 
socialising. At 9am and 11 am a man pushes a trolley round the building selling 
sandwiches, drinks and snacks so there is no need to leave your desk all day if you 
don't want to. Liz likes to get out when she can, though, even if it's just walking 
to one of the coffee shops along the road to buy a drink. 
The office has enormous plate glass windows with no blinds, which has become a 
favourite gripe among the people who work in there. In the summer, the sun is so 
bright that it is a struggle to see your computer screen. In the winter, it gets so 
cold that people work with their coats on because there is no insulation around the 
windows. Everyone has heard a rumour that blinds have been ordered for their 
floor, but as it is no one's particular responsibility to chase them up, nothing ever 
seems to happen. It is a common topic of conversation, along with the recurring 
problems with the printer and the impossibility of getting anyone from IT to sort it 
out. 
Normally the first thing Liz does when she gets in to work is to look through her 
folder for the day ahead. She has a cardboard folder for each day of the week, 
with briefing papers for meetings and any other relevant documents kept inside. It 
is the only way to stay organised when there are so many meetings to go to, often 
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one after another with no breaks in between. Liz carries th~ folder to every 
meeting so she rarely forgets the papers she needs. Today she opens the Monday 
folder and takes out the contents. She had three meetings scheduled but two of 
them have been cancelled over the weekend because there is a new outbreak of 
Newcastle Disease in Surrey. She still has a meeting at 11am to hear a report on a 
cost-benefit analysis project, but the other two (a meeting with some members of 
her team to discuss a new strategy for communicating with the farming industry 
about biosecurity, and a planning meeting for one of the contingency plan test 
exercises which is taking place later in the year) are now replaced by a 
stakeholder conference and an 'experts group' meeting. 
On Friday, a report came in of a suspected disease outbreak at a poultry farm in 
Surrey. It takes 24 hours for the laboratory which tests the samples to give a 
. , 
definite result, so after setting up some local veterinary officers to do surveillance 
activities around the site, there was little to be done that evening. Suspected cases 
of disease are very common - at least three or four per month - but most are 
found to be negative straight away. A suspected case isn't in itself cause for panic 
in the division, but it does mean that everyone is alert to the possibility of an 
emergency. Ever since the major Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in 2001, 
disease outbreaks have been treated with the upmost seriousness. Defra was so 
heavily criticised then that they are determined never to be caught out again, and 
even the smallest outbreak is treated seriously - emergency meetings, high disease 
alert status. Liz didn't work in animal health in 2001 - in fact she came from a 
different area entirely, the Meat Hygiene Service - but she is very much aware of 
the impact it has had. Just last week, in one meeting the Chief Veterinary Officer 
brought along a clipping from the Guardian, saying that none of the lessons of 
2001 had been taken on board by Defra. They all felt frustrated that they had 
made so little improvement in the eyes of the public despite doing everything they 
could to be more prepared for a disease outbreak. 
Liz had left work on Friday evening expecting to be telephoned the following 
morning with more news. She doesn't work weekends, but disease outbreaks are 
emergencies and staff expect that they will have to be available if necessary. They 
are supposed to be paid overtime, but in reality staff are expected to work as many 
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hours as are needed to control the disease and are not always paid as much as they 
deserve. On Saturday the disease was confirmed, and a teleconference was held so 
that the minimum number of staff had to actually make the journey to their central 
London office. Liz phoned in, along with Jonathon, and one or two other policy 
staff. The rest were scientists who could explain the seriousness of the situation 
based on the preliminary information they had. The time taken to collect more 
samples from neighbouring farms and have them tested meant that it was a matter 
of 'wait and see' for the London staff. There was a regular communication 
between the local vets and the London staff for the rest of the weekend, but on 
Sunday, when Liz was last in contact with the local veterinary officers, it was still 
unclear how big the outbreak was going to be. 
Now, having caught up on the latest news of the outbreak by email, Liz will need 
h 
to brief the people who weren't in on Friday. Flexible working means that most 
people spend one day per week working at home, and some of those who were 
away on Friday weren't notified of the disease outbreak because they aren't key to 
managing it. However, it is important that they are aware of what is going on, 
because if it turns into a big outbreak everyone will be affected in some way and 
will be required to contribute to the effort of controlling the disease. Liz looks 
around the office. Scott, one of the people she wants to brief, is just sitting down 
at his desk. Ali isn't in·yet, but Liz checks his online diary and it looks empty 
between 9 and lOam. Liz walks over and asks Scott ifhe is free at 9.15 for a quick 
briefing meeting. He is. Can he pass the message on to Ali when he gets in? Yes 
he can. There isn't time to book one of the meeting rooms now, so they will just 
find one that is empty and use it. Around the edge of the office are small meeting 
rooms that you can book online or just nip into for small divisional meetings. 
There are bigger rooms in the basement that they often use for meetings with 
people from outside the division, or outside Defra. If it is someone they want to 
impress, like the stakeholder groups, they sometimes use the rooms· in a different 
building, because they are nicer. Liz's office, although it is· new, is rather 
functional and plain. The basement rooms in particular, which have no windows, 
are not nice places to spend long meetings. 
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Liz goes back to her desk and starts printing out some papers about the outbreak 
to take along. At that moment, Jonathon returns to his desk and greets Liz. They 
talk briefly about their weekends, and laugh about the disease outbreak that 
interrupted their plans. It is an office joke that outbreaks always start on Fridays 
just to spoil their weekends. Jonathon will be out of the office for most of the day, 
as he has a meeting with the Chief Veterinary Officer and then the Minister. Liz's 
job description says that she is in charge of two branches of the division but as 
Jonathon will be out, and Liz has the most animal disease experience, she will be 
effectively in charge of the whole division today. 
9.15am: informal briefing meeting. 
Liz, Scott and Ali meet in one of the small rooms and sit round the table. Liz 
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spreads out some photocopied maps showing the infected farm, the surveillance 
and protection zones (shown as concentric circles around the premises) and some 
printed-out emails from veterinary staff who have sent updates on the disease this 
morning. She describes the situation. Neither she nor the other two policy staff 
have a scientific background so she doesn't bother going into detail about the 
epidemiology but just summarises events. On Friday Defra received reports of a 
suspected poultry disease outbreak in Surrey. The vet at the site couldn't say for 
certain what the disease was, because the clinical signs of many different pOUltry 
diseases are quite similar. The samples had to go to the Veterinary Laboratories 
Agency at Weybridge in order for the disease to be confirmed but this took a long 
time because the sample had to come by taxi. There was then some confusion 
over the lab results that delayed an announcement even further. The Chief 
Veterinary Officer confirmed the presence of Newcastle Disease on Saturday 
morning. The usual measures are in place: protection and surveillance zones, 
movement restrictions. A press release has gone out through the Government 
News Network. Culling will begin shortly at the site, but the birds have to be 
valued first. This is going to be done by a local valuer, and Defra have little 
control over the decisions that are made as to the value of the bird. The initial 
value has been set at £4 per bird, but Liz is uncomfortable with the way the 
valuation has been carried out. Disease outbreaks are always expensive, and there 
is a lot of pressure from the Minister to reduce costs across the Department. It is 
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in their interest to make sure that the values given are accurate. Scott asks if 
another valuer can be found to give a second opinion. Unfortunately, the need to 
do things as quickly as possible means they will probably have to go ahead with 
the person they have got. 
Liz gets out another map, showing the location of individual buildings on the 
farm. The farmer has several sheds of birds, and wants to spare some of the 
uninfected birds from being culled by housing them together under strict 
biosecurity conditions. Liz is not keen on this idea, because scientific knowledge 
suggests it is risky, and existing legislation will probably not allow it. Pointing at 
the map, she explains that technically, the entire farm is a single epidemiological 
unit and all the birds should be culled. If this epidemiological unit is split to allow 
some birds to be spared, this will set a precedent for future disease outbreaks, and 
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every farm would have to be considered on an individual basis. If there were a big 
outbreak, like Foot and Mouth Disease in 2001, this would be impossible to carry 
out. However, the legislation might be revised in the near future to bring it in line 
with other disease legislation, and Defra might be able to derogate (create an 
exemption to spare the birds) now if they had to. But Liz would rather go ahead as 
normal. A further complication is that the infected farm is near some other 
producers who will be affected by any decisions taken to derogate. Trade is 
restricted during a disease outbreak, and if potentially infected birds were kept 
alive, it would take even longer than usual for trade to resume. Liz has already 
been contacted by some of these producers asking that derogation is not allowed 
to go ahead. 
Some other staff in the division are not sympathetic at all to the idea of 
derogation. James, one of the senior veterinary advis'ers, argued with Liz at their 
last meeting because in his view, the industry should be taking more responsibility 
for disease outbreaks and although it is unfortunate that this outbreak has 
occurred, the farmer will have to accept the consequences. Also if the outbreak 
was big, it would involve hospitalising sick birds, setting up an appeals 
committee, putting a lot ofbiosecurity inspection personnel in place - it would be 
horrendously expensive. Liz can see other sides to the argument, however. In 
favour of derogation, Defra's reputation might be helped if they spare some of the 
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birds. In 2001 they got a reputation for being "heavy handed", culling animals that 
were later found to be healthy. At this early stage it is difficult to tell whether this 
will become a large outbreak or not, and if it is a big outbreak they could end up 
being criticised again for culling a lot of birds. At the teleconference at the 
weekend, it got quite tense as those who were for and against derogation argued 
with each other. Liz is unsure whether the farmer will be able to maintain the level 
of biosecurity needed for derogation. The fact that the disease outbreak has 
occurred in the first place is a worrying sign, because it suggests that either wild 
animals or dirty vehicles are bringing in diseases. Nobody from the London office 
has been out to the farm to see what it is like, and they rely on reports from local 
staff. It can be very frustrating when they are slow at getting information through 
to the London office, or if their information is incomplete. Over the weekend the 
flow of information was particularly bad, because there were fewer staff than 
usual at the local offices in Surrey. 
At this early stage, Liz has no more information to give, so she gets up to leave, 
reminding Scott and Ali that more meetings will be taking place throughout the 
day as more news comes in from staff at the Surrey site. For some staff, even in 
the exotic disease division, the outbreak will not have a great impact on their 
day's work, except that some of their less important meetings might be cancelled 
if other colleagues are involved in controlling the disease. There is a tense 
atmosphere in the office, however, as everyone is waiting to find out whether the 
disease has spread to other premises. For Liz, it has already had a very great 
impact on her day, as much of her routine work has been suspended so that she 
can concentrate on the outbreak. Almost her entire day has been taken over by 
meetings related to the outbreak, and in between these meetings she checks her 
emails or telephones colleagues to find out more information. 
After the meeting, Liz has an hour to try and fit in some of the work she would 
have been doing if there wasn't an outbreak. She is writing a report about the 
prioritisation of work within the division for a management board meeting in two 
weeks' time, and she wants to get it out of the way as soon as possible. It involves 
pulling information together from the intranet that can be really hard work when 
other people don't file their documents properly. Some files have very similar 
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names, or else they have illogical names and it takes a long time to locate them. It 
is even harder when the person who wrote the original document has left because 
then Liz has no one to ask about where such and such a piece of information came 
from. There have also been some emails about the meetings that have been called 
for this afternoon, so Liz prints out the attachments (mainly agendas and a 
background paper) and adds them to her Monday folder. She checks with one of 
the administrative staff that the telephone number has been emailed out to the 
relevant people so they can participate by teleconference. There won't be any time 
for a takeaway coffee today, so she quickly makes a drink in the tea point and 
takes it along to the next meeting. 
11 am Cost-Benefit Analysis Meeting 
, 
As the outbreak is, at the moment, small and contained, a lot of the routine . 
meetings are still taking place. There is no point in stopping people from going 
about their usual business just in case there is a new development with the 
outbreak. This particular meeting takes place in one of the larger meeting rooms, 
which is in the middle of the open plan office. It is only a few steps from people's 
desks to the room itself, so there is little feeling of disruption. Alan, one of the 
Department's economists, is giving a report on a small project he has been 
leading. It is a cost-benefit analysis of a new policy that the division is thinking of 
introducing. The meeting is partly to inform division staff about the results of . 
their project, and partly to discuss where to go from here. Alan uses Powerpoint 
slides with some facts and figures about the costs of different policy options, and 
hands out some two-page summaries of the findings. One or two questions are 
asked, mainly about the way in which the figures have been calculated. Have the 
administrative costs been included? Does the cost of a particular vaccine change if 
it is ordered in a bigger batch? For the most part, however, people are quiet and 
look restless. Although no one particularly resents being in the meeting, there is a 
feeling that it can't go on too long because of the disease situation. Phones can be 
heard ringing in the office; some of them are being answered by the 
administrative officers who are not in the meeting, but - due to the small number 
of staff in the division - others go unanswered. Liz frequently looks at her 
Blackberry, checking for new emails that might have come in with reports from 
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Surrey. She was given it when she was promoted and now Liz feels like she can't 
live without it; the majority of communication is done by email because people 
are so often in meetings or away from their. desks that telephoning or coming in 
person is useless. 
Alan's presentation is only a preliminary report, and no decisive action needs to 
be taken at this stage, so after some limited discussion the meeting is brought to 
an end. The meeting is mainly an iteration of points that have been made at 
previous gatherings: that the Minister wants costs cut in one way or another, and 
that the industry won't be amenable to these cuts coming from animal disease 
compensation. Alan isn't that bothered by other people's apathy; this meeting has 
been scheduled for a long time as every project has an obligation to give updates, 
and he will just carryon with the project regardless of comments made today. 
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Alan works in a different building, and doesn't see staff from this division very· 
often, so he hangs around afterwards talking to others, and most people gradually 
drift back to their desks. Liz, in contrast, rushes out of the meeting because she 
needs to jot down some notes for the next one that starts in ten minutes time. After 
again refreshing her email inbox to make sure nothing new has come in about the 
outbreak, she scribbles a few bullet points on a piece of paper and then walks over 
to Ali's desk to remind him that it's time for the "bird table". They walk to the 
meeting together. 
Midday: Bird Table 
The so-called bird table is being held on a different floor of the building to the one 
on which Liz works. Many of the staff from Liz's division go upstairs for the 
meeting, to the floor where the London-based vets work. These short periods of 
time, like walking to a meeting in a different part of the Department, give people a 
chance to chat to each other, sharing some office gossip or informally talking 
about their progress with a piece of work, which doesn't usually happen in the 
office because it is open plan and talking would be disruptive. This floor looks 
quite different from their own, as the walls are covered in maps and charts 
showing livestock populations, printouts of epidemiological models, surveillance 
zones and so on. Their own office is bare, save for some biosecurity posters left 
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over from a previous publicity campaign. Defra got the concept of a "bird table" 
from the military during the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak. It is designed 
to convey information as quickly as possible, so every detail is designed to help 
this happen. Everybody stands up, because the received wisdom is that meetings 
last longer when people sit down. This is not a meeting where people sit around 
and chat; in fact there is a slightly tense atmosphere at the start, because everyone 
is waiting for the Chair to start speaking, and no one wants to be left sharing 
office gossip when the room falls silent. Liz enjoys the bird tables because there is 
a sense of urgency about them; sometimes she gets the feeling that people enjoy 
the chance to be away from their desks and so drag conventional meetings out for 
longer than is really necessary. 
The most 'important' people (in this case, heads of divisions, representatives from 
. , 
the legal department, press office and so on) stand near the centre of the room .. 
This is referred to as being "in the loop". Everyone else stands around the edge of 
the room, being "out of the loop" and simply listening to the proceedings. In 
reality, this means 7 or 8 people standing around a small table, which is covered 
by a large map showing the location of the infected premises, with the 
surveillance and protection zones shown as large, black circles. Everyone else is 
standing awkwardly in small clusters, or perching on the edge of desks. Few have 
brought pens and notebooks because they anticipate a short meeting where they 
will be able to quickly absorb the information, although some of the more junior 
staff, who are still learning the ropes, stand ready to make notes. In addition to the 
directive that speakers should be brief and to the point in their presentations, there 
is a set order of topics on which people are permitted to speak during the bird 
table: 
1. Update on current situation 
2. Epidemiology 
3. Data analysis and mapping 
4. Operations 
5. Vaccination 
6. Culling and disposal 
7. Disease control policy 
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8. Legal 
9. International and trade issues 
10. Animal welfare 
11. Science 
12. Rural 
13. Food chain 
14. Livestock products 
15. Wildlife species conservation - if necessary 
16. Human resources (Animal Health; Defra and others) 
17. Procurement and contracts 
18. Finance 
19. IT 
20. Web team 
" , 
21. Communications (press office; Customer Contact Unit; Animal Health) 
22. Devolved administrations 
23. UK Permanent Representation to the European Union (UKREP) 
24. Operational Partners (e.g. Health Protection Agency, Department for 
Communities and Local Government, Food Standards Agency) 
25. Industry representative 
26. Chief Executive of Animal Health 
27. Chief Veterinary Officer 
28. Minister (if present) 
29. Director of Joint Coordination Centre 
Lists like this one, with fixed procedures and protocols, contribute to the "battle 
rhythm" of a disease outbreak. There are certain meetings to be held and 
documents to be produced during every outbreak as a matter of course, creating 
routine and avoiding the confusion that was said to have prevailed in the 
Department during the 2001 FMD outbreak. At the bird table, the Stat"e Veterinary 
Service representatives outline what they know about the disease, how the culling 
has proceeded, and what the current state of play is. They themselves have got 
their information from the vets in Surrey, although they can now speak with more 
authority as there is more information coming in. Liz represents her division, 
outlining the policy situation and speaking briefly about the possibility of 
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derogation. The press office want to know what they should mention in their next 
press release; everyone agrees that they should stick to the concrete facts: culling 
has begun and a surveillance zone is in place, The possibility of derogation should 
not be mentioned unless it becomes a definite policy. There are perfunctory 
presentations by representatives from the IT and GIS mapping divisions but they 
have little to say. In a large outbreak, they might comment on the way in which 
Defra's website is being used by farmers or report on any difficulties in mapping 
the disease spread. Other people speak about animal welfare, legislation, 
international trade, but the whole meeting only lasts around ten minutes. Partly, 
this is because everyone feels there is little to say; but also the format is designed 
to keep the meetings brief. The senior staff are keen to emphasise that although it 
is a small outbreak at the moment, everybody must be vigilant and prepared. 
Some of the junior staff, who are peripheral to the disease management, seem to 
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be quite bored by the meetings which all say the same: we don't know much yet, . 
we'll have to wait and see. 
This particular bird table is for representatives of all Defra sections, but afterwards 
Liz goes back downstairs to her own division to hold another bird table, to brief 
everyone there (staff from farm health planning and other less related work areas) 
about the disease outbreak. She shouts across the office to get everyone's 
attention, and they walk across from their own areas to gather around Liz's desk 
while she repeats the most relevant parts of the information given out upstairs. 
When she has finished she retrieves her sandwiches from the fridge and eats them 
at her desk, replying to emails as she does so. Many of them are tasks which can 
be delegated to others; there is a parliamentary question which a couple of the 
Grade 7s can put together an answer for, and Liz forwards the email to them with 
some brief instructions as to the sort of information to include. Then it is off to yet 
another part of the building for a meeting with stakeholders. 
1.30pm: Stakeholder teleconference 
The stakeholder conference is being held in the Chief Veterinary Officer's private 
office. He is one of the few who still have their own rooms in the bUilding. The 
Chief Veterinary Officer is not at the meeting, but his office has a large table in 
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the comer that can be used when the other meeting rooms have been booked. This 
is a teleconference, held to brief stakeholders about the outbreak. The relevant 
stakeholders call a telephone number that has been emailed to them, and are 
connected to a "spider phone" on the table around which the Defra staff are 
sitting. Jonathon is there to chair the meeting, along with several other Grade 7s 
from the division who will be able to answer policy questions, and Brian from the 
veterinary division. Among those on the phones are representatives of the 
National Farmers Union, British Veterinary Association, Turkey Club, RSPCA, 
World Pheasant Association, and the Game Farmers Association. Of course, there 
are more stakeholders who could be included, but Jonathon does not want the 
meeting to go on for too long so he has decided to invite a select few. This group 
will easily disseminate information to the vast majority of the farming industry 
anyway. 
During the meeting, there are tensions between Defra and some of the 
stakeholders, particularly when representatives of groups with very narrow 
interests dominate the discussion. Jonathon, Liz's line manager, is irritated at the 
time that is being taken up when he could be back in the office dealing with the 
outbreak. However, as a senior member of the division, he has to be present at the 
teleconference. He has developed a way of closing down discussion with the 
stakeholders more rapidly than some of his junior colleagues, and is able to move 
the meeting on when some of the familiar gripes (about compensation, for 
example), are raised again. Jonathon wants the division to be more holistic and 
cross-cutting and finds it frustrating having to deal with questions from people 
who only represent a tiny minority group. Some of the stakeholders have been 
dealing with Defra for years, and have a strong understanding of how the 
department works and what is possible. Some of the newcomers are more 
argumentative and are always trying to push for more money, or less regulation, 
or some other thing that will be impossible to achieve. In Jonathon's view, 
arguments about compensation can take place at routine stakeholder consultation 
meetings. This is 'war-time': only important issues that relate to the disease 
outbreak should be talked about. 
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Walking back from the meeting, Jonathon and Liz chat about how the morning 
has gone. Jonathon feels uneasy about how the stakeholder teleconference went. 
Although everyone was civil, Jonathon complains to Liz that there were some 
stakeholders on the lines who had. not said anything, including some of the 
producers who might be affected if Defra allowed derogation. If it was a face-to-
face meeting, he could have sorted out any problems they had, and discussed the 
issue with them. Now he is uncertain about how they have reacted to the news of 
the outbreak. Although the division sometimes gets frustrated by the stakeholders 
making endless demands and putting them in a difficult position, it is also very 
important to maintain good relations with them. As they return to their area of the 
third floor, Jonathon asks Liz to ensure that the producers are involved in future 
meetings about the outbreak, to ensure they aren't alienated. Liz drops the papers 
from the teleconference on her desk, makes another drink then heads straight off 
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to the experts group meeting that is being held in the basement. Normally they get 
tea and coffee at the experts group meetings but because it has been called at such 
short notice there wasn't time to order any. 
2.30 pm: Expert Group meeting 
One of the most common mechanisms for obtaining advice is the expert group 
format, whereby an established group of scientists and veterinarians meet with 
policy-makers to discuss the scientific aspects of a disease or group of related 
diseases. The experts group meeting is held in the basement, in one of the big 
meeting rooms. It is another teleconference, chaired by the head of the veterinary 
division. The experts groups (there are different ones for all the main exotic 
diseases) aren't always teleconferences, but because this one has been called at 
short notice due to the disease outbreak, many people are unable to come in 
person. Many of the scientists are based in Surrey, and of course there are staff 
present at the site of the outbreak on the line. In addition, there are representatives 
of the devolved administrations who need to be kept informed even if it seems 
unlikely that their countries will be affected by the disease. For some of the 
scientists, especially those working at the Veterinary Laboratories Agency where 
the samples are being tested for diseases, it is more important that they stay at 
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their laboratories and oversee what is happening, than travel to London to be at 
the meeting in person. 
The group that has gathered for this meeting mainly comprises scientists and vets, 
but there are a few staff from the policy side here too. Although many of the 
policy staff want to sit in on the meetings, Liz is anxious that they don't crowd the 
scientists and derail the discussions. The role of the experts groups is to bring the 
relevant scientists together to discuss issues like vaccination, disease spread, 
animal welfare and so on. Their recommendations, in peace-time, are written up in 
a report that then goes to the policy group for discussion. If there are too many 
interruptions from policy people, there might as well not be a policy group at all, 
and the experts group meetings would go on forever. It can also be embarrassing 
when people who don't understand the science ask naIve questions. One of the 
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new grade 7s, Matthew, asked a question at an experts meeting last week and the 
scientists didn't make much of an attempt to explain the answer in layman's 
terms. Liz found the whole situation very awkward and wanted to tell Matthew to 
shut up, but he is still new and Liz hopes that he will learn for himself that it is 
unacceptable to fill the experts meeting with policy questions. Liz is here to sit in 
on the meeting and get up to speed with the scientific issues. She might not 
understand everything that is being discussed, but it means that she has a better 
overview of what is happening on the ground and what the potential problems are. 
If she needs to make a policy decision quickly, she might be able to draw on the 
knowledge gained from this meeting, rather than having to try and get hold of one 
of the scientists again to ask their advice. 
All attendees have received an agenda in advance, but it is very brief. Normally, 
the meetings are long, with many documents being circulated in advance. 
Members of the experts group will receive project updates, background 
information documents, and briefing papers. Today, there are no documents as the 
situation has arisen so quickly. The meeting was less organised than usual, and the 
issues discussed were quite random because it was an outbreak meeting. Susan, 
the Chair, begins by giving a brief update on the situation in Surrey. Then 
Charles, one ofDefra's in-house scientists, talks about the emerging epidemiology 
of the outbreak. He gets his information by telephoning staff at the site of the 
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outbreak, then models the way in which the disease appears to be spreading. This 
helps everyone to get a rough idea of how big the outbreak is going to be. Today, 
though, there is no evidence that the disease has spread beyond the one farm, so 
there is little to report. There is also a report about the surveillance and inspection 
visits that are being carried out. Technical issues were discussed like the ways in 
which the samples were being tested. For example, did the group think it would be 
ok to substitute one system of pooling the eggs used for testing for the usual 
system? The basic facts about Newcastle Disease (its epidemiology and so on) are 
not disputed within the scientific community, so the discussion tends more 
towards operational issues like testing and surveillance regimes. It is quite 
different when they are discussing potentially more dangerous diseases, like 
Avian Influenza, or emerging diseases such as Bluetongue. 
The group talk about the situation on the farm, getting eyewitness accounts from 
some local veterinary staff. The London-based staff are still heavily reliant on 
their Surrey colleagues and the atmosphere becomes a little strained when it is 
revealed that they do not have all of the information that the group in London 
required. There had been some confusion about the information the Surrey staff 
were supposed to collect, and it was unclear whether the culling figures they gave 
referred to the birds that had already been culled, or the birds that were waiting to 
be culled. Liz is getting increasingly worried as she will have to report to 
Jonathon later on the situation, and it wi1llook bad if she doesn't have the right 
information about the outbreak. A member of the legal team has come to ask for 
advice on enforcing a particular biosecurity measure - is it reasonable to expect 
the farmer to take certain steps, and can it be proven that this will actually prevent 
the disease from spreading? There are often complicated legal issues involved in a 
disease outbreak because although there is legislation in place to deal with poor 
biosecurity (for example, if Defra suspect the farmer in question hasn't disinfected 
his vehicles properly) there are always grey areas and the legal staff need to 
understand some of the scientific evidence before they can proceed. Although 
there is no likelihood of prosecution in this case, the legal team need to ensure 
they are up to speed because they might be called on to contribute to a press 
release or bird table at any time. 
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Simran, a higher executive officer, is taking notes at the meeting and afterwards 
will write these up as a short report to be sent to the policy staff. Before they are 
sent out, Simran will send a draft version to all the people who were present at the 
meeting, to make sure she has represented their views correctly. She does not 
have a scientific background, and it can be difficult to summarise a discussion 
when you don't know exactly what people are talking about! When the meeting is 
over, Liz goes back to her desk to finish off her day's work. It seems unlikely that 
the outbreak is going to spread beyond the one already infected farm, so now she 
has to decide how to prioritise tomorrow's work. She checks her calendar and sees 
that she has another two long meetings scheduled for tomorrow, meaning that she 
won't have much time to catch up on writing her report. She still has some 
briefing documents to read for those meetings, but Liz decides that if she prints 
them out to read on the train home this evening she can afford to spend the rest of 
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today working on the report instead. Ali comes over to ask what happened at the 
experts group meeting and Liz chats to him about it. Yes, the tests on the 
neighbouring farms are coming back negative. No, they thought derogation was a 
bad idea. Liz jokes about the number of hours she has spent in meetings today and 
Scott laughs too; still, it's better than peace-time when there are endless 
management meetings to go to instead. 
An administrative officer comes over to give Liz a phone message: someone from 
international trade called, and could Liz ring them back. Looking at the clock, Liz 
realises that with only twenty minutes before she leaves the office she is not going 
to be able to work on the report after all. She makes the phone call and notes 
down the details on a post-it note, before shutting down her computer. On the way 
to the lifts, she picks up her piles of briefing papers from the printer, then stands 
and waits for a lift to the ground floor. While she is waiting she chats with 
Matthew who is also leaving. She asks him how the new job is going. "Ok", he 
replies, but he still feels that he has a lot to learn about the technical details. He is 
thinking of postponing a stakeholder meeting until he has had time to do some 
more reading. Liz agrees, and anyway, a lot of the stakeholders are tied up with 
the disease outbreak at the moment. They reach the ground floor, swipe their 
identity cards to leave the building, and then separate. 
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Chapter Two 
Policy-Making and the Politics of Disease 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I told a story about working in Defra as seen through the 
eyes of a policy-maker. The vignette described an organization with a distinctive 
vocabulary, an uncertain and pressured working environment, and serious but 
ambiguous and changeable problems to deal with. At the same time, however, it 
shows a workplace that every office worker would recognise, with the regular 
artefacts (reports, emails, agendas) and regular structures (a hierarchy, seating 
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plans) of office life. This is one story I could tell about policy-making based on 
my observation of officials in Defra. In this chapter, I want to consider more 
conventional accounts of Defra: the Department's own official publications, and 
academic commentaries. The aim of the chapter is to build up a picture of what 
we know - or can find out about - Defra from these sources, and the different 
stories they have to tell about the Department and its policy-making process. The 
chapter demonstrates that while official documents seek to portray the Department 
as a forward-looking, lesson-learning, evidence-seeking organization, hostile 
academic accounts portray a Department chained to pressure groups, abusing 
scientific advice, and unable to change its rigid policy processes. I also want to 
argue that these accounts leave significant gaps in our understanding of policy-
making, which can only be filled with an alternative approach to policy analysis. 
Defra as disaster zone 
There is a significant body of literature on MAFFIDefra3 and the governance of 
animal disease, and it is almost universally condemnatory of the Department's 
handling of outbreaks. The three main topics of analysis are Bovine Spongiform 
3 MAFF was replaced by Defra in 200 l, but the structures and processes for dealing with animal 
disease remain largely the same. To avoid unwieldy acronyms, I use 'Defra' throughout, except 
where a point relates specifically to the pre-200l MAFF period. 
34 
Encephalopathy (BSE), bovine tuberculosis (bTB), and Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD). There is a smaller literature on Avian Influenza and food safety issues 
(such as e. coli 0157 and other human health risks with an animal disease 
component). BSE and bTB are endemic diseases (that is, they are always present 
among domestic animals or wildlife in the UK) while FMD is exotic (not usually 
present), and as such they are dealt with by different parts of Defra, but this 
distinction is rarely made in the literature and so I have included relevant articles 
on both endemic and exotic diseases in this chapter in order to understand 
perceptions of animal disease policy-making in the broadest sense. Before going 
into this literature in detail, it is necessary for me to set out exactly who and what 
I am examining in this thesis. Defra is a large department and I am only focusing 
on one part of it, the Exotic Disease Prevention and Control division. Defra's 
responsibilities span a variety of policy areas, including environmental protection, 
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rural development, marine and fisheries, farming and food production, wildlife 
biodiversity, sustainable development, and animal health and welfare. Defra states 
on its website that its Departmental priorities are to secure a healthy natural 
environment for us all and deal with environmental risks; promote a sustainable, 
low-carbon and resource-efficient economy; and ensure a thriving farming sector 
and a sustainable, healthy and secure food supply. In the field of animal health 
and welfare specifically, Defra has both its own policy commitments to protecting 
the nation's animals from disease and ensuring a continued food supply, as set out 
in the 'vision' of the 2004 Animal Health and Welfare Strategy. The vision 
describes the world of animal health and welfare that Defra wants to create by 
2014: 
• Animals in Great Britain kept for food, farming, sport, companionship, 
entertainment and in zoos are healthy and treated humanely 
• Our disease status is amongst the highest in the world, and we are able to 
trade our animals and animal products internationally 
• The costs of livestock health and welfare are appropriately balanced between 
industry and the taxpayer 
• All disease emergencies are dealt with swiftly and effectively using an agreed 
approach 
35 
• Consumers value the confidence they have in food produced safely from 
healthy animals that are well cared for. Consumers and retailers accept that 
higher standards of animal health and welfare are not cost free 
• Livestock keeping is part of a competitive British farming industry which 
succeeds by meeting the needs of consumers at home and abroad, producing 
food safely and to high standards of health and welfare 
(Defra 2004a p14) 
Defra also has statutory obligations imposed by the UK's membership of the 
European Union and the World Organization for Animal Health (OlE), which 
develops common standards for protecting animal health, classifies those diseases 
that must be reported by member states, and specifies methods of diagnosis and 
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treatment. There is a complex legal framework through which disease controls are 
enforced. The principal legislation governing the health of farm animals in 
England is the Animal Health Act 1981, but this is supplemented by some 175 
statutory instruments, the majority of which are made under the 1981 Act. This 
legal framework not only dictates which diseases must be dealt with by Defra but 
also determines when a slaughter policy is to be used in case of outbreaks . 
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Strupture of the department 
The structure of Defra is depicted in Figure 1. At the highest level the Department 
has Directorate Generals, and within these are a number of Directors, each with a 
different role. Each Director oversees several divisions, and within these divisions 
there are multiple teams and/or business areas. The way in which these different 
sections correspond makes can be better explained by relating them to the field of 
animal disease. At the time of the initial fieldwork,4 Defra was divided into seven 
Directorate Generals (DGs), each corresponding to an area of policy covered by 
the Department. The DG that deals with livestock diseases, in which I spent my 
4 In late 2006/early 2007 Defra instigated an initiative called Renew Defra, which led to some 
internal restructuring and re-naming of divisions but which did not affect the general operation of 
the Department. For the sake of consistency I have used the pre-Renew structure here as this was 
in place at the time of my fieldwork. The impact of the Renew Defra on policy-making is 
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period of participant observation, is the Animal Health and Welfare Directorate 
General. Within this are four Directors who each oversee one particular aspect of 
policy. One of these, the Animal Health Director, oversees six DivisionslUnits. Of 
these six, the Exotic Disease Prevention and Control division is the division that I 
am interested in. It deals with all exotic diseases: FMD, Avian Influenza and 
Bluetongue are the most well known but there is a list of 34 notifiable exotic 
diseases in total that t?e dtvision has statutory responsibility for controlling. 
The final level of organization is within the division itself, where staff are divided 
into teams. In the Exotic Disease Prevention and Control division there are six 
teams, covering biosecurity, disease prevention, disease preparedness, EU and 
'better regulation', Farm Health Planning, and responsibility sharing. Each team 
consists of middle-ranking officials, from Grade 7 down. The everyday work of 
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the Exotic Disease Prevention and Control division of Defra includes developing 
regulations about the keeping, moving and slaughtering of livestock; monitoring 
compliance with these regulations; ensuring that this regulation complies with EU 
regulations; updating secondary legislation relating to animal disease; prioritising 
work streams to ensure that funds are shared between, for example, surveillance 
programmes, border controls, education programmes for farmers, and scientific 
research; representing the UK position at EU-Ievel meetings about animal disease; 
responding to reports of disease and deciding when to impose/remove trade 
restrictions; deciding how much vaccine to order in case of an outbreak and 
ensuring that stocks are maintained; and producing information to go on the 
animal disease pages of Defra's website. 
As this summary demonstrates, although the division is small - at the time of my 
fieldwork it comprised two senior civil servants, around 30 'middle management' 
level officials (civil service grades 6 through to Executive Officer) and five 
administrative officers - it has heavy responsibilities. Not only is it responsible 
for protecting against diseases that cause significant animal health, human health, 
economic and trade problems, but it is also the division upon which the reputation 
of the entire Department seems to rest. Defra is, for many people, synonymous 
with the incompetent handling of disease outbreaks. This is an unfair assessment; 
the division actually deals with a lot of disease outbreaks very well - there are 
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many small outbreaks involving only one or two premises that are brought under 
control rapidly and never reach the public eye; and in cases'where the disease has 
spread out of control there are often many complicating and unpredictable factors 
at work (for example, in 2007 there were 689 notifications of suspected exotic 
disease, and disease was confirmed in 81 cases). 
Nevertheless, the Department as a whole is judged by its failings in the realm of 
animal disease. Defra has presided over a number of scandals and disasters 
including BSE, which endured for decades, destroyed trust in the Department, was 
scandalous in its excessive secrecy and misuse of science, and which had serious 
human health implications. The 2001 FMD outbreak, a turning point for MAFF 
leading to its downfall, was hugely expensive, criticised by the public and widely 
acknowledged to be mishandled. The Department has also been responsible for 
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Bovine TB, an apparently intractable policy problem, with highly contested 
scientific evidence, political interference and implications of pressure group 
dealings behind the scenes, and for other food scares such as salmonella, listeria 
and e. coli. As well as long-standing criticisms ofDefra's preparedness and ability 
to deal with outbreaks, and their determination to pursue slaughter policies instead 
of alternative strategies, critical attention has recently been turning to the financial 
implications of disease outbreaks. This was precipitated by the enormous cost of 
the 2001 FMD outbreak, which ran to £8 billion, during which Defra had to deal 
with overcharging by contractors, legal fees from payment disputes and farmers 
contesting the controversial culling policy, and occasionally exaggerated 
compensation claims from affected producers. Even in the absence of such major 
disease outbreaks, spending on animal disease is very high. In 2007-08 Defra 
spent £381 million on animal health and welfare, of which dealing with bovine 
tuberculosis alone cost £77 million and exotic disease outbreaks a further £33 
million (National Audit Office (NAO) 2009). A 2008 National Audit Office report 
questioned Defra's financial management, citing animal disease outbreaks as one 
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of the reasons why the Department continually overspent on its budget, while a 
.' 
more recent report highlighted that Defra's continued diversion of resources 
towards tackling exotic disease is leading to shortfalls in other important areas 
such as animal welfare (NAO 2009). 
Because of its history of failure over animal disease, Defra has a reputation among 
politicians and other government departments for being incompetent and an 
albatross to the careers of ministers. Many Ministers found their political careers 
marred as a result of their involvement in a MAFF scandal, including, in the case 
of BSE, Minister John Gummer and his burger-eating daughter, and Permanent 
Secretary Richard Packer (who later claimed that he was made a scapegoat over 
BSE when forced out of his job in 2000), and later Nick Brown for his 
incompetence during the FMD outbreak. As a consequence, Defra has become 
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something of an omen of bad luck; in his recent memoirs an ex-Minister, Lord 
Donoughue, recalls his horror at being posted to "that notorious ministry, from 
which no minister in recent history had emerged undamaged" (cited in Ward and 
Lowe 2007 p413). Another Labour advisor told The Guardian (8 April, 2001) that 
MAFF 'was a secretive, depressed place, very suspicious of change, very 
defensive' [ ... ] and that the Government has 'learned the hard way that the 
Department which gave us BSE is the last organization you want on your side in a 
crisis' (McConnell and Stark 2002a p42). As Peter Hennessy observes in his 
survey of Whitehall, this attitude towards MAFF is nothing new. He writes that 
"The Ministry of Agriculture shows that if you are a government department, you 
cannot win. It has presided for forty years over the most consistent and 
conspicuous success story in British industry and yet it is surrounded by carping 
and controversy" (Hennessy 1990 p444). This is indeed the irony ofMAFF that at 
the same time as it has secured high levels of productivity, a stable industry and a 
generally very high standing in disease control terms, it continues to be notorious, 
for scandal and disaster. 
A Ministry for Industry 
One of the reasons why MAFF was perceived as a failure and has acquired such a 
bad reputation is because of its close links with certain pressure groups. One of 
40 
the prevailing narratives in the academic literature is that of the Ministry being 
heavily influenced by pressure groups to the neglect of its /wider interests and 
responsibilities. MAFF had traditionally been thought of (and considered itself) as 
a ministry for industry, and consequently it had a very close relationship with the 
main producer pressure group, the National Farmers Union (NFU). MAFF and its 
pressure groups have historically exemplified theorists' notions of a closed policy 
community that has even bordered on corporatism (e.g. Grant 1983; Cox et al 
1986) because the Ministry and the pressure group shared the same goals and are 
working towards the same ends. The NFU has long had a very important role in 
policy-making and has strongly influenced decisions taken in MAFF. Because the 
goals of agricultural policy were settled a long time ago and supported by a 
variety of post-war legislation which secured land rights for farmers (1948 
Agricultural Holdings Act), land for agricultural use (1947 Town and Country 
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Planning Act), and guaranteed financial stability in return for increasing outputs 
(1947 Agriculture Act), they were for a long time politically uncontroversial. 
Consequently, agriculture policy became centred on technical debates where 
groups like the NFU claimed the greatest expertise. From the outset, groups that 
disagreed with agriculture policy were excluded from the decision-making 
process, creating an image of consensus that it was easy for the policy community 
to maintain, and difficult for dissenters to contradict (Smith 1993 pl04). With a 
near monopoly of membership among the farming pressure groups, the NFU had 
a significant resource base at its disposal and was able to further strengthen its 
arguments by claims to be representative of the whole industry. This resource 
base also gave the NFU a great advantage over the (initially) smaller and less 
organised environmental groups. Their inability to concentrate their efforts on a 
single issue for a long period of time meant that farmers needed only to resist 
pressure for a finite period before the pressure group, and media, spotlights turned . 
elsewhere. In order to facilitate this process, the NFU took the initiative over 
environmental and price support policies by allowing small concessions and by 
themselves becoming the promoters of limited agri-environment schemes. 
Consequently the Government had no reason to allow new groups into the policy 
community (Smith 1990 p193; Winter 1996 pp223-224). While many 
commentators have criticised the close relationship it has apparently persisted 
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despite the challenges of scandals, environmentalism and economic restructuring 
in agriculture. 
The most important consequence ofthis.close relationship between MAFF and the 
farming industry pressure groups has been the tendency of policy to focus on 
agriculture to the exclusion of all other interests. The most damaging cases have 
been neglect of consumer and human health interests. Until the creation of the 
Food Standards Agency in 2000, MAFF had sole responsibility for regulating the 
food production industry, and had also historically played an important role in 
promoting agriculture (which had given the farming pressure groups their 
dominant roles in policy making). The tension between these two roles became 
apparent when animal diseases with human health impacts arose, where the 
Ministry had to choose between protecting the economic interests of the farming 
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industry either by downplaying the risk to avoid consumer panic; making the 
regulations on industry as minimal as possible; or compensating affected 
producers. 
An early example of the pressures faced by MAFF was the Salmonella outbreakS 
in 1988. Salmonella is a bacterium that can be found in poultry meat and eggs, 
and which can cause serious illness when contaminated poultry products are not 
thoroughly cooked. In the Salmonella episode, Health Minister Edwina Currie 
made a public statement warning that Salmonella had become endemic in the 
UK's chicken population, a statement which she later insisted was based on the 
information given to her by experts (Currie 2003 pp94-97). The actual risk to 
human health was contentious (because although the elderly, pregnant women and 
people with existing illnesses are at risk of serious illness from salmonella, other 
groups are not), and a dispute ensued between Currie and MAFF, who had been 
working on a voluntary code of practice with farmers for some time. Egg . 
producers feared a consumer backlash and the NFU encouraged its members to 
sue Currie over her statement if they suffered losses as a result. Eventually Currie 
was forced to resign, and a compensation scheme was introduced, which would 
S This incident was not strictly an 'outbreak' of Salmonella as it is endemic in the UK, but the 
political crisis came about because of a rapid increase in the number infected chickens and eggs 
and of cases of Salmonella enteritidis. See Smith (1991) pp240-241. 
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seem to suggest that the NFU remained a powerful force in politics. For many 
years, producer groups had been able to put the blame for the transmission of 
food-borne diseases on the consumer, by arguing that properly prepared and 
cooked food posed negligible health risks. The view of the policy community was 
that Salmonella in chickens was unavoidable, so the onus was on consumers to 
prevent food poisoning. MAFF had identified Salmonella as a problem in 1981 
but rejected the link between eggs and the disease (Smith 2004 p321). The 
Government did not choose to destroy flocks with Salmonella or prevent the 
recycling of slaughterhouse waste where infected birds might be returned to the 
food chain (Smith 1991 p241) but focused on a voluntary code of practice which 
would not disrupt the industry, which had been in development for months due to 
MAFF's 'softly softly' approach (Currie 2003). 
Smith (1991) argued that this episode could be seen as evidence that the NFU was 
actually losing power, because previously they would have been able to keep such 
an issue off the political agenda and out of the public eye whereas in this instance, 
although the NFU remained dominant, other pressure groups (particularly 
consumer groups) actually had an input into policy-making. When the issue was 
exposed, and received widespread media attention, it was significant because 
"The policy community which had previously managed to avoid conflict was now 
subject to widespread political debate. Food poisoning was transformed from an 
issue of a technical nature and of individual hygiene to one of central political 
importance" (Smith 1991 p244). Not only did the NFU seem to have lost its 
influence, but MAFF also could not presume to control issues that had an impact 
on sectors other than agriculture. Rather than the single decision-making centre 
which had previously existed, "the Ministries of Health and Agriculture took 
opposing views and tried to define new responsibilities. In supporting their own 
positions they opened the policy community further by bringing in new groups. 
and politicising to a greater degree the issue of food" (Smith 1991 p251). A study 
by Maloney et al in 1994 supports the trend identified by Smith. In their survey of 
the number of pressure groups involved in the formation of agriculture policy they 
found that in 1992, relatively soon after the legitimacy crisis of the agriculture 
policy community sparked by the health scares of Salmonella and the emerging 
BSE crisis, as many as 150 groups were involved in routine consultation with 
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MAFF, including 56 envirorunental and consumer groups, 47 agricultural groups 
and 14 industrial organizations and the once-closed policy -community had come 
to resemble a more open 'issue network' (Maloney et al1994 p21). This widening 
of participation in decision-making was seen as recognition that "the department 
has lost any stomach it ever had to defend agriculture in an unreserved manner" 
(Jordan et al1994 p506). 
In the longer term, this view of a wider issue network around agricultural issues 
seems unfounded. Other analysts see the growth of the number of pressure groups 
involved in a more cynical light, suggesting that what appears to be meaningful 
consultation is a simple paper exercise to make it seem that a greater number of 
parties are involved in policy-making. Pressure groups, far from enjoying their 
close relationship with goverrunent, are complaining of 'consultationitis' and 
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seeking to withdraw from what is cynically perceived to be Defra's attempt to 
superficially engage with different parties in order to appear concerned with all 
sides of the policy debates (Barling and Lang 2003). Following the outbreaks of 
BSE and FMD, Smith's (1991, 2004) view that a small circle of influential 
pressure groups has ceased to exist has been undermined, particularly because in 
both cases there is evidence to suggest that policy disasters occurred due to 
MAFF's desire to appease the farming lobby. As was demonstrated by the 
Salmonella episode, MAFF had a tendency to abdicate some of its regulatory 
responsibilities, particularly in cases where the blame could be assigned to 
consumers, who had few well-organised pressure groups and little presence in the 
policy community. BSE was an animal disease with human health implications 
but, unlike Salmonella, responsibility for dealing with it could not be passed on to 
consumers. It was the duty of goverrunent and industry to manage the disease and 
regulate food production and the failure of MAFF and the farming industry to do 
this, as many have argued, directly led to an epidemic. 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a neurological disease of cattle that 
was first discovered by pathologists at MAFF's Central Veterinary Laboratory in 
1986.6 It is a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE), which are 
6 For a more detailed account of the BSE crisis, see Appendix One. 
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diseases transmitted by abnormal forms of protein known as prions and are 
untreatable, invariably fatal and poorly understood. Research is difficult and 
expensive because it is not possible to test for the disease before clinical 
symptoms show (van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005 p72). The use of 
commercial cattle feed was the only factor common to all the affected farms, and 
scientists concluded that feed prepared with rendered slaughterhouse waste 
contaminated with a TSE agent was the source of the disease. Recycling abattoir 
waste from sheep and cattle to produce protein-rich feed was commonplace at this 
time. In 1988, as the number of reported cases continued to rise, a compulsory 
slaughter programme was introduced for infected animals which paid 
compensation to affected farmers and a ban was imposed on the use of ruminant-
derived protein in animal feed. Despite these measures the number of confirmed 
cases increased, suspected to be due in part to the 'grace period' given for retailers 
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and farmers to use up existing feed stocks, and by the end of 1990, 24,396 cases 
of BSE had been confirmed. The Government embarked on a campaign of 
reassurance, with John Gummer MP infamously feeding his daughter a beef 
burger in a misguided PR stunt. 
Throughout the early 1990s public fears of the health implications grew, along 
with a suspicion that they were being kept in the dark about the seriousness of the 
disease. A turning point for policy makers came in 1993 when a 13-year-old girl 
was diagnosed with Creuzfeld-Jakob Disease (CJD), a TSE that is usually 
confined to older adults. By 1995 there were 14 suspected cases including young 
people and farmers whose herds had suffered BSE. On the 20 March 1996 the 
Government's expert group, the Spongiform Encepalopathy Advisory Committee 
(SEAC) made a statement that in their opinion: "on current data and in the 
absence of any credible alternative the most likely explanation at present is that 
these cases [ofvCJD] are linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of the 
ban on specified bovine offals in 1989. This is a cause of great concern" 
(Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee 1996). The Government 
announced its intention to adopt further precautionary measures in accordance 
with SEAC's advice: carcasses from cattle aged over 30 months must be de-boned 
and the feeding of mammalian meat and bone meal (MBM) to all farm animals 
would be banned. Within two weeks, however, public pressure was so great that 
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these measures were replaced with a total ban on cattle over the age of 30 months 
being used for human food or animal feed. ./ 
One of the most frequently made observations about the BSE crisis was that the 
Government felt its desire to promote agriculture more strongly than its duty to 
protect consumer health (see for example Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2003). 
The point at which MAFF realised that BSE had human health implications is a 
contested one. It has been argued strenuously by the Permanent Secretary at the 
time, Richard Packer (2006 pp34-38) that it was natural for the Department to 
assume that the disease was restricted to livestock because of its similarity to 
scrapie, a similar TSE which has never jumped the species barrier, and for there to 
be a delay in informing the rest of government and the public about the disease. 
There is ongoing debate over the extent to which MAFF policy makers 
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deliberately withheld information on the disease from the Department of Health in 
order to avoid calls for greater action on the human health risks (see for example 
Miller (1999) for the argument that MAFF tried to sideline human health related 
research). For the Department's critics, however, too little was done to avoid 
catastrophe because MAFF was preoccupied with not disturbing agricultural 
markets. As Millstone and Van Zwanenberg (2007) argue, because of MAFF's 
commitment to reducing the burden of regulation and avoiding consumer panic 
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that would disrupt production and sales, 
MAFF adopted a strategy which, in effect, entailed painting itself 
into a comer. To avoid imposing regulatory measures for which 
conclusive scientific evidence could not be provided, and to try to 
maintain consumer confidence both at home and in export markets, 
MAFF policy-makers (Le., ministers and senior officials), with the 
whole-hearted support of the Prime Minister, adopted a policy of 
asserting that, while BSE was pathogenic to cattle, there were no 
risks whatsoever to human consumers; and that the assertion that 
there were no risks was based on unproblematically sound science. 
That strategy was extremely problematic, since any recognition of 
significant uncertainties or relevant new findings risked 
undermining the entire policy narrative. 
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The NFU and other industry groups were inevitably resistant to increasing the 
amount of regulation on their operations as this affected their profitability. With 
BSE there was an added dimension that increasing government regulation would 
give the impression that beef was unsafe to eat, which would prompt a fall in 
consumer confidence. Many examples have been given of the ways in which BSE 
policy was dictated by sensitivity to the economic fortunes of the farming 
industry, including the manipulation of scientific advisory committees (of which 
more later; see Miller 1999, Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005), the rejection 
of advice which would lead to consumer health scares (Greer 1999) and pressure 
on the Cabinet to favour industry-friendly precautionary measures (Gerodimos 
2004). Under the Conservative government of the 1980s, which was also reluctant 
to introduce more red tape for private businesses, this attitude was received 
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without difficulty. Although there were developments in food regulation and 
safety during the 1970s and 1980s they were, as former MAFF civil servant 
Michael Franklin argues, ' ... side shows. The heart of the Ministry lay in the 
Agriculture Act and the concerns of the farmers' (Franklin 1994 p4). Likewise, 
when the BSE Inquiry published its report, it concluded that the disease developed 
into an epidemic 'as a consequence of an intensive farming practice ... [which], 
unchallenged over decades, proved a recipe for disaster' (Phillips et al 2000 
pxvii). 
Consumer trust in MAFF was extremely diminished following the BSE scandal, 
and the creation of the Food Standards Agency in 2000 was effectively a means 
for the government to indicate that MAFF could no longer be trusted to safeguard 
consumer interests. While the success of the FSA in meeting this expectation is 
debatable (see for example Schofield and Shaoul (2000) and Barling and Lang 
(2003) for criticisms of the FSA and allegations that industry protection continues, 
and Rothstein (2004) on industry lobbying of the FSA) it has been a visible 
guardian of human health concerns. As the FMD outbreak just one year later 
demonstrated however, MAFF still defined animal disease as a narrow 
agricultural problem, neglecting wider interests and apparently being heavily 
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influenced by the NFU. 7 In February 2001 a severe outbreak ofFMD began in the 
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UK, on a scale for which the Government was woefully'underprepared. Slow 
initial detection of the disease, the practice of transporting livestock long 
distances, and unfavourable weather conditions led to cases of the disease rapidly 
outstripping MAFF's ability to diagnose and deal with them. After a month of 
increasing incidence rates the Prime Minister intervened, creating a Cabinet 
Office Briefing Room to oversee the handling of the outbreak. At the same time, a 
team of epidemiological modellers demonstrated a need to drastically reduce the 
time between report and slaughter. The army was brought in to manage the higher 
rate of slaughter and disposal required. At the height of the cull in April, around 
100,000 animals were being killed daily. Slaughter on this scale provoked 
widespread opposition and public misgivings that led to questioning of the disease 
control strategy. Hastily constructed burial pits began 'weeping' into water 
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supplies, and animal corpses had to be exhumed. Horrific tales - of incompetent 
slaughtermen, live animals crawling out of burial pits, and wagons transporting 
corpses leaking blood onto roads - abounded in the media. What had begun as a 
crisis for farmers soon escalated into a crisis which cut across many economic 
sectors, as tourist numbers fell and rural businesses suffered. The direct economic 
effects of FMD in the years 2001-2005 were estimated at a £355 million loss to 
the agricultural sector, compared with a loss of £2180 million to tourism 
(DefraJDepartment for Culture, Media and Sport 2002 para.16). 
The NFU was a key player in one of the most controversial policies of the 
outbreak, the blanket closure of countryside footpaths that took place at the 
beginning of the outbreak. In line with the 1983 Foot and Mouth Disease Order, 
any footpaths within a controlled area could be closed for disease management 
purposes. In 2001, the whole of Great Britain was designated a controlled area in 
an unprecedented move, and an amendment was made to the Order enabling local 
authorities to blanket close all footpaths under their jurisdiction. Formal guidance 
from MAFF stated that closures should only take place where there was a real risk 
of disease spread, but in practice many footpaths were closed unnecessarily by 
local authorities who thought they were doing the right thing in trying to prevent 
7 A more detailed discussion of the 2001 FMD outbreak can be found in Appendix Two. 
48 
disease spread by the only means at their disposal (McConnell and Stark 2002b 
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p674). The impact on the rural economy was apparently unforeseen but the effects 
of discouraging tourists and other visitors from the countryside had catastrophic 
effects on rural businesses. The losses from the rural economy eventually became 
far greater than the direct losses to agriculture as what was initially viewed an 
animal disease problem became a rural economy crisis (Ward et al 2004 p299). 
Speaking later about the footpath closures, then agriculture minister Nick Brown 
admitted that pressure from farmers had been an important influence on the 
decision to press for blanket closures. Another minister, Elliot Morley, added that 
during the crisis "the NFU had almost open door access - much more so than was 
the case with any other organization with any other Department" (cited in Ward et 
al 2004 p297). 
The NFU's success lay not in the size of their membership base or monopoly over 
consultation, but in their ability to frame policy problems from the outset in such a 
way that farming interests would be MAFF's primary concern. Ward et al have 
termed this process of problem definition "policy framing", which "involves the 
selective use of knowledge and information about a problem and the causal 
relationships surrounding it, to give it meaning and render it manageable" (Ward 
et al 2004 p92; and see Hindmoor 2009 for a similar argument about FMD 
vaccination policy). In the BSE crisis, this had happened almost unconsciously, as 
the disease was seen purely in animal health terms for the first decade after its 
discovery, and control was therefore geared towards minimising impacts to the 
agriculture sector rather than concentrating on the risk to human health. As 
Oosterveer (2002 p218) points out, BSE can be seen in two separate phases: as an 
animal health problem from 1985 to 1996, and as a human health problem from 
1996 onwards. During the FMD crisis, Ward et al (2004) argue that the NFU 
actively encouraged the blinkered approach to the disease that avoided 
consideration of wider economic and societal implications. 
FMD was problematized as a concern for MAFF and vets only, and the public 
were portrayed as potentially dangerous agents who would "unwittingly" spread 
the disease through their lack of understanding of the problem. MAFF styled 
themselves as the defenders of agriculture by doing all they could to prevent the 
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disease spreading and consequently "all other actors in play are reduced to the 
status of intermediaries who either aid MAFF in the eradication, or aid the disease 
in its spread" (Donaldson et al 2002 p206). Even those working in rural 
businesses were treated as somehow separate from farmers, and therefore 
unaffected by the problem ofFMD, as Ward et al (2004 p297) explain: 
Ministers had publicly acknowledged farmers' financial plight, but 
had been at pains to refute that this had consequences beyond 
farming. Only two months before the FMD outbreak, the Prime 
Minister headed a week of government campaigning on rural 
issues that proclaimed that the nonfarming rural economy was 
thriving despite farming's evident difficulties. This in effect 
reiterated a long-implicit framing of policy that the development of 
the wider rural economy was essentially detached from, but an 
effective antidote to, the fluctuating fortunes of agriculture. 
The government failed to see that agriculture and the rural economy are 
essentially interrelated and that they cannot function effectively when treated as 
separate entities by policy-makers. The crisis caused by the footpath closures 
occurred because the government failed to see that people are actors in multiple 
networks - by removing tourists from the countryside they were eliminated from 
potentially spreading the disease, but they were also removed from tourism/rural 
economy networks of which they were also part (Donaldson et al2002 p207). 
The analysis of policy-making during the BSE and FMD outbreaks seems to 
confirm the view that industry-related pressure groups have a significant influence 
over policy-making, often to the detriment of other affected parties. I have 
described how pressure groups operate at various stages of the policy process, . 
from attempting to place issues on the government's agenda at the problem-
framing stage, to influencing the mechanisms of implementation once a policy has 
been formulated. The use of scientific advice has suffered as a result of this 
pressure group interference, both deliberately and as an unintended consequence 
of the Ministry's desire to pursue particular courses of action. As described above, 
there have been allegations that industry groups indirectly influenced the use of 
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scientific expertise over BSE by persuading government that protecting food 
,. 
production would be jeopardised by the strict precautions advocated by scientists, 
thus politicising the decision about how much risk to human health was 
acceptable. Over the issue of bovine tuberculosis, where scientific advice 
constitutes an important branch of the policy-making process thanks to a highly 
publicised research campaign, industry groups have been strenuous in resisting 
the scientists' recommendations and questioning the validity of their findings. Just 
as the Food Standards Agency was created as a (visible and trust-restoring) means 
of taking responsibility for consumer affairs and human health protection away 
from MAFF, so there was also a response to the mounting criticisms of the 
Ministry's use of science: evidence-based policy-making. 
Evidence-based policy and the politicisation of expertise 
Evidence-based policy (EBP) is commonly traced back to the 1999 White Paper 
Modernising Government that addressed the traditional reliance on generalist 
administrative skills and bureaucratic operational procedures. The Paper argued 
that "government must be willing constantly to re-evaluate what it is doing so as 
to produce policies that really deal with problems; that are forward-looking and 
shaped by evidence rather than a response to short term pressures; that tackle 
causes not symptoms; that are measured by results not activity; that are flexible 
and innovative rather than closed and bureaucratic; and that promote compliance 
rather than avoidance or fraud" (Cabinet Office 1999 pIS). Government 
demanded "more new ideas, more willingness to question inherited ways of doing 
things, better use of evidence and research in policy-making and better focus on 
policies that will deliver long term goals" (Cabinet Office 1999). The Cabinet 
Office define evidence as "Expert knowledge; published research; existing 
statistics; stakeholder consultations; previous policy evaluations; the·· Internet; 
outcomes from consultations; co stings of policy options; output from economic 
and statistical modelling" (Strategic Policy Making Team 1999). Although 
evidence-based policy-making was implemented across government, its derivation 
from the disasters of MAFF were' clear: as one commentator suggested, although 
the impact of BSE on New Labour's thinking should not be overestimated, it is 
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reasonable to concur with Alan Greer that Modernising Government "could have 
been written with BSE in mind" (1999 p613). The BSE episode is also cited in the 
Performance and Innovation Unit report, Better Policy Delivery and Design 
(Mulgan and Lee 2001) and the National Audit Office report, Getting the 
Evidence (2003), as a paradigm of policy failure. 
EBP is frequently expressed as a model of policy-making whereby information is 
sought to answer policy problems in an iterative process of question setting and 
evidence-gathering. This is Defra's interpretation: 
(Defra 2003 p6) 



























.. . reco<jnislng that 
the process Is Iteratve 
MAFF, and now Defra, have embraced the EBP movement and constantly cite the 
model of policy-making in their Departmental publications. In recent years, Defra 
has focussed its attention on the amount of scientific research it commissions and 
uses, which has been reflected in the number of reports and publications which 
have appeared on this topic. These include "Assuring the Quality of Defra 
Research" (Risk Solutions 2002), "Delivering the Evidence: Defra's Science and 
Innovation Strategy 2003-06" (Defra 2003), "Evidence and Innovation: Defra's 
needs from the sciences over the next 10 years" (Defra 2004b ), "The 
Development and Use of Scientific Advice in Defra" (Taig, 2004), "Science 
Meets Policy 2005: Next Steps for an Effective Science-Policy Interface" (Defra 
2006d) and "Our approach to evidence and innovation" (Defra 2006c). Defra has 
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frequently boasted of the amount of money spent on scientific research, implicitly 
suggesting that more research equals better policy. It is/estimated that Defra 
spends around £300m annually on research, monitoring and surveillance 
activities, employs 2500 scientific staff and has around thirty direct science 
advisory bodies (Office of Science and Innovation (OSI) 2006 p54). 
Underpinning this activity are Defra's principles for commissioning science for 
policy, in which the Department aims to ensure that: 
• We are carrying out the right scientific activities to underpin current and 
future policy needs and to anticipate emerging risks and opportunities. 
• The scientific advice we obtain, and the science activities supporting it, is 
of a high quality. 
• We have access to the right expertise and skills to procure and interpret 
scientific information, and that scientific advice is used appropriately in 
the policy-making process. 
• Defra science is open and transparent, and its aims and results are 
effectively communicated. 
(Defra 2007a) 
But what is it that the Department hopes to gain by commissioning such a large 
volume of scientific research? There are two complementary answers to this 
question. The first is that government officials seek objective, impartial advice 
that they can use to support their arguments and, in doing so, put themselves 
beyond reproach. In short, they want to capitalise on the public perception of 
science as an apolitical form of knowledge. The second is that they see scientific 
research as providing certainty. Uncertainty is very difficult to accommodate in 
contemporary policy-making, where decisions are scrutinised by Parliament, the 
media, and stakeholders, and uncertainty is taken as a sign of weakness. EBP is 
not so much a means of making policy but an ethos of how policy should be 
made, based on the idea that if only the correct evidence can be obtained, then 
objective and 'correct' decisions _ will flow naturally from it. As I shall argue, 
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however, it is this quest for objectivity and certainty that introduces new 
controversies and problems into the policy-making process.-----
The search for scientific objectivity 
It has been suggested that owing to its origins in medicine, EBP shares some of 
the methodological assumptions associated with this field; policy-making is a 
diagnostic task, and policy-makers seek information on the efficacy of different 
"treatments" for the problems they identify (Pawson 2002). The approach 
implicitly accepts that objective information (that is, free from the biases of 
political agendas) is readily accessible through observation, if only the right 
questions are asked (Townley 2002). This creates an impression of objectivity; 
ministers become 'experts' through the process of data gathering. The transfer of 
. I 
functions to independent bodies (whether Non-Departmental Public Bodies or ad 
hoc advisory groups) has a similar effect, removing issues from the political 
domain and placing them in the hands of visibly independent experts (Flinders 
2004). Not only does depoliticisation bring the advantage of shielding the 
government from the consequences of unpopular policies, it also "seeks to change 
market expectations regarding the effectiveness and credibility of policy-making" 
(Burnham 2001 p 129). Government must appear competent in order to win 
market confidence, building political credit that will allow them to pursue other 
less popular policies. The legitimacy of a policy is, in effect, judged by the 
process of decision-making as well as any tangible outcomes. 
Policy-makers look to scientific expertise as a 'magic bullet' not only because it 
depoliticises their decisions but because it offers certainty in complex situations 
and hence places them beyond reproach from their critics. Hinchliffe (2001) 
argues that Defra is keen to fund and use scientific research becaus~ policy-
makers take the view that science is an explanatory tool that can help them to 
describe and understand nature. They assume that although there may be different 
perceptions of natural risks, in time "a consensus and or closure on the problem 
under consideration is possible. In holding up the possibility of an object-centred 
agreement, uncertainty is reduced to being largely a problem of making accurate 
representations" (Hinchliffe 2001 p 186). As science is a means for policy-makers 
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to understand the natural world, the logical extension of this VIew is that 
commissioning more research will lead to better understanding and, eventually, 
perfect knowledge of the natural environment. Greater knowledge and 
understanding leads to greater certainty. The consequences of such a position 
were seen in the BSE crisis, which Hinchliffe argues was caused by policy-
makers' failure to appreciate the indeterminate and contested nature of the 
disease. As a consequence of their tendency to treat nature as fixed, "there is little 
or no consideration of the extent to which nature can be known. Instead, the task 
of government and of environmental policy-makers seems only to make sure that 
the best representation of nature is made available at the time of making a 
decision (with any failure to do so being a result of underdeveloped science or of 
political failings). Once represented, the immutable and incontestable character of 
a natural entity will form the basis for a consensual approach to decision-making" 
• I 
(Hinchliffe 2001 pp182-183). 
As a consequence of policy-makers' desire for objective evidence, evidence 
produced by the natural and physical sciences is favoured above all other forms of 
knowledge. Busch et al argue that "One of the dominant features of modem 
scientific practice is the tendency to think of science as a special human 
enterprise, governed by standards that are essentially different from other, 
ordinary approaches to knowledge and problem solving. These standards set 
scientific enquiry apart from other enterprises by virtue of being clear, generally 
well-formulated, rigorous, and fundamentally rational" (Busch et al 1992 p34). 
The preference for certain forms of expertise has been observed by critics of 
evidence-based policy. In the field of healthcare, for example, a "hierarchy of 
evidence" exists which places randomised experimentation at the apex of 
desirability and observational evidence at the bottom (Davies and Nutley 2002 
pp4-5). The desire for science as a means of reducing uncertainty and enabling 
better policy choices, has led not only to more funding for science, but also for 
more policy problems to be brought under the remit of scientific inquiry. Wilson 
and Hegland (2005), in their study of scientists working on the Common Fisheries 
Policy, described pressure on scientists to "inflate the science boundary", meaning 
to expand the range of issues that can be legitimately resolved through scientific 
findings. Scientists, they found, "are increasingly being asked to deal with 
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problems and concepts more directly suited to the social sciences" rather than 
simply assessing fish stocks' biological condition (Wilson and Hegland 2005 
p.iv). Yet, while scientists are being asked to consider political, economic and 
sociological questions as part of their research, those more nonnally associated 
with the study of these issues - social scientists - continue to be excluded from 
Defra's advisory process. The Science Advisory Council (SAC) has been 
extremely critical of Defra's attitude towards social science, claiming that policy-
makers see 'it only as a means of gauging public opinion or making scientific 
findings intelligible to other audiences. They tenn this post-hoc use of social 
science expertise "end of pipe", meaning that it is an optional add-on when the 
natural science research has been completed (Science Advisory Council 2006 
pll). 
The role for social science is virtually non-existent; the only exception being 
statistical analysis, because of its similarity in methods and results to the natural 
sciences. Murdoch and Ward (1997) see the initiation of the farm management 
survey in the 1930s as an historical attempt by the British government to make the 
agriculture sector 'visible' to policy-makers. By defining land units by their 
economic output policy-makers were able to pronounce which holdings were and 
were not "farms", and the data was later used to implement a national 
comprehensive agricultural policy. Making fanns objectively measurable entities 
enabled the government to make policies for a sector that they themselves had 
created. Likewise, as they portrayed agriculture in tenns of a "national farm" a 
sense of collective identity was created and fanners were "increasingly 
incorporated into the prevailing mode of governmentality" which focused on 
"aggregate national output of key commodities as the crucial 'bottom line'" 
(Murdoch and Ward 1997 pp309, 316). Enticott (2001) takes a similar line in his 
study of a contemporary problem, bovine tuberculosis, arguing that the. 
government preferred to discuss the issue in numerical tenns because it enabled 
them to describe the situation despite inherent uncertainty about the disease. A 
statistical approach meant that policy could be based on the probability of badgers 
passing the disease to cows, regardless of the fact that there was very little 
scientific understanding of how such a transmission could occur. 
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However, even within the natural sciences, some disciplines and branches claim 
to be more objective than others, with frequent disputes over whether objective 
but detached knowledge is more useful than applied - and applicable - research. 
Bickerstaff and Simmons (2004) have looked at the rise of epidemiological 
modelling and the conflict it causes with veterinarians. As the recommendations 
made by the two groups frequently differ, claims about objectivity have 
increasingly been used to justify their positions. During the Foot and Mouth 
outbreak, one modeller, Professor Roy Anderson, criticised vets for resisting the 
contiguous cull policy (which was justified by epidemiological modelling they 
had carried out) for "basing their stance on personal opinion rather than hard 
scientific assessment", which he characterised as a "cultural difference" between 
the two groups. In his view, the role for veterinarians was in policy 
implementation rather than policy formation, and they were portrayed as being 
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"too close" to farmers and their industry. Epidemiological modellers, on the other 
hand, had "cultural distance" which gave them greater objectivity (cited in 
Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004 pp405-406). 
The vets in tum criticised the modellers' SCIence as "abstract, inexact, and 
inherently subjective or partial" when compared with their own "empirical, 
contextually sensitive, exact" practices based on their greater knowledge of the 
field (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004 pp407-408). Similar arguments have raged 
throughout the recent attempts to find a solution to the spread of bovine 
tuberculosis, a disease believed to be spread by badgers, but the transmission of 
which decades of scientific research has failed to conclusively explain or prevent. 
A link between badgers and the spread of bovine TB was first suspected in 1971 
when a dead badger infected with TB was found on a Gloucestershire farm which 
had recently suffered a bTB outbreak (Enticott 2001 p154).8 Although no firm 
conclusions could be drawn about the mode of transmission, experiments in which 
badgers and cattle were housed together to ascertain whether badgers could pass 
the disease to cattle led MAFF to conclude that they were the single most 
significant source of the problem, and in 1973 MAFF resolved to deal with 
badgers where they posed a threat to the health of cattle. Although several reviews 
8 For a more detailed discussion of the history of bovine tuberculosis see Appendix Three. 
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were conducted in the 1970s and 80s, these led only to changes in the means of 
culling badgers, and the efficacy of the strategy was not seriously challenged until 
the publication of a report by Sir John Krebs in 1996. Krebs highlighted the flaws 
of previous experiments and proposed a new approach, involving systematic 
culling, known as the Randomised Badger Culling Trials (RBCT) or 'Krebs 
Trials'. The Independent Scientific Group on Cattle TB (ISG) was set up to design 
the RBCT, under the Government's objectives of identifying "a sustainable policy 
to control bovine tuberculosis, based on sound science" and to clarify any link 
between badgers and bTB using scientific evidence rather than "folklore and 
guesswork" (Agriculture Select Committee 1999 para. 2). The ISG Scientists have 
deliberately designed their field trials to appear as objective as possible (as was 
their mandate following the Krebs report) and have frequently come into conflict 
with vets who believe their 'first principles' approach to disease control is of more 
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use in such a difficult situation. In essence this means that when the pathology of 
the disease is poorly understood, measures which are seen to work (in this case 
badger culling) should be used even though there is little supporting scientific 
evidence to explain the efficacy of such measures. 
Again, the competing claims made by scientists and veterinarians are fuelled by 
the tension between producing objective knowledge and producing effective 
policy outcomes. In the case of bovine TB, the Independent Scientific Group has 
found that culling badgers has little (or even an adverse) effect on controlling the 
spread of the disease, but this does not lead to an obvious policy outcome. The 
veterinary profession, on the other hand, has consistently favoured badger culling 
as a method of controlling the spread of bTB and has argued that if scientists 
cannot come up with an alternative, culling should be pursued regardless of their 
evidence because it is the only workable option. Although the British Veterinary 
Association has supported the moves to increase cattle testing, it insists that "the 
culling of badgers is the most viable option we have" (British Veterinary 
Association (BV A) 2006). It contends that there is still insufficient scientific 
evidence to rule out culling as an option, and argue that "In a situation where the 
control of an animal-based disease is critical, yet absolute science is absent, the 
application of first principles of disease control by the veterinary profession is 
essential" (BV A 2006 para. 8). The history of the veterinary profession -
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particularly the fact that its early successes in disease control came despite a lack 
of knowledge of epidemiology - is the foundation of this claim. As culling, which 
is the primary tool of this approach, becomes less publicly acceptable, other forms 
of expertise threaten to supplant vets as the primary advisers on animal disease 
Issues. 
Another similar development is the increased reference to biosecurity in the last 
decade, which offers policy-makers certainty and a means of exercising control. 
Biosecurity itself, however, is a problematic concept, as the efficacy of many of 
its incarnations is not scientifically proven. For example, the use of disinfectant 
mats to prevent the spread of FMD, the benefits of which even the Agriculture 
Minister at the time of the 2001 outbreak, Nick Brown, acknowledged to be 
"more symbolic than real" (Nerlich and Wright 2006). Donaldson and Wood poin~ 
to the rapid increase in the use of surveillance biosecurity in the last five years, 
claiming that it "offers an approach that sidesteps the indeterminacy of the disease 
[ ... ] by proposing that the maintenance of static territorial integrity can disrupt the 
disease materiality. It also requires a relatively more easily achieved goal of 
politicians: the control of humans" (Donaldson and Wood 2004 p386). 
Biosecurity practices make nature observable (by monitoring the movements of 
disease and its carriers) and controllable (preventing likely sources of infection 
from crossing government-defined boundaries). 
Misusing Science? 
In summary, then, the EBP tum shows that policy-makers are aImmg for 
objectivity, and seem to believe that more science will reduce uncertainty and help 
them to depoliticise decision-making. This is not happening in practice, however, 
firstly because there is political interference in the commissioning and use of. 
scientific expertise, and secondly because the need for certainty and the 
bureaucratic nature of the decision-making process mean that it is difficult to take 
new approaches to problems and difficult to accommodate equivocal scientific 
expertise. 
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Politicisation of advice 
Although Defra strives for objectivity through EBP, critics of MAFF/Defra's 
policy-making process have provided numerous examples of overt political 
interference in the process of obtaining and using scientific advice. Many such 
examples emerged from the BSE episode. As was mentioned earlier, BSE was for 
many years seen only as an animal health problem, which meant that 
responsibility for dealing with the disease - including commissioning and funding 
research - fell to MAFF. This formed another barrier to the serious consideration 
of human health implications, as not only did policy-makers disregard the risk, but 
scientists were effectively prevented from researching it. Miller (1999) claims that 
in the early 1990s the Chief Vet and a senior civil servant put pressure on the 
Agriculture and Food Rese~ch Council to send all applications for research intq 
BSE to MAFF. Researchers complained that MAFF blocked their access to BSE-
infected material and epidemiological data, and were told to direct their research 
towards areas that would support the Ministry's view that the human health risk 
was low. One neuropathologist explained: 
There was a structure set up which said that this disease was cattle 
scrapie. Sheep scrapie doesn't do us any harm therefore this won't 
either. Research was set up to prove this theory, much more 
pertinent evidence to the contrary was, shall we say, brushed to the 
side, for a while at least 
(cited in Miller 1999 p1245). 
Despite the fact that advisory groups were idealised by the government as sources 
of independent information because they were comprised of academics (one . 
implication being that they would be giving 'pure' i.e. not policy driven advice), 
members later revealed the overt instructions they received on toeing the Ministry 
line. The Southwood Working Party is a particularly good example. Van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone (2005 p31) state that the group was "directly but 
discreetly told by the MAFF permanent secretary not to make any 
recommendations that would lead to an increase in public expenditure, and it was 
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subsequently asked to avoid alanning the public by underplaying its concerns 
about risks of exposure to the BSE agent from phannaceuticals and from 
occupational exposures." It was also encouraged to consider economlC 
implications for the meat sector that led to the group dropping certain 
precautionary feed bans. Scientists were asked not to use the term "scrapie-like 
disease" in their research papers because it was deemed by MAFF to be 
"emotive" and would attract a lot of publicity (Miller 1999 p 1245). The remit of 
the Southwood Working Party was also very confusing to its members. It was 
formally appointed to "advise on the implications of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy and matters relating thereto" leading to ambiguity about whether 
the group should be advising on science, or policy, or both. Some commentators 
see this ambiguity as a deliberate tactic by MAFF as it presented them with "a 
strategic opportunity for b~th officials and committee members to shift what th~ 
working party was responsible for, and what it was represented as responsible for, 
on different kinds of issues" (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005 p98). Whether 
there was malicious intent or not, the remit of the group seems to belie an 
understanding by policy-makers that there is no neat science/policy split and that 
advisors - however independent - will inevitably be involved in the making of 
policy as well as simply 'doing the science'. 
The way in which advisory committees operated within the bureaucratic structure 
also gave the Ministry considerable influence over the outcome of their meetings. 
The nature of the groups - individuals brought together periodically to discuss 
issues with very little time available - meant that they relied upon civil servants 
for documentation. Gerodimos (2004 p918) claims that "department officials and 
civil servants played a key role as a link between advisory committees and 
ministers. They also drafted the bulk of policy on BSE and possessed vital 
bureaucratic resources such as in-depth knowledge of their own depa.rtments' . 
mechanisms." He suggests that there were cases when important decisions, such 
as whether vaccines derived directly or indirectly from bovine tissue should be 
banned instantly or steadily phased out, did not even reach ministers but were 
decided by lower-ranking civil servants. Van Zwanenberg and Millstone (2005 
p97) argue that this reliance on civil servants compromised the independence of 
the Southwood Working Party further as the secretariat of the group, for example, 
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comprised of only two officials (one from MAFF and one from the Department of 
Health) who were charged with all aspects of documenting/the proceedings. Prior 
to the group's first meeting, these two officials helped Southwood to draw up a 
list of questions for the Working Party to address, and subsequently drafted the 
answers to these questions, supplied most of the data and evidence to the 
committee, drafted much of the final report and discussed the practicality of the 
recommendations with the group. Through what appears to be an innocuous civil 
service convention of providing a secretariat, the Ministry had opportunity to 
control every aspect of the advisory group's operation. 
More recently, the creation of an Independent Scientific Group (ISO) to advise the 
government on bovine tuberculosis, as described above, has provided another 
example of partial science: Although MAFF claimed that the objective of th€1 
group was to use "sound science" rather than "guesswork" (Agriculture Select 
Committee 1999 para. 2) the ISG themselves acknowledged that the design of 
their experiments was influenced by political motivations and that they were 
asked to disregard potential solutions which would be "politically unacceptable" 
(Independent Scientific Group (ISO) 1999 para. 12.0.3). They said they were 
aware that "the widespread elimination of badgers from large tracts of the 
countryside would not be politically or socially acceptable, hence we have sought 
to explore a much wider consideration of the problem and its possible solution(s)" 
(ISG 1999 para. 12.0.3). From the outset, then, the scientists acknowledged that 
they were being asked to take non-scientific issues into consideration despite the 
protestations of the government that the ISG was to be the last word in scientific 
rigour and impartiality. Several years later, Defra used the findings of the ISG to 
draft a consultation document essentially claiming that the scientists supported 
badger culling as one of several options for the control of the disease in cattle. 
Consequently the ISG wrote to stakeholders to raise awareness of what they felt . 
was a misrepresentation of their findings, and in their official submission to the 
consultation decried the scientific basis for badger culling as "neither accurately 
portrayed nor carefully explored in the consultation document". Moreover, they 
argued that it "does not provide stakeholders or the wider public with an 
appropriately balanced view of the scientific background to the issues they are 
asked to consider, and furthermore appears to have led Defra to ignore relevant 
62 
scientific evidence in forming the badger culling strategies proposed m the 
consultation document" (ISG 2006a pI). ----
The ISG were also open about the part they had played in policy formation, telling 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs select committee that they had played 
no part in the development of the consultation document, and only saw a draft 
version the day before it was published (Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
Select Committee (EFRA) 2006 Q51). John Bourne, the chair of the ISG, told the 
inquiry that the Group found it "very difficult to understand" why the CVO and 
Agriculture Minister Ben Bradshaw have said that they are able to develop policy 
without waiting for the end of the RBCT, in direct contradiction to Defra's 
commitment to gathering sound scientific evidence (EFRA 2006 Q41). The EFRA 
Select Committee launche~ an inquiry into the consultation in January 2006 ang 
their report noted Defra's apparent disregard for the findings of the RBCT when 
designing the consultation. The obvious discrepancy between the advice provided 
by the ISG and the course of action favoured by Defra attracted criticism and 
scrutiny, particUlarly because large amounts of money were being spent on the 
experiment. The consternation of the EFRA Select Committee at the disregard for 
evidence was such that they have stated that "if the line the UK Government 
proposes to take differs from the position adopted by the ISG on what constitutes 
an effective culling strategy, Defra should publish details of the science 
underpinning its conclusions on the consultation" (EFRA 2006 para. 6). 
Politicisation does not only take the form of overt selectivity of evidence use or 
the discrediting of dissenting scientists, but can also take place at an earlier stage 
in the process by closing off certain avenues of research or framing questions in 
such a way that they can only be answered using particular types of evidence. Just 
as the framing of FMD as an agricultural problem led to the marginalisation of. 
tourism and business interests, so equivalent processes take place in relation to 
scientific research. Knorr-Cetina (1981 p88) argues that it is misleading to 
consider the role of non-scientists in the choice of research problems as an 
external influence, because "the process of defining a problem penetrates to the 
core of research production through the negotiations of its implications and 
operationalisations". The FMD science group, set up during the 2001 outbreak, 
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included three teams of university-based epidemiological modellers and one from 
the Veterinary Laboratories Agency, as well as Government veterinary 
epidemiologists, veterinary experts, serologists and logisticians. The diversity, and 
transparency, of the group was lauded (see Scudamore and Harris 2002 p706). 
Critics have argued, however, that the initial membership of the group (its core 
was the four groups ofmodellers) and the immediate adoption of the contiguous 
cull policy "meant that consideration of any alternative scientific (and 
nonscientific) constructions of risk (and risk management) were effectively closed 
off, thus blurring the line between scientists advising on policy and scientists 
making policy" (Bickerstaff and Simmons 2004 p399). Ambiguity and uncertainty 
were unwelcome to policy-makers struggling to bring the disease under control. In 
the words of the Chief Scientific Adviser: "We had calculated a whole range of 
scenarios but I simply said ~hat this is the one that will work. So it wasn't a matte~ 
of giving what I thought would be a confusing set of options" (cited in Bickerstaff 
and Simmons 2004 p399). 
There can also be acknowledged partiality from the scientists themselves, when 
they take a particular stance on an issue and give their opinion rather than being 
mere proxies for information. Animal Health (formerly the State Veterinary 
Service or SVS), which fulfils many functions including providing input into 
policy-making from a veterinary perspective, diagnosing and treating animal 
disease, and implementation of other aspects of Defra policy, is a unique and 
occasionally controversial organization. The politics of veterinary expertise has 
received attention in recent years because of their role in the FMD outbreak (see 
for example Woods 2004a, 2004b), although there had also been tensions over 
BSE control when the British Veterinary Association had advised its members not 
to participate in SVS schemes because it did not agree with a government policy 
(Fisher 1997). Animal Health occupies a problematic position between policy and. 
implementation, and its success in managing this tension often seems to be a 
deciding factor in the success of overall disease control policy. Various 
commentators have argued that Animal Health is a politicised organization 
because it takes an overt stance on issues like the culling of badgers in order to 
control bovine TB (Lawson 2006; Wilkinson 2007). 
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Historically at the heart of disease policy, Animal Health now faces competition 
from other sources of expertise (particularly epidemiological modellers, as was 
discussed earlier) and has undergone reorganization and severe budgetary cuts 
since the 1980s. Policy-makers appreciate the pivotal role of Animal Health in an 
outbreak but tensions develop when it appears that vets have their own views on 
policy matters or are working at odds to the Department. A review commissioned 
by Defra in 2004 described the problems that are occurring because the Animal 
Health and Welfare Directorate General is undergoing a transition from a 
veterinary-led to a policy-led culture of working. Describing the role of Animal 
Health as a "double-edged sword" the report points out that alongside their 
valuable field role, several veterinary units also have their own science budgets 
that are not always synchronised with the research needed for policy. There are 
personal conflicts too, bec~use Animal Health is a "large cadre of individually 
very highly qualified professionals who are used to doing their own diagnosis and 
prescription of solutions. They may in some cases undennine Defra policy by 
letting people know that their views are different or that they are doing something 
reluctantly under 'HQ orders'" (Taig 2004 p13). In summary then, scientific 
objectivity is rarely achieved both because of the political agenda within which 
research is sought having an impact upon the framing of questions and research, 
and because the scientists and veterinarians themselves are unable or unwilling to 
provide unequivocal answers to complex policy problems. There are also features 
of bureaucratic decision-making that hinder attempts to follow the ideal model of 
evidence-based policy-making, including risk aversion, an inability to record 
uncertainty or disagreement in official documents, and the lengthy process 
through which evidence and argumentation must pass before a decision can be 
reached. 
Bureaucratic culture and the policy-making process 
Defra has a culture of inertia and an aversion to risk-taking that both slows down 
policy-making and prevents people from voicing their concerns when they feel 
that policy is taking the wrong. direction. lain Anderson, chair of the FMD 
Lessons Learned Inquiry, claimed that "Within MAFF, and now DEFRA, I 
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detected a culture predisposed to decision taking by committee with an associated 
fear of personal risk taking. Such a climate does not encouiage creative initiative. 
It inhibits adaptive behaviour, and organizational learning which, over time, 
lowers the quality of decisions taken. It seems to me that a reappraisal of 
prevailing attitudes and behaviours within the Department would be beneficial" 
(Anderson 2002 p7). McConnell and Stark, in their analysis of the FMD crisis, 
argue that in some respects the MAFF culture was a manifestation of 
"groupthink" where groups of decision-makers with an inward-looking culture 
make bad judgements because of "mindless conformity" and "collective 
misjudgements of serious risks" (McConnell and Stark 2002a p43). These 
findings are supported by academic analyses of risk management. For example 
Beck et al (2005) have argued that when faced with unprecedented disasters like 
BSE (or FMD on the scale. of the 2001 outbreak) government officials adhere tq 
conventional response patterns because the individuals concerned do not feel able 
to act autonomously. When the crisis develops in novel ways, administrators are 
unable to react in innovative ways and those in the lower ranks are unable to take 
corrective action (Beck et al2005 p398). 
This tendency towards inertia and an inability to change direction is exacerbated 
by the desire for certainty in scientific expertise and consequently policy 
decisions. In particular, the inability to tolerate uncertainty in the decision-making 
process makes it very difficult for policy-makers to change their minds about an 
issue, even when new evidence emerges. As Wynne and Dressel (2001) argue, 
British policy-makers attitude towards risk means that potential damage or harm 
has to be specified and accepted even if the estimated probabilities of this harm 
occurring are very low. Uncertainty "has to be focused on something concretely 
identified, and indeed has to be quantifiable if at all feasible; ignorance in the 
sense of unknowns is disqualified from this framework, since by defiriition we 
cannot describe what we do not know" (Wynne and Dressel 2001 p 151). This 
need for certainty means that, once consensus has been reached, it is very difficult 
for policy-makers to consider other options, or even register dissent. As Majone 
suggests, there is no formal place for discretion: bureaucratic organizations can 
only function when they face a small number of exceptions and uncertainties, and 
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are able to follow relatively strict procedures (Majone 1984 pp 19-20). In the BSE 
case, the Phillips Inquiry termed the complacency that resulted from the apparent 
agreement over scientific knowledge and low health risk "sedation". Van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone (2003 p33) go further, arguing that 
The entire policy machinery in effect crystallised and rigidified 
around that narrative, demonstrating a remarkable lack of 
responsiveness to the remaining uncertainties or their diminution, 
and to the emergence of new knowledge and information. A 
crucial problem was that the commanding heights of the regime 
became so myopic and rigid that it was unable or unwilling to 
recognise that risks could be other than negligible. Having 
articulated a narrative to the effects that the science was robust and 
the risks were zero or negligible, MAFF found it very difficult to 
accept and respond to new evidence that implied that its 
assumptions about the risks (and the policy that flowed from those 
assumptions) might need to be revised. 
A tendency is created, therefore, for the scientific position that is first accepted by 
the Government to become dominant, and for dissenting scientists to become 
excluded from the advisory process. This also happened during BSE with the 
creation of what Jacob and Hellstrom (2000) call "an in-group and an out-group 
of claimsmakers among the scientific community." In other words, a link was 
made between the acceptability of the scientists' viewpoint and the quality of their 
science. Those who offered alternative theories to those favoured by MAFF were 
discredited, as allegedly happened in the infamous cases of Harash Narang, 
Stephen Dealler and Richard Lacey. Out-group scientists "tended to be advocates 
of very strong precaution and full communication to the public. In-group scientists· 
such as Sir Southwood (not himself a BSE expert) tended to take the view that 
once certain precautionary measures were in place, "there was no value in 
stressing that some people might already have caught a really terrible disease 
about which nothing could be done"" (Jacob and Hellstrom 2000 p309). What the 
out-group scientists suffered from was their willingness to admit scientific 
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uncertainty that undermined their public credibility, even though their uncertainty 
was no greater than that of the 'government-friendly' scientIsts whose misgivings 
were concealed (Beck et al 2005 p404). 
The bureaucratic nature of policy-making obscures the journey that policies take, 
giving the impression that there was no dissent, uncertainty or confusion, which 
later also hinders a change of direction. The process of drafting and re-drafting 
documents, and summarising complex scientific advice, can serve to direct 
policies in a particular direction, as material which is initially discarded by those 
writing policy documents can rarely be reincorporated at a later stage. Hinchliffe 
(2001 p194) gives a pertinent description of how the process worked when a 
decision needed to be taken on keeping BSE-infected cattle out of the food chain: 
The submission's journey from the animal health division at 
MAFF to the Minister for Agriculture took 1 Y2 months. On route, 
the paper work passed through a number of hands, including those 
of Permanent and Under Secretaries, who had responsibilities for 
adding cost estimates, checking the submission's compatibility 
with other agricultural policy, raising issues of a legal nature and 
so on. Could farmers be compensated from the public purse if no 
danger to human health had been demonstrated? Wouldn't this 
contravene the 1981 Animal Health Act? Did compensation set a 
precedent for a raft of other crop and animal disease problems and 
so effectively sanction further subsidization of the agricultural 
sector? Could a ban on ruminant-derived feed be enforced in lieu 
of a definitive statement on the origins of the disease? What would 
the effect be on the feed industry and on farming practices? These 
questions were all appended to the submission in verbal and 
written form as it moved. 
There is little evidence of this process in the final policy document, and the many 
actors and ideas that played a part in shaping the policy are hidden from outsiders' 
views. This was amply demonstrated during the BSE Inquiry, which took years to 
piece together the chains of events behind key decisions. For example, MAFF 
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arrived at a corporate consensus that the amount of infective material needed to be 
consumed to contract the disease was "massive" even though individual scientists 
warned otherwise (and were later vindicated when it emerged that the size of 
material need only be the equivalent of two peppercorns). Those involved in 
making the decision were unable to account for the consensus over a "massive" 
dose, as no one could point to an exact date or meeting when agreement might 
have been reached. 
Another consequence of the apparent rigidity of the policy process is that it makes 
it easier to commission more of the same research than something new, 
perpetuating the dominance of the approaches that are established at an early stage 
of problem-framing. The Department has been criticised for favouring the 
continuation of existing approaches to research instead of "radically differen~ 
directions" and being unwilling to consider "non-standard views and novel 
approaches" particularly on long standing problems (SAC 2006 p3). This is partly 
due to the way funding priorities are allocated, which until recently was based 
largely on history. Areas of expenditure "tended to receive proportionally the 
same amount of funding from year to year. There is recognition that, as needs and 
priorities change over time, funding also needs to be reallocated, for example on 
the basis of (estimated) economic and social risks to policy" (OSI 2006 p31). 
Little is done to assess how the framing of a research problem has impacted upon 
the way the research has been carried out and the results that have been found 
(SAC 2006 p3). It has been noted that it is procedurally easier for Defra staff to 
commission new research on a topic rather than use existing findings. There are 
few mechanisms in place to assess the extent to which findings are communicated 
and used throughout the department (Taig 2004) and "little evidence that Defra 
has yet achieved much in terms of evaluating whether, and how effectively, 
science has influenced policy" (OSI 2006 p39). 
Researchers themselves are frustrated that it is easier to get funding for new 
scientific work than to research ways of applying existing knowledge, and some 
recorded a very low level of satisfaction with the ways in which their research had 
been used by Defra (Taig 2004 p 12). Corporate memory problems caused by a 
high staff turnover hinder the effective transfer of knowledge. Some scientists 
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think that the identification of research gaps relies on the capabilities of individual 
project officers and express concern that Defra's success in 'reviewing science and 
identifying gaps "may diminish as its scientific experts retire and are not replaced 
at the same grade or level of expertise" (OSI 2006 p27). New follow-on projects 
are often commissioned before the original project has been completed and its 
outputs fully evaluated which may be symptomatic of the reliance placed on a few 
key individuals to manage the research agenda (SAC 2006 p12). It is clear that 
Defra's difficulty in effectively using science is a deep structural issue and not 
simply deliberate political perversion of objectively "good" science. Both the 
culture and processes of Defra policy-making hinder effective use of expert 
advice. 
Conclusion: what do we know about policy-making in Defra? 
Defra's own official publications in the field of animal disease portray the 
Department as being committed to evidence-based policy-making, seeking to 
commission high volumes of scientific advice to support its decision-making 
processes. The Department has objectives to meet (a"s set out in the Animal Health 
and Welfare Strategy) to which all of its policy-making activity is directed. 
Defra's account of itself is, as one would expect, an account of a competent, 
rigorous user of expertise making sound and unimpeachable policy choices. In 
contrast, the analyses of academic commentators portray the Department as a 
disaster zone, as a ministry for industry, and as a poor user of science. It is 
portrayed as a disaster zone because of its poor reputation over the handling of 
disease outbreaks, poor financial management, lack of evidence-based policy-
making and all-round political albatross. Accounts of Defra as disaster zone seem 
to suggest that it is incapable of change for the better; it has a culture of failure 
and inertia. Defra is also portrayed as a ministry for industry, preoccupied with 
satisfying farming pressure groups and neglecting its other responsibilities as a 
consequence. Commentators on the role of pressure groups in Defra's policy-
making process have highlighted the power of these groups to set policy agendas 
and steer the course of action towards the outcomes that they favour. Occasionally 
this includes steering policy-makers towards or away from certain forms of 
scientific advice. Pressure groups theorists have claimed that the interference of 
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interest groups forces policy-makers to choose between their demands and the 
advice given to them by scientific advisers (e.g. Smith 1990). For example, in 
disease outbreaks where tighter regulation is recommended by experts, civil 
servants may be pressured to resist such stringent measures to avoid economic 
impacts on the agriculture industry. Finally, Defra is also a poor user of science, 
seeking expertise but only choosing to listen to those who support its policies. As 
critical accounts argue, Defra's unreflexive quest for objectivity and impartiality 
in policy-making ignores debates about whether these values can ever really be 
achieved, and simply serves to exclude alternative approaches from the policy 
process. Different forms of expertise have been forced to compete for attention 
because the decision-making process, which is unable to accommodate 
uncertainty and plurality of evidence, demands narrow sets of options and 
unequivocal results. 
Despite the wealth of literature on Defra policy-making, there are still significant 
gaps in our knowledge, particularly regarding how things happen in the decision-
making process. Reading the accounts above, little sense is given of how pressure 
group lobbying is actually taken on board and influences individual officials; 
there is little information on how scientists give advice and what is done with that 
advice, and the advice of conflicting groups. The detail on the precise number and 
rank of officials involved in decision-making is sketchy and often derived from 
the names on policy documents even though the incompleteness of these 
documents as records of decision-making has been recognised. The people and 
activities that populate my vignette are entirely absent from conventional accounts 
of Defra policy-making. In the absence of detail about the practices and 
materiality of policy-making, the existing academic literature either overlooks the 
need for detail entirely or deduces that meetings were held and documents 
submitted by picking over the evidence from official inquiry reports. In. 
consequence, these analyses of policy-making are forced to piece together how 
decisions were made after the fact, inferring causality and attributing intent to 
officials, without being able to substantiate their claims. This is not something 
specific to the Defra literature; it is a symptom of the predominant means of 
analysing policy. In the next chapter I situate the Defra literature in the context of 
policy analysis methods more broadly, to explain why certain tendencies prevail 
71 
(such as the focus on moments of decision, and the assumption that policy-making 
is an elite activity) and the reasons why a new approach'to policy analysis is 
required if the how of policy-making in Defra is to be better understood. 
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Chapter Three 
Getting Beyond the Textbook: Competing Paradigms of Policy-
Making 
Introduction 
Research methods textbooks often tell us that when an ethnographer enters 'the 
field', the strangeness of the new culture and surroundings being encountered 
prompt him or her to appreciate afresh those features of their own everyday life 
that were previously taken for granted. In this chapter I want to make a similar 
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claim for my own experience of observing Defra. The 'strangeness' of the policy-
making activities I witnessed in Defra - in contrast to my expectations of what 
policy-making should look like - made me aware of how deeply certain 
assumptions about policy are held, by myself and in mainstream policy analysis 
literature. These assumptions, and my desire to challenge them and find new ways 
to talk about policy-making, are the focus of this chapter. I begin by setting out 
the 'textbook' approach to policy analysis, into which category much of the 
literature on Defra and animal disease policy falls, and explaining the premise of 
the approach and its dominance within the field of policy studies. I then describe 
in more depth my preliminary observations of policy-making in Defra, and the 
differences between my account and the existing literature. Finally, I set out a new 
approach to policy-making that draws on both the established discipline of· 
organizational studies and the emerging field of interpretive policy analysis. 
The textbook policy process 
The literature in the previous chapter mainly falls, consciously or unconsciously, 
within what has been variously termed the "rationality project" (Stone 1988) or 
the "textbook conception of the policy process" (Nakamura 1987). This rational 
model of the policy process is 'characterised by the view that policy-making 
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follows a rational and predictable course with distinct and identifiable stages. 
Policy-making is seen thus: 
Decision-makers first identify empirically the existence of a 
problem, then formulate goals and objectives that would lead to an 
optimal solution. After determining the relevant consequences and 
probabilities of alternative means to the solution, they assign a 
numerical value to each cost and benefit associated with the 
consequences. Combining the information about consequences, 
probabilities, and costs and benefits, they select the most effective 
and efficient alternative. 
(Fischer 2003 p4) 
The origins of the textbook approach to policy-making are usually traced back to 
Lasswell (1956) who differentiated a series of functional activities in what he 
termed the 'decision process': intelligence, recommendation, prescription, 
invocation, application, appraisal, and termination: Lasswell's formulation was 
abstract (derived from systems theory) and not intended as a comment on the 
policy process in terms of political actors and institutions. However, it was part of 
a wider project; Lasswell wanted to bring about a multidisciplinary field of study 
that could inform post-War policy-making, as set out in a chapter entitled 'The 
Policy Orientation' (1951). Lasswell set out a wide-ranging agenda of creating an 
applied social science that could generate objective solutions to policy problems 
and in doing so, reduce political debate (Fischer 2003 p3). Despite this appeal for 
a broad, multidisciplinary approach, policy studies has actually developed along 
narrow technocratic lines, with an emphasis on the neopositivist methodologies 
that dominated the social sciences in the 1950s and 60s. The result was a view of. 
policy-making as described above by Fischer. The process was seen to be 
sequential; differentiated by function (each stage represents a distinct activity 
required by a system to move to the next stage); and cumulative in the sense that 
each round of activities produces results that are fed back into the process 
(Nakamura 1987 pI42). 
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Having conceptualised the policy process as rational and sequential, later authors 
applied labels to the different stages, such as policy initiation, incubation, 
modification, adoption, implementation and appraisal (Polsby 1969) or problem 
formation, formulation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation (Anderson 
1975). Next came the allocation of different actors to these stages in the textbook 
process. Typically, policy formation/formulation is the business of high level 
decision-makers like appointed executives and legislators. The implementation of 
these decisions "becomes the province of their subordinates like bureaucrats or 
others who accept the mission of carrying out decisions made by more 
authoritative actors." Evaluation happens last, driven by standards established by 
policy-makers and carried out by a range of participants (elected officials, 
bureaucrats, analysts) whose behaviour is shaped by their institutional positions 
(Nakamura 1987 pI43). Assigning people to stages of the process is not simply a 
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descriptive task; it also denotes hierarchy in the ideas, decisions, and actions of 
policy-makers. As Brunsson argues, "according to the assumption of sequentiality 
the decision process precedes the decision, and the decision precedes the action. 
In this way the decision process and the decision cause the action; the symbolic 
and ideological activities control the practical and concrete. In other words, there 
is a control hierarchy between thought, decisions and actions. Those who think 
and decide control those who act" (Brunsson 1989 pp 174-175). This leads to the 
conventional assumption that the highest-ranking actors (Ministers, senior civil 
servants) must be responsible for decision-making because the setting of policy 
dictates all which follow and therefore the senior staff should dictate the actions 
of their subordinates. Below the Ministerial and senior civil service levels all else 
is 'mere implementation'. 
In addition to this imputed hierarchy of actors and activity, the rational conception 
of policy-making also narrows the way we are able to talk about policy-making in . 
other respects as well. It is fundamentally decision-oriented, and focuses on 
creating the optimal circumstances for decisions to be made, by reducing debate, 
gathering as much information as possible, and attempting to predict 
consequences and eliminate unpredictability in the results of the decision. It also 
removes values from the policy process, prescribing an ideal type of policy-
making whereby the personal beliefs of policy-makers and the values of society at 
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large can be either removed or reduced to externalities. Rationalism deals with 
facts and, as Fischer puts it, "if politics does not fit info the methodological 
scheme, then politics is the problem", leading some rationalists to argue that the 
political system itself must be changed to accommodate policy analysis (Fischer 
2003 p5). The rational model also downplays the importance of the decision-
making process and suggests that the system has no value of its own; it is a 
scientific means of arriving at a decision, and even this decision is less important 
than the action which results, because it is the action which will be judged and 
evaluated (Bruns son 1989 p174). Policy-making, then, is spoken about as a 
process of decision-making, concerned mainly with high-ranking politicians and 
officials, in which success is measured by policy outcomes. If we call to mind 
some of the literature on animal disease from the previous chapter, it is evident 
that it fits into this model. Consider, for example, the analyses of FMD that argue 
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policy failed because the problem-framing stage was marred by interference from 
pressure groups (e.g. Hindmoor 2009) or the argument that BSE policy was 
unsuccessful because scientific evidence was not objectively used at key decision-
making junctures (e.g. Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2003, 2005). These 
examples highlight a feature of the means of rational policy analysis: that it is 
usually conducted by choosing an existing policy and then tracing its development 
retrospectively, identifying key moments of decision and deducing the 
motivations behind the actions of the people involved. 
The account above is a necessarily caricatured description of the rationality 
project but it is true to the spirit of textbook policy analysis. Nor is it an 
exaggeration to say that this view of policy-making continues to dominate the 
majority of scholarship on policy-making, even if the scholars themselves do not 
acknowledge neopositivist tendencies. Though policy analysis has become more 
sophisticated, many continue to accept the central propositions. of the. 
conventional approach. For example, those who argue against the rationality or 
objectivity of the different stages of policy-making (e.g. Lindblom 1959) still 
accept that there are discrete stages of policy-making. Those who suggest 
pressure groups influence problem formulation (e.g. Marsh and Rhodes 1992) 
support the notion that there is an identifiable stage at which problems are put on 
the policy agenda. The success of this approach is marked by the fact that 
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conventional policy analysis features prominently in social science curricula to the 
detriment of all other approaches (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002). Perhaps 
more important is the fact that outside academia, 'rational' model policy analysts 
are found throughout government, public policy think tanks, interest groups and 
research institutions (Fischer 2003 p4). In fact, the dominance of the rational 
model within government itself has led some to comment that they fear policy-
makers will simply ignore them if they stop speaking in the language of the 
textbook model. The recent emergence of evidence-based policy-making (which 
perfectly reiterates the classical formulation of policy-making, only with an 
emphasis on gathering more information in the process), as documented in 
Chapter Two, compounds this problem as it forces researchers to fit into the 
mould of EBP and has merely spawned a new wave of research asking 'how 
much' evidence is being used to inform different policies and not challenging the 
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essentials of the idea. 
Observing Defra: challenging the textbook model 
My dissatisfaction with the rational model of policy~making as a template for my 
own analysis stemmed from the period of fieldwork in Defra which emphasised 
the disparity between policy-making as it is described in the existing literature on 
animal disease and the reality of what happens on a daily basis in the Department. 
Firstly, the activities that constitute policy-making are much more diverse than 
simple decision-making. Policy-making, in this division of Defra, encompasses an 
enormous range of meetings, written reports, emergency planning exercises, 
visits, and so on. Secondly, the complexity of the policy-making process seemed 
to me much more intricate, recursive and disordered than is portrayed in rational 
analyses. Thirdly, the range of people involved in policy-making was much 
greater than is often assumed. Policy-making (in the sense of consulting, making 
strategic decisions, and working through the difficulties of implementation) is the 
province of middle-ranking officials rather than senior civil servants. In the 
following section I look in detail at the disparities between my observations and 
the expectations of policy analysts in order to explain why an alternative means of 
studying policy-making is necessary. 
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How is policy made? 
Close scrutiny of existing accounts of policy-making in Defra reveals that there is 
very little mention of the activity of policy-making at all. It is just assumed to 
happen. Occasionally meetings are alluded to, and the publication of statements 
and press releases are seen as significant acts. But the actual day-to-day activities 
of policy-makers are a mystery. All that is apparently necessary to know is that 
they add up to 'decision-making'. By my observation, in contrast, an enormous 
variety of activities are carried out within Defra's exotic disease division, very 
few of which could accurately be described as 'decision-making'. In a typical 
week, officials in the division will attend a wide range of meetings, covering, for 
example, updates from scientists on the latest developments in diagnostic 
technology and reports about the status of the vaccine banks so they can make 
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decisions about ordering supplies. They hold brainstorming meetings with 
scientists and veterinarians to explore the extent of the evidence available on a 
particular disease and meetings with stakeholders to discuss how industry groups 
can help Defra to disseminate information about disease to farmers. They will also 
be involved in 'business' meetings with management boards and other strategic 
groups that will discuss the prioritisation of work within the Department and the 
division. Within the division, heads of team will meet their team members to 
discuss which work they will be continuing with and which they will be 
discontinuing over the following months. Other meetings will involve officials 
meeting with colleagues from other divisions to hear project updates and 
exchange information. They might be summoned to meetings with the Science 
Advisory Council, National Audit Office, or other groups wanting information on 
the work of the division. In addition to these planned meetings there will be 
countless unplanned, spontaneous gatherings of colleagues to discuss progress on 
a piece of work, problems which have arisen, briefings for those who work part 
time or who have been on leave, and meetings to discuss where an individual 
stands on a particular issue, or how another colleague or Minister is going to be 
dealt with. 
The working day of Defra civil servants is not only constituted of meetings. There 
is a lot of writing to be done too: drafting the answers to Parliamentary questions, 
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responding to requests for information, composing the agendas for meetings and 
the briefing documents for the chairs of those meetings, updating the Defra 
website, preparing reports on projects, writing the text for educational campaigns, 
drafting consultation documents, synthesising the results of closed consultations, 
putting together presentations for future meetings. Periodically, staff will be 
tasked with reviewing the documents in the computer database, streamlining and 
updating them and identifying gaps in their knowledge. More meetings will be 
held to identify how these gaps will be filled, for example through 'brainstorming' 
meetings where the evidence base for a particular policy area will be critically 
reviewed. Staff are also seconded to other parts of Defra in order to increase their 
knowledge of a related policy area or to offer their expertise to others. They also 
visit sites that could potentially be affected by animal diseases, such as public 
parks, wildlife sanctuaries, and food producers. They set up and attend road shows 
• I 
and public education events, as well as producing leaflets and posters for 
distribution and display. They meet with representatives from other government 
departments and simulate their response to a disease outbreak, either through 
'table top' exercises (where they study maps and discuss hypothetical problems 
and solutions) to real-time exercises where other staff pretend to be journalists and 
stakeholders to test the capacity of Defra staff to cope with an outbreak. These 
activities are only an indicative sample of the types of work done by Defra 
officials in 'peace-time'. In 'war-time', of course, even more types of activity are 
involved as the pressure to identify a disease, tackle its spread, and communicate 
with the public is intensified. 
While some of these activities taken in isolation may seem insignificant, they 
form part of a continuous stream of work that constitutes policy-formation. It is 
tempting to assume that the momentous policy announcements that receive media 
attention form the bulk of activity for civil servants - largely because, ~s I have. 
argued, little is known about the other types of work done by government officials 
on a day to day basis - but as Page (2001 ppvii-viii) explains, 
Politicians, civil servants and the interest groups with which they 
interact do not spend all, or even most, of their time concerned 
with what might be called 'major' policy changes such as new 
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legislation establishing freedom of infonnation or comprehensive 
reviews of the welfare state. Most of what can be tenned 
'government' appears to be a matter of dull routine, and unless we 
understand this, we cannot understand what government is about. 
Page argues that delegated legislation and routine matters of policy-making "are 
part of a world whose existence is certainly well known, but its character has 
largely escaped serious social scientific attention" (Page 2001 pp3-4). Attention is 
warranted because studying more mundane policy jobs reveals the everyday 
processes of government. By their very nature, major policy decisions that attract 
public and media attention are not representative of the routine jobs done by civil 
servants, whereas a shift in focus to everyday work gives us a much better 
understanding of how policy-making occurs. 
Moving the focus to everyday activity also reveals the complexity of policy-
making. If we accept that all the varied activities described above constitute 
policy-making, then it is clear that it cannot be reduced to simple linear goal-
oriented patterns of action. Defra officials are often carrying out activities without 
a specific 'decision' in mind to which their activity will contribute: for example, 
they may be reviewing preparedness for an outbreak as a routine activity - not 
because an outbreak is expected - and in the course of that review issues mayor 
may not be raised about which more action is necessary. Likewise, scientific 
research is routinely commissioned - to update officials on new developments in a 
particular field, or simply because it is deemed a good idea to increase knowledge 
in an area of Defra's interest. Not every piece of research commissioned by Defra 
is destined to be 'evidence' in a decision-making process. Officials are recruited 
largely as project managers; they have workstreams to oversee and objectives to 
meet, but it is not always evident whether there is an overall 'direction' to the 
work they are doing. There are so many strands of work going on, each overseen 
by one of the many different branches of the division, that it is very difficult to 
speak of animal disease 'policy' in anything other than the broadest tenns. 
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Who are policy-makers? 
In addition to these observations about the nature of policy-making, my 
experience of working in Defra differed from the accounts given in conventional 
policy literature regarding the relative importance of senior and junior officials. 
Conventional policy analysis, because of its emphasis on decisions, believes that 
middle- and lower-ranking officials have little input into policy and no input into 
the running of their Department. The authors of this literature prefer to focus on 
the more exciting worlds of mandarins and ministers, pressure group politics and 
corporatist alliances, major policies with their society-changing successes and 
politically disastrous failures. The wealth of literature on policy-making focuses 
almost exclusively on the senior civil service, even though these 'mandarins' 
account for less than one per cent of the total workforce. The 'top' civil servic~ 
contains just 4570 people, but if the five management grades below the top senior 
civil service level are included this rises to 253,700. While these studies tell us 
much about the work of senior officials and ministers, they leave significant gaps 
in our understanding of policy-making because they fail to take account of the 
thousands of others who are involved in bureaucratic government. It is easy to talk 
of policy-making and policy-makers without ever explicitly setting out of what 
the process consists or who it involves. As Page (2001 p16) puts it, "For all the 
models of policy-making, all the case studies of British government in action and 
all the grand theories that have emerged along with the massive growth in the 
number of social science researchers and their publications since the 1950s, we 
still know very little about how government actually works on a day to day basis". 
Just as the range of activities carried out in the name of policy-making in Defra is 
much more varied than policy analysis literature would suggest, so the range of 
people involved in these activities is also much greater than the se~ior civil 
service and politicians to whom such analysis is usually confined. Of course, 
Ministers and senior civil servants are crucial actors in the picture of how policy is 
made. Ministers have the democratic mandate to set policy direction and the 
senior civil service is instrumental in setting the priorities and securing funding 
for their department to ensure that work can be done towards the Minister's policy 
objectives. However, to imply that all those who work at levels below the senior 
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civil service are employed merely to implement these decisions, to deal with 
details and correct small problems as their arise, is utterly erroneous. Lower 
ranking civil servants are not simply people who implement policies dictated to 
them by ministers and senior officials. As Page and Jenkins argue, the main part 
of their work "is to create solutions to problems; if politicians knew how they 
wanted the problems solved sufficiently to give their administrative subordinates 
direct instructions, they would not need policy bureaucracies. Politicians are often 
not even generally aware that such policy problems exist before their policy 
officials raise them" (2005 pvi). 
Page describes the middle-ranking officials as "the unsung efficient secret of 
everyday government" because they "develop a strong expertise in their areas of 
responsibility and apply it to concrete issues of public policy with sensitivity to 
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the political and constitutional constraints within which they have to operate" 
(Page 2001 pI80). The importance of middle-ranking officials in policy-making 
(as opposed to just the top few civil servants) leads Page and Jenkins (2005) to 
use the phrase 'policy bureaucracy' to describe the body of officials involved in 
policy work. 'Bureaucracy' emphasises the hierarchical but interdependent 
structure and relationships of the officials, and also the fact that policy-making is 
not a single smooth process but a series of tasks distributed among a range of 
groups. These tasks are the myriad activities that I described above as having 
witnessed officials doing in Defra on a daily basis; they are not insignificant 
'detail' but form the bulk of all the work done in the civil service. As Lindblom 
and Woodhouse put it, "if it were possible to count all the policy-making acts in 
any political system - choices made, attempts at persuasion, agreements reached, 
threats and promises made, authoritative commands given or received - one 
would find that, so defined, policy-making rests overwhelmingly in the hands of 
the bureaucracy, leaving relatively few policies to be determined els.ewhere" . 
(Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993 p59). If we accept that policy-making is a 
bureaucratic activity, it becomes evident that it is insufficient to focus on the tiny 
proportion of officials at the top in the same way that it would be insufficient to 
focus only on administrative staff, if the object is to understand how policy is 
made. 
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Interpretive policy analysis 
Following the period of participant observation it became clear that Defra officials 
do not act according to the expectations of policy analysts and that policy-making 
does not proceed according to their models. However, if we accept that people are 
not acting 'rationally' it becomes necessary to understand what does guide their 
actions. In other words, what are their values and beliefs if they are not simply 
following orders? This then leads to my overarching research question: how do 
officials find and make order or, by what principles do they organize themselves? 
This question cannot be answered by approaches to policy-making that treat 
officials as instruments of decision-making and ignore their views of policy-
making and the problems at hand. In most policy analysis, even where individual 
actions and the motivation J:>ehind them are considered they are generally those of 
Ministers or senior civil servants (which as I have already argued is a mistaken 
assumption), and their beliefs are generally inferred from policy documents and 
media reporting of events, rather than from speaking to the individuals 
themselves. Studying policy documents in order to piece together retrospectively 
how decisions were made runs the risk of imputing a rationality or intent that was 
not necessarily there. As Yanow (1996) suggests, policy analysis often involves 
trying to identify cause and effect patterns in the actions of politicians or officials 
after a decision has been made without ever being certain that such patterns 
existed at the time. Policies, Yanow argues, are not strictly rational, goal-oriented 
actions but may be seen as "expressive statements": as expressions of the values 
of government, expressions of the identity of the polity, or as claims for attention 
(Yanow 1996 pp22-23). We can only understand policy by understanding the 
people that made it. Rhodes et al (2007a), in their study of government elites (by 
which they mean ministers and senior civil servants) argue that: 
we know little about how elites make sense of their world day in 
and day out. It remains unclear how individuals, issues and 
institutions add up to meaningful government action. Thus, a solid 
understanding of phenom~na like leadership, strategic decision-
making, change management, and project management in public 
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organizations not only requires us to understand what the people 
who control these activities do and how they do it; but also to gain 
insight into why they do it. How do they find space amid 
constraining structures to enact alternative realities? How, by using 
certain words, metaphors and symbols, do. they alter, bend or 
modify ingrained meanings? 
Exactly the same arguments can be made for the study of middle-ranking officials 
if we substitute the phenomena of leadership, strategic decision-making and 
change/project management with the phenomena of consultation, evidence 
gathering, policy formulation and bureaucratic government. In the first instance, 
we know almost nothing about how middle ranking officials interact. There is 
little literature on the types of meetings that are held, and the ways in which 
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people behave and debate issues and produce documents, in the process of policy-
making. In addition to this lack of descriptive material, there is a more significant 
lack of understanding of how the interaction between different actors influences 
the policy process. We know little about how policy makers interact with one 
another; how policy-makers and scientists interact; and how both policy-makers 
and scientists interact with Defra as an organization. Consequently, we do not 
understand how policy-making is affected by the relationships between people, 
and how the values these people hold about policy-making and their role in the 
process affects the way policies tum out. 
The desire to avoid explanatory models and focus on values has led me to 
interpretive policy analysis, which puts the emphasis on description and 
understanding rather than explanation, and which emphasises the values and 
actions of the individual over theories and models of behaviour. Interpretive 
policy analysis is an emerging critique of conventional policy studies that borrows 
heavily from interpretive thought as developed in other social science disciplines, 
particularly sociology and anthropology. Tracing the roots of interpretive policy 
analysis is an almost impossible task; it has been linked to critical theory, post-
structuralism, postmodernism, social constructionism, discourse analysis, 
hermeneutics, phenomenology, symbolic interactionism and feminist theory. 
Among the names mentioned as influences on interpretivism include Wilhelm 
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Dilthey, Edmund Husserl, Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Theodor Adorno, Jiirgen 
Habermas, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Paul Ricoeur (for more 
comprehensive attempts to trace the history of interpretivism see Fischer 2003; 
Yanow 1996). It is more productive to try to identify some common themes in 
interpretive thought, as the intellectual precursors to these ideas and themes are 
often readily apparent. Despite its varied roots and decades of development in 
sociology and anthropology, where it is more commonly used, several uniting 
features can be identified: understanding actors' meanings, rejection of a formal 
hypothesis, and situating actors in webs of tradition and belief. 
Interpretive policy analysis differs from the conventional model by seeing values, 
beliefs and feelings as a set of meanings, rather than simply seeing values as a set 
of costs, benefits and choices, and by seeing human action as expressive of 
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meaning, rather than focusing on human behaviour as instrumentally and 
technically rational (Yanow 2000 ppviii-ix). The focus on meaning occurs 
because interpretivists see meaning as a component in the construction and 
understanding of social reality, where social meanings are always open to 
reconstruction and change because the social "world of the individual or group "is 
constantly enlarged by new experiences and thoughts; it is continuously in the 
process of evolving through reflection, practices, and communication with others" 
(Fischer 2003 p49). The purpose of such sustained focus on beliefs and the 
meaning people give to their actions is not to study these meanings for their own 
sake, but to study them "as they appear within, and even frame, actions, practices 
and institutions" (Bevir and Rhodes 2003 pI7). In other words, interpretive 
analysis seeks to explore beliefs in the context of actors' lived experience. It is 
"not only a matter of finding out what a spuriously pure subject might think and 
do but, through tracing these connections and critically engaging with these 
stories, it is also one of trying to get both at why this has come to be the case and 
at what wider causes and effects this might have" (Cook and Crang 1995 pp8-9). 
Exploring the meaning behind policy-makers' actions is more authentic than 
guessing at their motivations by studying policy documents and presuming that 
they are rational actors. As Yanow (1996) suggests, the logic of positivist political 
science is appealing because it offers the chance to ascribe rationality to 
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governments' actions. However, this is misleading because such rationality may 
never have existed: "We see cause-and-effect relations~ after the fact, but in 
attributing intention to the causality traditional analysis ascribes both 
instrumentality and intentionality before-the-fact to policy actors and events. We 
cannot know for certain, however, that the patterns we are seeing retrospectively 
in policy actions 'actually' resided in them" (Yanow 1996 p23). Interpretation is a 
more valid approach because policies are not strictly rational, goal-oriented 
actions. Policies may be seen as "expressive statements": as expressions of the 
values of government, expressions of the identity of the polity, or as claims for 
attention (Yanow 1996 pp22-23). Further grounds for taking an interpretive view 
of policy comes from growing scepticism about the validity of the policy process 
- government's ways of getting and using evidence, the lack of public 
involvement in decision-11?-aking and so on - which call simplistic accounts 0'[ 
politics into question. As Roe puts it, "many public policy issues have become so 
uncertain, complex, and polarised - their empirical, political, legal and 
bureaucratic merits unknown, not agreed upon, or both - that the only things left 
to examine are the different stories policymakers and their critics use to articulate 
and make sense of that uncertainty, complexity, and polarization" (Roe 1994 p3). 
The aim of interpretivism is not to replace formal models of decision-making but 
to offer alternative means of understanding how policy is made. At the heart of 
interpretivism is a shift in focus "from discovering a set of universal laws about 
objective, sense-based facts to the human capacity for making and communicating 
meaning" (Yanow 1996 p5). Interpretivism stresses the importance of 
understanding intentional human action. This emphasis involves minimal theory 
because interpretivists aim to provide a "distinctive, alternative analysis" rather 
than systematically accounting for the field as a whole (Bevir and Rhodes 2003 
p5). The goal is social understanding, rather than causal explanation. As Fischer. 
(2003 p50) explains, "Whereas positivist-oriented empirical analysis aims at 
causal explanation and prediction of behaviour, social understanding requires a 
teleological explanation related to goals and purposes. In the traditions of 
sociology, following the great German sociologist Max Weber, such explanation 
is referred to as the process of Verstehen. Verstehen identifies the process of 
rendering facts understandable by interpreting their meanings in the light of 
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relevant· social goals and values." Consequently, interpretive studies do not 
proceed from a formalised hypothesis, partly because the researcher does not 
know ahead of time what meanings will be found, and partly because the 
flexibility of qualitative research means that the research design changes in the 
face of field realities which the researcher did not anticipate (Yanow 2006 p71). 
Whereas the scientific method of investigation has five distinct steps (identify 
research problem! state hypothesis; prepare research design; collect data; 
process/analyze data; draw conclusions/findings), interpretive investigation is 
freer to pursue research questions as they emerge, in a field that has not been 
overly restricted by the research design. 
The purpose of an interpretive study, then, is not to discover theoretical 
explanations for human ~ehaviour, but to be a "process of setting forth thr 
meaning of an event or experience" where meaning "is defined in terms of the 
intentions and actions of a person" (Denzin 2001 pp52-53). One of the first 
exponents of the interpretive approach, Charles Taylor, identifies three 
characteristics of meaning as it is used by social scientists: 
1. Meaning is for a subject: it is not the meaning of the situation in 
vacuo, but its meaning for a subject, a specific subject, a group of 
subjects, or perhaps what its meaning is for the human subject as 
such (even though particular humans might be reproached with not 
admitting or realizing this). 
2. Meaning is of something; that is, we can distinguish between a 
given element - situation, action, or whatever - and its meaning. 
But this is not to say that they are physically separable. Rather we 
are dealing with two descriptions of the element, in one of which it 
is characterized in terms of its meaning for the subject. 
3. Things only have meaning in a field, that is, in relation to the 
meanings of other things. This means that there is no such thing as 
a single, unrelated meaningful element; and it means that changes 
in other meanings in the field can involve changes in the given 
element. 
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(Taylor 1987 p41) 
Taking these characteristics into account, interpretivists aIm to avoid both 
universalism and subjectivity. As Yanow (1996) argues, human variety 
necessarily means that others may interpret creations of human activity 
differently. There is "the possibility of multiple meanings, of varieties of 
interpretation. There are the possibilities of miscommunication and of 
noncommunication, of meanings that are shared or not shared, of meanings once 
shared that are later dismantled" (Yanow 1996 p7). Meanings must also be 
conceptualised intersubjectively, recognising that 'meaning' is not something that 
exists in the minds of individuals taken in isolation, but as something bound up 
with "concrete contexts of shared social practices and interacting individuals" 
(Adcock 2003 p 16). 
For interpretivists, meanings are constructed in the interactions of participants in 
those meanings. However there are few explicit explanations of how meanings are 
structured and transmitted in the interpretive literature. Some interpretivists hold 
that meanings are passed on through traditions, which Bevir and Rhodes define as 
"a set of inherited beliefs" (Bevir and Rhodes 2006 p7). As they argue, while 
identifying the meanings held by political actors requires ethnographic enquiry, 
reading practices and texts and so on, explanation "needs a historical form of 
inquiry: we have to locate their stories within their wider webs of belief, and these 
webs of belief against the background of traditions they modify in response to 
specific dilemmas" (Bevir and Rhodes 2003 p5). They offer two caveats when 
talking about traditions, however: the first is that traditions are, like other abstract 
concepts such as class and institutions, unable to fully explain people's beliefs, 
actions and interests. Instead traditions "represent only an abstract stand-in for the 
multiple and complex beliefs and actions of the individuals we classify under 
[them]" (Bevir 2003 pI9). The second is that traditions are not fixed but are 
"evolving, adaptable sets of beliefs that enable those acting in the political sphere 
to understand and make sense of their world [ ... ] They are sometimes resilient 
and enduring; sometimes ambivalent or contradictory in their core beliefs. Some 
parts are codified and rule-bound, others exist as a loosely connected constellation 
of ideas variously constructed by participants or observers" (Rhodes et al 2008 
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p463). Bevir and Rhodes' analysis is distinctive in the sense that they attempt to 
identify Ministers' beliefs against well-known political traditions (Tory, Liberal, 
Whig, Socialist), whereas other authors are less overt about returning to 
historically-defined categories as units of meaning, preferring a grounded 
approach whereby analytical themes are inferred from the data (particularly 
among North American interpretivists e.g. Soss 2000; Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003; Roe 1994). 
Just as these characteristics that I have labelled 'central tenets' are not at all 
universally agreed upon and subscribed to by interpretive policy scholars, so their 
methods and results also vary. A summary of some well-known interpretive 
policy studies gives an indication of the broad range of work that has been done. 
Lipsky (1980) is one of the earliest interpretivists to gain widespread attentiop 
with his book Street Level Bureaucrats, which studied the values held by police 
officers, teachers etc. (the street level bureaucrats of the title) and how they either 
remain loyal to these values or change them in adverse circumstances. Lipsky's 
approach has led to a fruitful branch of studies into local government and 
executive agencies in the UK, such as those by Gains (2003) and Durose (2007) 
and other interpretive approaches drawing on new institutionalism and 
organizational learning (Brannan 2009, Leach and Lowndes 2007; Lowndes 
2005). While these studies typically look at the values held by officials and 
contrast them with the values of the organization (or of central government), 
Yanow's (1996) influential study of a government agency looked at the 
relationship between the values of the agency and the wider societal values in 
which the agency was situated. Finally, in a different manner again, Bevir and 
Rhodes (2003, 2006 and also Rhodes 2005, Rhodes et al 2007b, 2008) have 
developed a body of work on British Ministerial and senior civil service attitudes, 
which develops interpretive analysis as an extension of the decentred governance 
approach. 
An organizational approach 
While the literature on interpretive policy analysis has strongly influenced my 
research, my interest in researching the organization of government also led me 
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towards literature on the sociology of organizations. Despite striking similarities 
in both approach and methods, scholars in the disciplinef of interpretive policy 
analysis and organization studies almost universally ignore one another. Early 
policy studies drew heavily on organization theory - the formal models of 
decision-making being directly borrowed from organizational psychology - but as 
the sociology of organizations developed in a more interpretive direction, policy 
studies failed to follow until very recently. Interpretive policy analysis, as an 
emerging field, has little cohesion in either method or modes of analysis and 
therefore while it provides the context for my research I felt that much could be 
gained by drawing on concepts developed by organizational sociologists. Of 
particular interest was the work on storytelling in organizations, which bears a 
close resemblance to some of the interpretive policy analysis work. Although the 
concept of storytelling is, rarely used in political science (an exception bein~ 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003 who study storytelling among street-level 
bureaucrats), it is well established as a field of enquiry in organizational studies. 
Stories or narratives are acknowledged as ubiquitous and potent ways of 
communicating feelings, values and beliefs within and between organizations. 
Storytelling has been explored in contexts as diverse as a mental health centre 
(Schwartzman 1987, 1993), a nuclear energy laboratory (Law 1994b), and an 
office supplies firm (Boje 1991), yet very little has been said about the UK civil 
service, despite its essential similarities with the organizations listed here. 
Stories, then, are the tales told within organizations (and by organizations, to 
stakeholders, researchers and so on) about their activities. While the stories 
themselves may be entertaining and engaging, they have many important 
functions to play, including communicating historical experiences and providing 
individuals with a way to weave this experience into discussions of current 
activities; socialising new members; documenting successes and fai~ures and. 
drawing conclusions (or morals) from them; stereotyping other organizations; and 
indirectly communicating information to individuals about issues which are too 
threatening or sensitively to discuss directly (Schwartzman 1993 p44). In essence, 
stories can be seen as attempts to "throw an ordering net over the activities within 
the organization" (Law 1994b pp2-3). They help individuals and groups to make 
sense of their own identity, that of their organization, and the environment in 
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which they are located. Stories become, in Law's words, "modes of ordering" 
when they are not only verbal accounts but are perforriied or embodied in a 
concrete, non-verbal manner (Law 1994b p20). In other words, when they are 
linked to action. 
There is some disagreement as to the use of the terms 'story' and narrative'. 
Czarniawska argues that "a story consists of a plot comprising causally related 
episodes that culminate in a solution to a problem" (1997 p78). Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno (2003) argue along similar lines, defining stories as complete and 
logical tales with a beginning, middle and end. For them, narrative is a broad 
category, while story is narrow; all stories are narratives, but not all narratives are 
stories (2003 p26). Boje (1991) on the other hand contends that narrative implies 
a greater level of coherenc.e and causation than the looser concept of story. As hie 
argues, "the folk of organizations inhabit storytelling spaces outside plot, not tidy 
and rationalised narrative spaces. Narrative analysts replace folk stories with less 
messy academic narrative emplotments and create an account of organizations 
that is fictively rational, free of tangled contingency and against story" (Boje 2001 
p2). For Weick, (1995) narratives have explanatory power that does not always 
accurately reflect the events that they describe: "When people put their lives into . 
narrative form, the resulting stories do not duplicate the experience. The 
experience is filtered. Events in a story are resorted and given an order, typically 
one in which a sequence is created". Narratives are finalizing, because they 
transform events "into historical facts by demonstrating their ability to function as 
elements of completed stories" (White 1987 cited in Boje 2001). Stories, as 
defined by Boje, resist this tendency: they are open-ended, disorganised, and do 
not necessarily have a strong causal link or 'plot'. In this thesis, I have used the 
terms narrative and story interchangeably, along with the term 'discourse' and the 
phrase 'modes of ordering'. While recognising that these terms have distinctive 
intellectual heritages and are strongly contested by various groups of scholars, I 
feel that they can all be usefully deployed in my analysis of the· accounts of 
policy-making gathered in my research, and that the use of these different terms 
will be seen not as a terminological sleight of hand, but as an attempt to capture 
the depth of the analytical approach proposed in this thesis. 
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Gabriel suggests that organizational researchers have only recently realised that 
"stories and narratives do not merely offer accounts of politics, but can also act as 
political interventions, challenging dominant discourses, subverting them, or 
questioning them. Stories set agendas, express emotions, and fashion ways of 
thinking. In these and other ways, they are no longer seen purely as effects of a 
'superstructure', mere by-products of core social and political processes, but very 
much parts of these core processes" (Gabriel 2004 p3). Stories are enacted -
become modes of ordering - in various ways. One of the most evident is that they 
act as guides to decision-making; as "recipes for action" (Gabriel 2004 p3). As 
Boje (1991 pl06) argues, 
Stories are to the storytelling system what precedent cases are to 
the judicial system. Just as in the courtroom, stories are performed 
among stakeholders to make sense of an equivocal situation. The 
implication of stories as precedents is that story performances are 
part of an organization-wide information-processing network. Bits 
and pieces of organization experience are recounted socially 
throughout the firm to formulate recognizable, cogent, defensible, 
and seemingly rational collective accounts that will serve as 
precedent for individual assumption, decision and action 
Over time, people "engage in a dynamic process of incremental refinement of 
their stories of new events as well as on-going reinterpretations of culturally 
sacred story lines. When a decision is at hand, the old stories are recounted and 
compared to unfolding story lines to keep the organization from repeating 
historically bad choices and to invite the repetition of past successes" (Boje 1991 
pl06). 
Stories, by this understanding, are a form of memory for an organization, storing 
information about its history. Organizational memory, and the behaviour and 
culture of its individual members, cannot be extricated; as Hedberg (1981 p6) puts 
it, "as individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, and beliefs over 
times, organizations develop their world views and ideologies. Members come 
and go, and leadership changes, but organizations' memories preserve certain 
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behaviours, mental maps, norms and values over time." Organizational memory 
can take explicit forms, such as formal rules, structures, policy documents, 
manuals, operating procedures, computer based information systems and so on, 
but it can also be transmitted implicitly through norms and beliefs (Dekker and 
Hansen 2004). Stories, when they are transmitted, perpetuate a particular part of 
the memory and translate individuals into a group: "Although individuals are 
limited information processors, each person retains a part of the story line, a bit of 
interpretation, story performance practices, and some facts that confirm a line of 
reasoning" (Boje 1991 pl06). 
Stories can also fulfil a critical function, as they often differ significantly from the 
'official' stories told by and about the organization. Official stories are reproduced 
in organizational rituals, advertisements, web sites, and official publications. 
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Inevitably, they usually express the positive qualities that the leaders of the 
organization wish to publicise. These are stories of great achievements, of crises 
averted or overcome, and of dedicated employees. In what Gabriel (2004 p4) 
terms the ''unmanaged organization", however, competing and even conflicting 
stories are told. These stories may challenge, ridiCule or subvert official stories, 
celebrate resistance, criticise injustices and hypocrisy, and extol solidarity. These 
stories express a wide range of emotions, from pride and hope to anger and 
anxiety. They help employees to endure difficult experiences and to capture their 
feelings towards the diverse events that occur (Gabriel 2004 pp3-4). 
What is the ontological status of organizational stories? If we think of stories as 
ways of recounting the past to make sense of the present, it is tempting to think 
that they are simply re-presentations of facts; in other words, to think that they are 
simply interesting ways of recounting the key dates and events in an 
organization's history to newcomers, or in other situations where guidance is 
needed. This would deny the fundamentally interpretive nature of storytelling, 
however. It is evident that the selection of events to be 'remembered', the ways in 
which stories are told, by whom and to whom, are subjective and political acts. 
On the other hand, it is equally wrong to dismiss them as "dreams" or 
"misleading ideologies", given their power to enact reality within an organization 
and influence people's behaviour (Law 1994b p83). It is true that stories do not 
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derive their power from adherence to the 'facts', as Czarniawska argues: "in 
narrative, the perceived coherence of the sequence (temporal order) of events 
rather than the truth or falsity of story elements determines the plot and thus the 
power of the narrative as a story. [ ... J In other words, there are no structural 
differences between fictional and factual narratives, and their respective attraction 
is not determined by their claim to be fact or fiction" (1998 p5). If stories are 
neither pure fact nor pure fiction (or even more radically, it is impossible to 
distinguish between fact and fiction as far as organizational stories are 
concerned), how can we understand the nature of stories? 
Law defines stories as ''fairly regular patterns that may be usefully imputed for 
certain purposes to the recursive networks of the social. In other words, they are 
recurring patterns embodied within, witnessed by, generated in and reproduced as 
. I 
part of the ordering of human and non-human relations" (Law 1994b pp82-83). 
Law suggests that organizational stories, or modes of ordering, have six 
characteristics. Firstly, they are monist, in the sense that they are not ideas 
separate from a material reality. Narratives cannot be reduced to talking and 
writing, because they generate many other materials too, such as agents, 
machines, and materially heterogeneous social arrangements. Secondly, narratives 
are recursive: they generate and perform, and are embodied, in social and material 
arrangements, but at the same time they do not have any existence outside their 
performances. Thirdly, narrative is strategic, generating power and hierarchy. 
Fourth, narratives are always incomplete. That is, their attempts to tell, embody, 
and perform ordering arrangements tend, in the end, to fail. Fifth, narratives differ 
in that what counts as a 'material', for example, in one mode of ordering may not 
in another, leading to the sixth characteristic: narratives interact creatively so that 
one narrative fulfils a sensemaking function when others fail (Law 1994a pp259-
260). 
Law argues that because these modes of ordering are incomplete, contradictory 
and precarious, 'the organization' is a multidiscursive product. Consequently, he 
suggests both that there is no organization outside of these modes of ordering, and 
that there is no possibility of a "final account" of the organization (Law 1994a 
p250). If we accept his argument, then it is no longer necessary to worry about the 
94 
'truthfulness' of stories. The important point is to look at how and why particular 
stories are being told, as these give us an insight into the values and beliefs of the 
tellers. As Law says of his study into Daresbury Laboratory, "how Laboratory 
members tell stories, how they formulate their past, is an important clue to a much 
more general issues: how is it that they would like to order the organization in a 
much wider range of circumstances; and how it is the organization is being 
performed in a wide range of circumstances. For this is the point: stories are often 
more than stories; they are clues to patterns that may be imputed to the recursive 
sociotechnical networks" (Law 1994b p 19). 
Studying stories, therefore, gives us insight into an organization and its members. 
It helps us to understand behaviour and beliefs. It is wrong to suggest, though, that 
by uncovering all the sto~es there are in an organization, one would be able ~o 
unlock the secrets to its culture and activities. There are many forms of ordering 
in addition to stories, including formal organizational structures (the division of 
labour and so on). Stories are only one way of organizing, even if they are a 
powerful and persuasive way. Moreover, there are no 'definitive' stories: they are 
all contingent, changing, unfinished and partial. Boje (1991 ppllO-111) suggests 
that the performative element of storytelling ensures that there will always be 
multiple versions of events, as performing them is itself an expressive act. For 
example, a story will take a more abbreviated form with those already within the 
group, who are expected to know the details, but the same story will be told with 
much more embellishment to newcomers, outsiders and researchers. Certain 
stories can only be told by those in a position to divulge sensitive information, and 
making a judgement about who to tell is a significant act. The role of stories as 
modes of ordering also ensures that multiple stories, and versions of stories, 
persist, to guard against the failure of one story to help participants make sense of 
events, or to bring about desired effects. It would be impossib~e for an 
organization to survive if it did not have multiple, mutable stories because the 
failure of a story may occur at any time (Law 2001). 
In summary, then, research into the sociology of organizations tells us that 
employees attempt to make sense of the world in which they are operating, and in 
doing so formulate understandings and beliefs about themselves, their colleagues, 
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and their organization. The primary means of doing this is through talk: talk about 
events that have happened in the organization's pas( talk about how the 
organization should ideally function and its staff should behave, talk about each 
persons role and contribution to the organization's goals. In talking about these 
things, participants are not simply transmitting information but they are actively 
shaping and reshaping the organization by generating materials, spatial 
arrangements, performances and so on and, together with these artefacts, they 
generate effects. In the following chapters I explore the ways in which Defra 
officials and their scientific advisers make sense of Defra as an organization, the 
policy-making process, and evidence-based policy-making. My aim, after Law 
(1994b p4), is "to tell tales about the very important but very local social 
philosophies which we all embody and perform." To do this, I describe and 
investigate the stories that the officials/advisers tell about Defra, their colleagues, 
. I 
and themselves. Through these stories, I want to understand the values that 
officials/advisers hold and how these values inform their policy-making actions. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set out some of the reasons why the existing literature on 
policy-making in Defra fails to capture a sense of life in the Department as I 
observed it, arguing that this is because the conventional approach to policy 
analysis focuses too heavily on rational behaviour and overlooks the importance 
of values and interpretation. The textbook approach to policy analysis sees policy-
making in a very particular way: as procedural, following specific steps; as goal-
oriented, with the ultimate aim of the policy-maker being to make a decision that 
others will then implement; and being the concern of Ministers and senior 
officials, who are the "policy-makers" in question. This approach to policy 
analysis, though long-standing and providing much useful insight into the policy 
process, was at odds with my own encounter with policy-makers and their work 
during my participant observation period in Defra. During this time, the activity I 
saw was not of a simple, decision-making nature: it included many different 
activities many of which were not oriented towards a particular (policy) goal but 
were necessary for maintaining a body of knowledge, gaining an insight into 
industry conditions, keeping policy-makers informed about work in other 
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divisions, and so on. Policy-making, as I observed it, was not all aimed towards 
the end of making decisions, and as a result of this, wasinore disordered than I 
had expected. This is not to say that policy-makers were confused or that they 
were failing to do their jobs, rather than they were imposing their own order onto 
the tasks that needed to be fulfilled. A third but important point is that the people I 
observed - the middle-ranking officials, rather than ministers or mandarins -
seemed to be the key actors in the policy process, against my expectations and the 
writings of conventional policy scholars. This has important ramifications for the 
study of policy-making because this group are not represented in policy 
documents, are not open to public scrutiny through the media and so on, and so 
the usual means of analysing discourse and. retrospectively piecing together the 
rationale behind their actions from statements and publications is impossible. 
To return, then, to the question of how order is found or imposed, I want to bring 
back the crucial element that textbook policy analysis leaves out: meaning. 
Specifically, I want to understand the meanings that inform the actions of policy-
makers in Defra. While the growing field of interpretive policy analysis offers a 
framework through which to study meaning in the policy-making process, I feel 
that there is also something to be gained by applying the tools of organization 
studies to the civil service. It is my intention, in this thesis, to explore storytelling 
in Defra and in doing so to understand how officials order their working lives. In 
the following chapter, I further elucidate my research methods and discuss the 




In trod uction 
A commitment to an interpretive approach to policy analysis does not necessarily 
entail a commitment to particular research methods, and in this chapter I discuss 
my choice of strategies for collecting the data for my research, namely participant 
observation and interviewing. The difficulty in writing a 'methods' chapter is that 
my experience has not followed what Cook and Crang (1995 p4) call the 
"conventional read-then~do-then-write sequence" of doing research. My 
fieldwork was arranged to make the most of opportunities for participant 
observation that arose during the early stages of the research. The structure of the 
chapter represents the temporal sequence in which the data was gathered and 
written up, but in reality the development of research questions, analysis of data, 
and time spent in the field was an iterative process rather than a linear sequence of 
activities. Firstly, therefore, the chapter covers the period of participant 
observation, then the rationale for doing interviews, and finally the means by 
which I analysed and wrote about the results. The purpose of the chapter is not 
only to describe what I did but also to explain how it fits into the methodology of 
the research project, and to be as transparent as possible. Consequently I have set 
out in as much detail as possible the practicalities of doing the fieldwork. 
Participant Observation 
My research began with a period of participant observation, which, as I have 
already mentioned in preceding chapters, was to prove instrumental in directing 
the course of the project. This preliminary fieldwork took the form of a two-
month secondment to Defra, working in the Exotic Disease Prevention and 
Control (EDPC) division of the Animal Health and Welfare Directorate General. I 
worked from Monday to Thursday at the divisional offices in Page Street, 
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Westminster, ostensibly as a civil servant. I was given several projects to work on, 
independently or as part of the team to which I had been' assigned. These tasks 
ranged from essentially administrative tasks such as writing reports to more 
investigative roles, gathering evidence for cross-cutting reviews and presenting 
the results to more senior staff. As part of these projects I was required to attend 
various meetings. These ranged from small informal team meetings to large board 
meetings with staff from across Defra and its agencies. In addition, as staff 
became aware of my presence and personal research interests they invited me to 
other meetings that they thOUght would be of interest. Living in London, sharing 
the staff canteen and keeping office hours, as well as my active participation in 
meetings and the policy process, gave me an experience of life as a civil servant in 
that particular division of Defra which no other method of research could afford. 
The aim of this participant observation was to gain first-hand experience of 
policy-making in Defra. Ethnographic inquiry enables the researcher to find out 
what it is that everybody in the setting in question takes for granted. I had felt 
some dissatisfaction with my previous attempts at researching Defra policy-
making (my masters degree thesis, which studied bovine tuberculosis and relied 
on interviews) because of my inability to 'ask the right questions'; because I 
didn't really have a sense of who was at different types of meetings, how advice 
was transferred between scientists and policy-makers, and because all these things 
were taken for granted by my interviewees, I felt that my analysis only performed 
a superficial interpretation of the issues involved. Thus, by doing the participant 
observation I wanted to be able to refine my research questions and be more 
informed about the background issues of working in Defra. Another important 
aspect of ethnography for me was the fact that it is (usually) done in real time, in 
contrast to retrospective policy analysis. Consequently, this gives a very different 
perspective to normal means of studying policy-making, although the importance. 
of this was something that only really became apparent during the participant 
observation when my experiences contrasted with my expectations. 
Participant observation is not simply a process of entering a field site and taking 
notes on its characteristics but, as Denzin describes, "a field strategy that 
simultaneously combines document analysis, respondent and informant 
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interviewing, direct participation and observation and introspection" (1970 p 186). 
The experiences of researchers vary widely as there are few guidelines 
determining the optimum length of fieldwork, or the means of conducting the data 
collection. Consequently, it is important that written accounts include reflections 
on the key factors that have influenced the field research. Altheide and Johnson 
(1994 p494) suggest several items for locating and informing the role of the 
researcher vis-a.-vis the phenomenon being studied, around which this section is 
structured: 
• Accessing the setting 
• Approach and presentation of self 
• Trust and rapport 
• The researcher's role and way of fitting in 
• Mistakes, misconceptions, surprises 
• Types and varieties of data 
• Data collection and recording 
These items are used as starting points for discussing the key issues that arose 
during my Defra placement. 
Accessing the setting 
In order to access the setting (in this case, Defra's exotic disease prevention and 
control division), I used a contact that my doctoral supervisor had made within the 
division to try to negotiate entry. After a series of emails, we had a teleconference 
to discuss the length of my visit, the hours I would work, and how the secondment 
would be funded. At that stage, I knew little about the work I would be expected 
to do and understood little about the division itself. My arrival in London to begin 
the secondment was, in effect, a more important phase of accessing the setting, as 
I met my two Defra supervisors who were responsible for managing the 
secondment. This entree period was marked by many conversations in which my 
Defra supervisors talked about. the importance of confidentiality, and they 
frequently sought reassurance that I understood my obligations not to talk to 
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'outsiders' about my work and what I heard in meetings. The confidentiality 
agreement we brokered was less formal and more ambiguous than I would have 
liked. My Defra supervisors were happy for me to see, read, and hear anything 
during my secondment. I could make notes, and use my observations in my 
research so long as the material did not cast Defra 'in a bad light'. I was not 
permitted to use the names of staff, or to quote their words directly. And in some 
cases, where the material concerned was sensitive, I was not to use it at all. I felt 
as though the first week was a chance for them to 'test' my trustworthiness, by 
monitoring my behaviour and reactions to the events I witnessed. I was careful not 
to make too many notes, ask awkward questions, or speak out of tum at meetings. 
By the end of the week they appeared to be satisfied, and allowed me to start work 
on my project autonomously. 
I 
For much of the time, my two Defra supervisors acted as gatekeepers, determining 
who I spoke to and which meetings I attended. Although they were diligent in 
collecting me from my desk before meetings and showing me where to go, I had 
no way of knowing how and why they chose to take me to some events and not 
others. Some of their decisions were guided by the project they had given me, as I 
was frequently asked to attend a meeting that would be relevant to my work. At 
other times I was told that it would be good for me to witness a particular type of 
meeting because I would find it interesting (as an outsider with an interest in 
policy-making), but I was usually not asked to attend similar meetings again 
because they thought I only needed to see one typical meeting and no more. It was 
possible for me to find out some of the meetings that were taking place by looking 
in staffs electronic diaries that are used to check availability when scheduling 
events. However, even when I found out that a meeting was taking place that I 
was interested in, I felt powerless to ask if I could go along. On one occasion I did 
ask, and was told that I couldn't go because the division was trying to cut down 
on the number of staff who attended this particular type of meeting. At this point I 
seemed to occupy a difficult position between insider and outsider; I was clearly 
considered 'staff by those who wanted to limit the number of attendees, but I felt 
very strongly that as an independent researcher, I would be interested in going 
along. This was not the only example of my gatekeepers' agenda in deciding 
which meetings I should attend. In some cases, I was effectively compelled to 
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attend a meeting because I would be required to discuss my project and the 
.. 
progress I was making. Although this was unnecessary to some extent (one of my 
Defra supervisors could equally have given an update) it seemed to me that they 
were keen to show their managers what they were 'getting' from the student on 
secondment, and to prove that I had been a worthwhile investment. 
Participant observation is criticised on the basis that it may cause actors to change 
their behaviour in the presence of the researcher. These reactive effects may 
seriously jeopardise the external validity of the research if actors have 
significantly altered their normal behaviour. Moug (2007 pl09) argues that 
reactive effects are unavoidable in participant observation because the researcher 
deliberately "sets out to become involved in, or influence, the setting under 
investigation by striking up relationships with people in the setting". The 
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acceptance of the presence of a researcher over time does not diminish the 
problem; instead it produces a "selective contamination" in the data gathered as 
information given at the beginning of the study may be less reliable than that 
gained when the researcher is accepted (Denzin 1970 p261). It is also claimed that 
in some situations, participant observation hinders the collection of data because 
the participation element (especially in workplaces) can "get in the way of' 
observation (Moug 2007 pI 09). Advocates of non-participant observation claim 
that it allows the researcher to remain at a distance from the situation or actors 
under study, giving them greater freedom to collect data and enabling them to 
avoid taking a stance on issues such as the politics of the group being studied 
(Moug 2007 ppll0-l11). 
While these are valid criticisms, they are similar to those made of all types of 
social research; people are not studied in a vacuum and it is impossible to create a 
laboratory-like situation where the presence of a researcher has no effect 
whatsoever. There are two possible approaches that can minimise the threat that 
reactive effects pose to the validity of the research. The first is to triangulate data, 
that is, to compare information from different sources and information gathered in 
different ways. The second approach is to acknowledge the extent of reactive 
effects among the research participants in the written account, to make the reader 
aware of potential 'contamination'. Those employing an interpretive approach see 
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this issue differently, however. The suggestion that observation and participation 
are mutually exclusive is problematic because the interpretive researcher is not 
aiming for clinical distance from the 'research subjects'. The part that the 
researcher plays in the sensemaking process of the participants must be 
acknowledged. Perhaps more than most, I actively influenced the research setting 
by not only openly observing policy-making but actually contributing to policy-
making by producing reports and documents of my own, giving presentations at 
meetings and so on. It is not a case of sitting quietly in a comer to observe the 
lives of others. When participating in an activity the researcher is constantly 
gathering information through their own experience. The authority of the 
researcher comes from "being there" and encountering at first hand "the mundane 
nature of elite life, and the 'nitty-gritty' of government action" (Rhodes et al 2007 
p3). 
Approach and Presentation of self 
Many staff were made aware, by emails from my Defra supervisors, that I was 
visiting the division and that I was an academic researcher with an interest in the 
policy process. In practice, however, I only met a small number of staff in person 
during the first week and after that I was generally assumed by everyone else to 
be a new employee. The turnover of staff in the division is fairly high and it was 
commonplace for staff to be seconded from other divisions, or employed as 
consultants on a short or long-term basis. Consequently, there was little reason for 
me to be noticed as a newcomer, and almost all staff accepted my presence 
without question. Atkinson and Hammersley (1994 p249) suggest four factors in 
the self-presentation of the researcher which influence the experience of 
participant observation: 
• Whether the researcher is known to be a researcher by all those 
being studied, or only by some, or by none. 
• How much, and what, is known about the research and by 
whom. 
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• What sorts of activities are and are not engaged in by the 
researcher in the field, and how this locates· her or him in 
relation to the various conceptions of category and group 
membership used by participants. 
• What the orientation of the researcher is; how completely he or 
she consciously adopts the orientation of insider or outsider. 
Several points can be made here. Firstly, from the outset I was clear that the Defra 
staff would be made aware that I was working with them as a researcher from 
Newcastle University, and that my secondment would provide me with an 
opportunity to observe their working practice. I was not comfortable with the idea 
of covert research and, in any case, explaining my research often helped me 
because staff invited me to meetings that they thought would be of interest, or tqld 
me an anecdote that they thought was relevant to my area of work. However, it 
would have been impossible for me to tell everyone I met, over a period of eight 
weeks, that I was not a Defra employee and that I was observing their behaviour 
as an 'outsider', At some meetings, there were over forty people present, and it 
would have been inappropriate for me to interrupt the proceedings to try and say 
something about my research. In other cases, when I was working on the project 
Defra had given me, it seemed irrelevant to tell someone who I was phoning for a 
piece of information that I was also there to undertake my own research. Despite 
these limitations, I took many opportunities to make my position clear to those 
whom I was observing. In addition to the information that was circulated before 
my arrival, at some meetings my Defra supervisor introduced me to the Chair (and 
anyone else who happened to bepresent) so that I might have permission to sit in 
on the meeting. When there was a teleconference, all participants stated their 
name and which organization they were from, for the benefit of those telephoning 
m. 
Atkinson and Hammersely's criterion of "consciously [adopting] the orientation 
of insider or outsider" (1994 p249) was problematic as it was other Defra staff 
who seemed to determine my status, and my portrayal as insider or outsider 
became context-dependent. At meetings with stakeholder groups, for example, 
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these stakeholders were clearly 'outsiders' who had been invited to a Defra 
.. 
building for a meeting. I was seen by them as 'Defra' and thus an 'insider', and 
rarely had an opportunity to speak directly with the stakeholders. At management 
board meetings, however, my Defra supervisors were keen to emphasise that I 
was an academic 'outsider' who they had brought in to give a fresh perspective on 
their work. As a social scientist, I was particularly valuable because this is an 
aspect of their expertise that the division is keen to expand. At meetings with 
scientists and veterinarians, they saw me as being on the 'policy' side (rather than 
the 'experts' side), because I was identified with my Defra supervisors who are 
policy-makers. All of these instances affected the ways in which I was perceived 
by others, and as a result affected their interaction with me in some way. 
Membership of certain groups (such as 'insiders', or policy-makers) in the 
division could be a powerful tool for accessing other groups or information, and 
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my experience of working in Defra could have been quite different if I had been 
identified with other categories of actor. 
One more point that I would like to make about researcher identity is that it is not 
a simple case of 'managing' one's own presentation of self - it is reciprocal and 
one's own views of the organization change as a result of the process of working 
there. As Coffey (1999 p5) points out, "This sort of approach does not address, in 
any detail, how fieldwork shapes and constructs identities, intimate relations, an 
emotional self and a physical self." Actually working alongside Defra officials 
shaped the sort of research I wanted to do; I didn't want to simply criticise them 
and appraise their "ability" to make policy. As the project unfolded, it became 
clear that I wanted to highlight the nuances of policy-making, the multiplicity of 
forms it can take and the difficulty, in consequence, of pronouncing whether 
certain types of policy formation are 'good' or 'bad'. Partly, this was because I 
sympathised with the Defra officials, having shared their experience for several 
months. Partly it was a result of a more sophisticated understanding of the nature 
of policy-making. The question of critique and critical distance in interpretive 
research generally, and my project specifically, is returned to in the conclusion of 
this thesis. 
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Understanding language and culture 
Before entering the field, I attempted to do some preparatory work to ensure that I 
was well equipped for the secondment. As well as thinking through the areas I 
would later like to investigate in my thesis, I tried to find out something about the 
organization I was joining and the work I would be expected to do. However, one 
of the primary reason researchers choose participant observation as a method is to 
study hard-to-reach groups who cannot be located by other means, and civil 
servants are no exception. My only substantial source of information about Defra 
was their own website but this gives very little information about the structure of 
the Department and when I arrived I had almost no idea what the division I was 
joining actually did on a daily basis. I was given many documents when I arrived, 
including an organizational 'map' showing the job description and grade of all the 
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staff within the division. I was also given many background documents for the 
project I would be working on, as a way of familiarising myself with both the 
topic area and the method (in terms of length and style) of writing documents for 
Defra. I was given many practical items including notebooks and pens like those 
used by everyone else in the division, folders and files and my own telephone line 
and Defra email address. I received the welcome pack that is usually given to new 
employees, which included information about the local area, staff leisure and 
catering facilities, and many other routine details. I felt very much like an 
outsider, but the staff were keen that I should feel at home and be treated no 
differently from other employees. 
However, learning the culture of the department took a long time, and producing 
reports was a laborious process of finding similar work done in the past and 
emulating its structure and format. When I arrived, one of my Defra supervisors 
pointed out that, as a doctoral student, I was the most qualified person who had 
come to do such a secondment in the division. They had strong preconceptions 
(encouraged by my CV which included a number of publications in the area of 
agriculture policy) that I held expertise that would be of use to them. I, on the 
other hand, felt under-qualified for the work they were expecting me to do. Much 
of the content was outside my existing field of knowledge (concerning specific 
animal diseases, or pieces of legislation) and many of the skills they demanded 
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(including risk assessment and project management) were beyond my abilities. 
Even attending meetings could be fraught with misunderstandings and required 
negotiation between myself and the other participants. In one rather awkward 
instance, I was asked to move from the seat I was sitting in at the table to one in 
the comer of the room, because it was customary for the most 'important' 
participants to sit near the chairperson. On other occasions I was asked to sit at the 
side of the room unless others failed to arrive, in which case I could be 'promoted' 
to the empty seat at the table. Being able to manage these situations successfully 
and adapt to the culture of the Department was crucial to the success of the 
placement. 
Trust and Rapport 
The success of participant observation hinges upon the relationship between the 
researcher and those who s/he is attempting to study. The acceptance of the 
researcher into the group being observed, the researcher's access to people and 
materials, and the direction that the fieldwork takes are all dependent upon the 
way the researcher manages their self-presentation. Participant observation is 
different from other qualitative methods, such as interviewing, in that the 
researcher is in a very precarious position involving the constant renegotiation of 
roles. Once an interview has been granted, for example, the researcher will more 
often than not be able to ask their questions without fear that the subject will 
suddenly terminate the interview. In participant observation, on the other hand, 
the researcher is at the mercy of those s/he is studying, as inappropriate behaviour 
may result in expUlsion from the field (or in less extreme cases, they may be 
denied access to group members or events). This creates a power relationship that 
often favours the research subjects. Should the relationship with my Defra 
supervisors have deteriorated, they would have been able to exclude me from 
meetings and effectively cut off my contact with other staff. The tasks I had been 
assigned offered me an 'official excuse' to contact people outside of my 
immediate circle of colleagues, but an inability to produce adequate results could 
have isolated me from the staff. My credibility as a researcher was, for them, 
based on my academic qualifications, and it is likely that our relationship would 
have changed had I failed to produce effective outputs from the tasks I was given. 
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Despite my early acceptance in the office, I frequently' encountered suspicion 
among new acquaintances. Defra receives heavy criticism from journalists and 
pressure groups, and 'outsiders' are consequently perceived to be hostile to the 
Department. By carefully wording the aims of my fieldwork, however, I was able 
to use my project to gain the trust of my Defra colleagues. As others have 
observed, the chances of co-operation increase when the researcher's interests 
seem to coincide with those of the subjects, and especially so when gatekeepers 
believe the research will report favourably on an issue they want to be publicized 
(Shaffir and Stebbins 1991 pp25-30). When I was able to speak in more general 
terms about my research, and describe it as a project on Defra's policy-making 
process, I found that people were very receptive to my presence because many 
had their own grievances about the part they played in policy-making. Winning 
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trust was a long process involving tact and sensitivity. I was frequently taken into 
the confidences of staff who wanted to complain about some aspect of their job, 
whether it was the heavy workload, unrealistic demands from Ministers, or the 
uncooperative members of the farming industry they were expected to deal with. 
Although I tried not to appear to take sides, my apparent sympathy (as opposed to 
vocal criticism) contributed to my acceptance within the Department. Had I 
argued with their views on disease management, or other contentious issues, it is 
likely that I would have encountered reserve and an unwillingness to share 
information with me. 
I also learnt to behave in a manner appropriate to the office environment. For 
example, I did not take a central position at meetings, nor noted down everything 
that was said and done. I felt that the latter was particularly important as constant 
note-taking, particularly when people were speaking about sensitive issues, would 
have created an impression that they were 'under surveillance'. A turning point 
came during a meeting where the Chair looked around before sharing some 
information and said "we're all Defra people here"; an important indicator of my 
acceptance. Even this acceptance was only temporary, however, and when I 
returned to conduct interviews eight months later, respondents were again at pains 
to re-establish the terms of our relationship. Some used phrases like "we know 
each other" to emphasise their willingness to help with the research, while others 
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said "I know you don't want to make Defra look bad", as though trying to prevent 
any criticism by reminding me of the good relationship'I had enjoyed with the 
Department. 
Collecting empirical materials 
During the period of participation, I had two methods of collecting empirical data: 
recording events in my field diary, and gathering documents, either paper or 
electronic. Documentation took many forms including minutes of meetings, 
emails, reports given to me by other staff members and documents that I found on 
the Defra intranet. As I had only a rudimentary idea of the direction my thesis 
would take, I kept a copy of virtually every document that I received. Taking 
notes required greater thought. Wolfinger identifies two strategies for note taking: 
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comprehensive note-taking, where everything (as far as practically possible) is 
noted, and the 'salience hierarchy' where the researcher focuses on events which 
he or she considers most important (Wolfinger 2002). In practice, for many people 
a salience hierarchy is employed whether they recognise it or not, as each 
individual has mechanisms for filtering and sorting information which depend on 
many factors. For example, with regard to the documentation, I reported keeping 
"virtually everything" I obtained during the placement. But this still leaves a 
number of documents - emails about the staff canteen, for example - which I 
discarded because I assumed them to be irrelevant. At the time of the initial 
fieldwork, I was not interested in the materiality of policy-making and so 
prioritised attention to talk above attention to objects and spaces. As Emerson et al 
argue, it is vital that researchers acknowledge the mental sorting processes they 
have used when recording their impressions of events, as "fieldnotes are written 
accounts that filter members' experiences and concerns through the person and 
perspectives of the ethnographer; fieldnotes provide the ethnographer's, not the 
member's accounts of the latter's experiences, meanings, and concerns" (Emerson 
et al1995 p13). 
Many authors of ethnographic methods texts stress the importance of writing 
extensive notes while 'in the field', both to capture initial impressions before 
becoming accustomed to the setting and therefore becoming blind to important 
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features, and to give a broad base of data which does not restrict the possible 
avenues of analysis that can later be carried out (see for-example Emerson et al 
1995 pll). There are dilemmas for the researcher, however, in finding the time to 
write and whether to make notes overtly or covertly in the presence of the 
research subjects. One benefit of this type of organizational ethnography was the 
culture of taking notes at meetings. Without exception, participants at meetings 
would be taking notes and my Defra supervisors at the start of the placement gave 
me several standard-issue notepads, so even my writing materials blended in with 
those of my subjects. However, there were times, as mentioned earlier, when it 
seemed inappropriate to be taking notes, for example when something tangential 
to the meeting was being discussed (e.g. gossip about other staff, or tentative ideas 
that were not yet formally proposed for discussion). There were also many 
instances when conversations held in the lift, by the kettle, or at an office party 
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were interesting but I had no chance to write them down until several hours after 
the event. 
Interviewing 
As I have already discussed in the thesis, the preliminary fieldwork was a period 
of discovery where disparities emerged between what I expected policy-making to 
look like and what was actually observed. As Yanow suggests, the process of 
reflecting on these puzzles and tensions can lead the researcher to perceive that 
members of the group being studied have invested something with a meaning that 
is different to the meaning afforded it by the researcher (Yanow 1996 p45). As a 
result, the tasks of the researcher are to understand what these meanings are and to 
understand the interpretive processes at work. Being interested in the storytelling 
approach, I decided to conduct interviews to explore the way that policy-makers 
talk about policy-making. There are those (e.g. Gabriel 2004, Maynard-Moody 
and Musheno 2003) who advocate actually asking participants to recount stories 
(defined as anecdotes with beginning, middle and end, a plot etc), rather than 
simply interviewing them about their experiences. However, I do not feel that this 
strict adherence to the notion of a story is necessary; meanings can be 
communicated in many different forms and, it seemed from my observations, 
there was little 'story-telling', strictly defined, in Defra. As such, I did not feel 
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that asking people about their experience of policy-making would miss substantial 
.-
information. Indeed, it transpired that in the course of the interviews people often 
recounted anecdotes about occurrences without specific prompts to do so. So my 
purpose in conducting the interviews was to gain an understanding of the meaning 
that policy-makers and scientists attach to their work. 
Eight months after completing my period of participant observation I began 
conducting in-depth interviews with 16 individuals who I had identified as key 
actors in the policy-making process around animal disease. In deciding who to 
interview, I tried to recruit people who would have different perspectives on 
policy-making. The interviews were typically one hour in duration and took place 
at the workplace of the interviewee, because I felt it was important to meet 
participants in their work environment. I used the experience of participant 
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observation to make decisions about who to interview. Yanow (2006 p71) draws 
an analogy with actors rehearsing to illustrate this process: through preliminary 
fieldwork, researchers "learn the action repertoires of their research craft: how to 
select 'good' research sites - places where they will be more likely to observe 
what it is they want to see; how to identify 'good' documentary locations or 
'good' people to chat with; how to 'topic talk' with them; and so on". Sampling in 
this sense does not involve randomly selecting respondents, but using intuition 
and knowledge gained over a lengthy period of fieldwork to select the most 
appropriate candidates for further research. I knew from my prior experience that 
insight into the policy process would require speaking to a wide range of people, 
and I also knew who would be most willing and able to participate in an 
interview. 
Consequently, I identified key categories of actors: Defra civil servants (from the 
exotic disease division), Defra Science Directorate staff, Government scientists, 
Government veterinarians, Chief Scientific Advisors, Chief Veterinary Officers, 
Science Advisory Council members, consultants, stakeholders, and civil servants 
from the devolved administrations. I located informants from each category and 
contacted them by email. The response rate was high. Of the 20 people who were 
approached 16 agreed to be interviewed. I knew that a large number of interviews 
would not be possible, due to the small number of individuals within each 
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category, and because they were extremely busy due to a series of exotic disease 
outbreaks from September to January 2007 (there were multiple outbreaks of Foot 
and Mouth Disease, Avian Influenza and Bluetongue disease in this period). 
However, the number of people interviewed was less important than their 
relevance to my research questions. As Cook and Crang point out, "researching 
the lives of every member of every interest group is not only impractical in most 
studies but is also unnecessary because there usually comes a point in the research 
process where the range of arguments that can be made concerning a particular 
matter has been made" (1995 p11). Therefore, rather than seeking the highest 
number of respondents, I worked on the principle of asking interviewees who else 
they thought I should speak to and, when no new names were offered, I felt 
confident that I had covered all the relevant actors. 
As well as the problem of accessing respondents during a time of disease 
outbreaks and other upheavals (the exotic disease division was in the process of 
moving to offices in a new building), several other issues arose as a result of the 
'elite status' of many of the people I was interviewing. Rossman and Rallis (2003) 
have described the challenge posed by interviewing elites and they make 
observations that are equally relevant to my study of senior civil servants, 
laboratory directors and so on. The elite individual, they argue, "is typically quite 
savvy and may resent the restrictions of narrow or ill-phrased questions. He or she 
may want an active interplay with the interviewer. Elites respond well to inquiries 
about broad topics and to intelligent, provocative, open-ended questions that allow 
them to use their knowledge and imagination". Therefore, greater demands are 
placed on the ability of the interviewer, "who must establish competence by 
displaying a thorough knowledge of the topic or, lacking such knowledge, by 
projecting an accurate conceptualisation of the problem through shrewd 
questioning" (2003 p192). Through my placement in Defra, I did haye detailed 
knowledge of the topic and, usually, the person I was interviewing. This was not 
enough to ensure a successful interview, however; there were several occasions on 
which I felt I was being given generalisations instead of meaningful occurrences, 
or that the interviewee was answering a different question to the one I had asked. 
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Thomas, who studied corporate executives, explains why this can happen in elite 
interviews: "talk is the stock in trade of corporate executives. That is, they are 
paid to think and talk and, more pointedly, to talk to a wide variety of audiences. 
Their public or organizational persona is formed through training in public 
speaking, in dealing with the press, and even in how to be interviewed" (1995 
pll). Consequently, it is quite common to "watch an executive mentally 
'rewinding the tape' in search of an appropriate phrase or monologue that appears 
to accord to a particular question. This may be unavoidable (even unintentional), 
but the effect is the same: He will launch into a speech if the question allows or if 
the question does not challenge the appropriateness of a speech" (Thomas 1995 
p 11). The most exaggerated example of this was an interview where the 
participant talked for fifteen minutes without my having asked the first question. 
Forester (2008 p146) warns against being "held hostage to familiar but reductive 
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rationalisations", variously termed "scripts", "spiels" and "homilies". A strategy 
to avoid rehearsed narratives is to ask for specific details and examples and to 
challenge serial grievances with requests for possible solutions (Forester 2008 
pI46). Additionally, it is important to be clear about who exactly you want to 
interview - the individual, the position, or the organization, because "in the 
absence of clarity, the third is likely to be chosen by the interviewee" (Thomas 
1995 pI 0). In my experience, respondents immediately began to talk about 
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Defra's position on a subject, and seemed surprised that I would rather hear about 
their own personal experience. Likewise, many assumed I wanted to talk about the 
latest disease outbreaks, which were frequently in the news, rather than their 
everyday work. Only through very specific and explicit questioning was I able to 
redirect them to the topics I wished them to speak about. 
There are other, more deliberate reasons for respondents to avoid answering 
questions that is particularly common in political research. Political. elites may 
approach the interview with an agenda at odds with that of the researcher, a 
consequence of their position in the public arena and the importance of their 
image and reputation. The aims of the interviewee may be "to present themselves 
in a good light, not to be indiscreet, to convey a particular interpretation of events, 
to get arguments and points of view across, to deride or displace other 
interpretations and points of view" (Ball 1994 pp97 -98). The researcher must, as 
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a consequence, be aware that misleading answers may be given. In studies of the 
civil service, some have found that actors tend to claim key roles and influence for 
themselves (e.g. Ball 1994 p 104) while others argue that they often 
underemphasize their role, particularly if the policy has not been a successful one 
(Duke 2002 p49). While the nature of interpretive research is to treat all 
respondents' viewpoints as valid interpretations (in other words, the researcher 
does not have access to different 'truths' because he or she is an outside observer), 
this does not entail uncritically accepting every story that is told. It is vital that the 
researcher considers alternative perspectives on the information offered by elites 
and acknowledges resistance to, or narratives that compete with, the dominant 
discourses presented to them. The potential for ignoring certain discourses, or of 
self-silencing by participants, must also be considered. There may be people who 
felt unable to talk about ~ertain topics or who felt compelled to present their vie»,s 
in a particular way. It is one of the chief purposes of this thesis to challenge this; 
firstly by interviewing those usually ignored (middle ranking officials) and also 
by seeking to explore challenges to the dominant 'rational' discourse of policy-
making. 
Analysing the results and writing the text 
Just as my research has not followed the supposedly linear transition from 
literature review to fieldwork, it is also difficult to make a neat distinction 
between data collection and analysis. As Yanow observes, the distinction between 
data "collection" activities and data "analysis" has temporal reality (in the sense 
that fieldwork often precedes desk-based analysis) but it is conceptually artificial 
because sensemaking occurs before entering the field and while observing and 
interviewing, as well as afterwards in the "analysis" period (Yanow 1996 p35). In 
my case, I had already had time to reflect on and begin to interpret the period of 
participant observation before I began interviewing, and so directed my interview 
questions towards particular topics. In this sense, then, I had already begun to 
make sense of Defra and use this preliminary sensemaking to guide my further 
investigation. Even within the interviewing period, my questions changed as 
interesting themes emerged. Interviewing is more than simply setting a tape 
recorder running and asking a series of questions. I wanted to follow Soss (2006 
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p136), who argues that in-depth interviewing "can be viewed as a set of 
simultaneous activities that support and direct one another in the field: discursive 
and dialectical conversations with interviewees, transcription activities, coding 
and analysis of data in hand, analytic memo writing, purposive selection of next 
informants, revision of interview protocols, and so on." There is a second element 
to the falseness of the distinction between data collection and interpretation, 
however, which stems from the fact that there is no such thing as 'pure' data, free 
from interpretation. As Yanow puts it, data "are not 'collected' or 'gathered' as if 
they were so many butterflies or seashells strewn about an organizational beach 
just waiting to be found" (Yanow 1996 p44). This is particularly true of attempts 
to gather stories and narratives, because each retelling is a recreation of the world 
of the participant, and these recreations "are not photographically accurate 
accounts of events and. people. Researchers cannot separate the storytellers' 
interpretations and their decisions regarding what to present and how to present 
the story from the events recounted (or invented) and the characters described (or 
imagined). Stories are not facts or evidence waiting for interpretation; they are, 
from the moment they are conceived through their many te1lings and retellings, 
the embodiment of the storytellers' interpretations" (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno p320). 
The aim, then, was not to collect pure stories and then analyse them from my 
privileged position as 'outside' observer. The aim of interpretive analysis is to 
study situated meanings; consequently I wanted to study the stories told to me 
during the interviews and compare this with my experience of observing Defra. 
As Taylor explains, "We make sense of action when there is a coherence between 
the actions of the agent and the meaning of his situation for him. We find his 
action puzzling until we find such a coherence [ ... ] This coherence in no way 
implies that the action is rational: the meaning of a situation for an agent may be 
full of confusion and contradiction, but the adequate depiction of this 
contradiction makes sense of it" (cited in Soss p 133). The first stage of my 
analysis involved coding the interview transcripts: assigning chunks of the text to 
different categories. To do this I used qualitative data analysis software, QSR 
NVivo 7, which allows text to be coded with multiple tags and permits faster 
access than traditional 'cut and paste' methods. In coding the data, I highlighted 
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parts of the text and applied a category to them: not a predetermined category, but 
a label derived from the interview transcripts themselves, such as 'frustration', 
'management' and 'craziness'. It is not my intention in this chapter to discussion 
the merits and shortcomings of the NVivo software (there is a burgeoning 
literature on the subject of computer-aided qualitative data analysis, e.g. Kelle 
1995; Weitzman 2000; Bringer et a12004) because it was simply a starting point 
for my analysis and my interpretation of the data did not rely on its peculiar 
merits. 
After coding the interview transcripts, I perceived that two themes predominated 
in the data: complaints about work, especially feelings of ineffectiveness and the 
difficulty of working the Department, and ideas about who is or is not useful, 
expert, and so on. These, themes were arrived at intuitively, rather than by doipg 
pseudo-quantitative keyword searches; it was not that particular terms were used 
more than others, but that it became apparent to me many comments returned to 
these two overarching narratives. Therefore, I wrote two chapters - directly 
following this one - arranged around the themes of bureaucracy and expertise. In 
the spirit of Law (2004), who counsels against searches for certainty and 
singularity, these are not two directly complementary sets of stories; the voices of 
both policy officials and scientists are present in each, and they are sometimes 
overtly contradictory in their interpretations of events. The same people who call 
themselves experts are derided as 'out of touch' by others, while the same meeting 
may be heralded a success by some and a waste of time by their colleagues. These 
contradictions and gaps are not problematic; rather, competing interpretations 
form the basis for the argument in the rest of this thesis. 
Writing up interpretive research requires sensitivity to the fact that a thesis gives 
the impression of being a final, ordered and complete account of the phenomenon 
or group under study. It is rare for participants to collaborate in producing the text, 
and so it is perceived as the observations of an 'expert' who has entered their field 
and recorded their behaviour. Interpretation can be portrayed as an "act of 
inscription" which gives authority to the inscriber and simultaneously "suppresses 
the dialogic dimension of constructing interpretations of human action" 
(Schwandt 1994 p 131). Conventional social science texts often claim to be 
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definitive accounts of the research subject, presuming that "there is a world out 
there (the real) that can be captured by a 'knowing' author through the careful 
transcription ( and analysis) of field materials" (Denzin 1997 pp4-5). This style of 
reporting social scientific findings, with its emphasis on the objective stance of 
the researcher, "contrasts badly with the down-to-earth routines of the people 
under study" (Shaffir and Stebbins 1991 pS). Thick description is posited as an 
alternative means of communicating research findings; a means which prioritises 
detail over conformity to a theoretical purpose. Denzin (2001 pS2) argues that the 
purpose of thick description is "to rescue the meanings and experiences that have 
occurred in the field situation. It captures the interpretations persons bring to the 
events that have been recorded. It reports these interpretations as they unfold 
during the interaction." In doing so it establishes the grounds for "thick 
interpretation", which attempts to "uncover the meanings that inform and , 
structure the subject's experiences." In order to fulfil these aims, thick description 
should be sufficiently detailed that it allows the reader to experience vicariously 
the events that are being described, by presenting data without significant 
explanatory glosses (Denzin 2001 pI17). 
I have used two different writing strategies to represent the data that I have 
gathered. The first is the vignette in Chapter One, which is based on my fieldwork 
diary from the participant observation period. The vignette aims, after Denzin 
(2001), to offer a means for thick interpretation. In capturing the mundane nature 
of everyday life in Defra the vignette not only gives those who have never worked 
in such a Department an opportunity to understand what it is like, but also gives 
detail of circumstances and activities and places that are generally absent from 
interview data, precisely because they are features of Defra so taken for granted 
by those who work there. The second writing strategy is the use of direct 
quotations from interview transcripts, edited only for grammatical accuracy where 
necessary, and supported by my own explanations of the context in which the 
words were spoken or the described events took place. These are included in 
Chapters Five and Six. I felt that it was important to use direct quotations because 
the language in which they talk about their experiences is a significant indicator of 
the way that they have interpreted them. By combining these two forms of 
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presenting data, I aim to give a fuller picture of life in Defra, and to allow 
sufficient detail for others to reinterpret the data for themselves. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described in detail the two phases of fieldwork carried out as part 
of my research project, the rationale behind them, and the benefits and drawbacks 
of each method of gathering data. As I have demonstrated, the two phases held 
very different challenges. In the participant observation phase, I had to develop a 
working relationship with Defra staff and establish myself as both an independent 
researcher and a policy colleague, and manage the conflicting roles and identities 
that these dual purposes entailed. The second phase, consisting of in-depth 
interviews, was more formal in the sense that I had only one role, as an outsider 
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wanting to know more about Defra, but there was still a degree of sensitivity and 
negotiation required in order to arrange the interviews and ask participants about 
their work. The aim of this chapter was not to demonstrate the validity of my 
findings by discussing sample sizes and researcher disturbance and so on, because 
I do not feel that these criteria are particularly helpful ones against which to judge 
the merit of interpretive policy analysis. The aim was to set out the circumstances 
under which the research was conducted, to point out difficulties and to make 
clear the sources upon which my own claims and interpretations are based. In 
doing this, readers may judge for themselves how plausible they find my 
arguments in this thesis. 
The emphasis of this chapter has been on the reflexivity that is essential to the 
interpretive methodology. Interpretive research is not impressionistic, despite the 
emphasis put on thick description and lengthy reporting of participants' own 
stories and opinions. The fact that researchers do not enter the field with fixed 
hypotheses and research questions to answer should not imply that interpretive 
data gathering and analysis is without order. As Yanow argues, the rhetorical 
power of the orderly and finite steps of positivist research denotes a sense of 
rigour which is, by extension, absent from interpretive research but interpretive 
methods are formal, in the sense of conforming to accepted rules or customs 
(Yanow 2000 ppix-x). The rules and customs are simply somewhat different to 
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the rules of more traditional methods, which might emphasise, say, sample size or 
triangulation. For interpretivists, criteria by which to judge a 'good' interpretation 
include internal consistency, a logical flow, and a wealth of detail that persuade 
the reader that the interpreter "knows intimately what happened, has an insider's 
understanding and a plausible explanation" (Yanow 2000 pp57-58). In this 
chapter I have set out the steps I took to ensure that these criteria have been met in 




On Being the Bureaucracy: What it Means to Make Policy in Defra 
So how difficult was it to get into policy-making? It was difficult to 
understand this slightly different world, [in my previous job} 
you're still running projects but they're generally much more 
focused; you're clear what you want to deliver, you're clear on the 
cost. Projects that fail and ones that don't are clear. So you're 
clear what you want to do, you're clear what your costs are, 
you're clear what your deadlines are and generally you know 
who's going to make decisions. When it came to policy-making, I 
head an area that had done some work but it wasn't obvious to me 
how they were going to deliver it because they hadn't got the buy-
in they needed. They knew roughly what they were trying to 
achieve, but they were going into all sorts of detail about detailed 
recovery mechanisms and hadn't got the sign up to actually 
recover it. 
Grade 7 Civil Servant 
Introduction 
In Britain, the tenn 'civil servant' has many connotations, almost all of which are 
negative. The civil service and its members have a definite place in the public 
imagination, and a lexicon of tenns from the neutral ('faceless', 'bureaucratic' and 
the like) to the insulting ('pen pushers', 'jobsworths' and so on). Page and Jenkins 
(2005) outline three different images commonly associated with the civil service. 
The first is of the higher civil service as a sort of gentlemen's club, with few 
women employees, and a world of gentlemen's agreements, inventiveness with 
diplomatic language, shared codes of behaviour and so on. This image is 
supported by the research of Bevir and Rhodes (2003) who allude to the public 
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school traditions of this group when they claim that 'chaps' remains an important 
concept in understanding the culture of the senior civil service. The second image 
is that of a "much larger army of public servants who staff the offices of national 
government services which deal directly with the public or provide 'back office 
functions' [ ... J including social security, immigration, passports, and tax 
administration" (Page and Jenkins 2005 ppI7-18). In this sense the term 'civil 
servant' is extended to refer to all public officials who work in offices whether 
employed by central government, local government, or any other public body. The 
defining features of these civil servants are that they are generally less well or 
even poorly paid and unionized. This image "shares much in common with a 
traditional view of the British working class, which, with the decline in 
manufacturing employment, has become increasingly represented in the service 
sector" (Page and Jenkin~ 2005 ppI7-18). The third image proposed is that of ,an 
"army of faceless individuals in suits and bowler hats - the universal signifier of 
the English civil servant, understood from here to Beijing." The civil servant's 
clothing, including the hats that portray the civil service as still a largely male 
preserve despite statistics to the contrary, and commuter lifestyle, "firmly places 
them among the ranks of the middle class" (Page and Jenkins 2005 p 18). 
In addition to these images, Law (1994b) adds a description of the typical civil 
servant's behaviour and attitude: "The civil servant is told as the antithesis of the 
heroic agent. She absorbs like a sponge. She routinizes. She picks over the details. 
She worries about formalities. She dilutes and diverts [ ... J the bureaucratic wheels 
grind slow and fine as they wear down the entrepreneur and his works" (1994b 
p77). This is the personality type of a stereotypical civil servant, but she operates 
within a much bigger mode of ordering, that of the civil service as an 
administrative system: 
Administration tells of and generates the perfectly well-regulated 
organization. It tells of people, files and (to go beyond Weber) 
machines that play allotted roles; it tells of hierarchical structures 
of offices with defined procedures for ordering exchanges between 
those offices; it tells of organized and rational division of labour; 
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and it tells of management as the art of planning, implementing, 
maintaining and policing that structure. 
(Law, 1994b p77) 
It is these aspects of civil servants and their systems - the emphasis on procedure, 
the dogged insistence on abiding by a rule book, the countless hours spent 
overseeing insignificant bureaucratic tasks, which are caricatured in television 
programmes such as Yes Minister and, more recently, The Thick of It. In the 
former, it is the creation of enormous bureaucratic structures to prevent progress 
or change that is the civil servants' weapon against interfering politicians. In the 
latter, the civil servants are left haplessly implementing endless changes in policy 
thought up on the spot by their incompetent Minister and his team of special 
, I 
advisers. In both, the image of the civil service is that of a layer of bureaucratic 
'padding' between politicians and society. 
Du Gay (2000) offers three suggestions as to why bureaucracy has come to be at 
best, mocked, and at worst, reviled. He claims there are three ways of conceiving 
of bureaucracy that represent three aspects of its failure. The first conception of 
bureaucracy du Gay terms the "popular conception", related to those stereotypes 
described above. Bureaucracy in this respect refers to large organizations that 
apply rules to cases, rather than using, for example, initiative or imagination to be 
more flexible in following procedure. The popular conception, therefore, "often 
appears to be little more than a long list of what people do not like about their 
relations with modem, 'positive' government: 'red tape', regimentation, a rising 
flood of forms, impersonalism and so on and so forth" (du Gay 2000 pI). Du Gay 
argues that this conception is contradictory, as someone who ridicules government 
form-filling and paperwork would be equally disdainful if their, affairs or 
documents were lost track of by an official because they did not have recourse to 
such elaborate filing systems. Also, a person who complains about civil servants 
being tied to procedure would complain equally vociferously if they found that 
they had been treated differently to their neighbour in the same circumstances (du 
Gay 2000 pI). Therefore, he suggests, popular anti-bureaucratic sentiment trades 
on two dramatic, but rather contradictory representations of the 'typical 
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bureaucrat'. "One has this creature endlessly drafting diabolical regulations, 
'cunningly contriving new controls over the private citizen' while extending its 
own, malign influence" while the other "has bureaucrats positioned as idle loafers, 
spending their days [ ... ] reading magazines, planning sailing trips, or buying and 
selling stocks, all at the taxpayers expense" (du Gay 2000 ppl-2). 
The second variant sees what Weber extols as "instrumental rationality" as a 
negative force, rather than a dispassionate and logical system of government. The 
bureau, under this conception, "can sustain its identity only through repressing 
and marginalizing its 'other' - the emotional, the personal, the sexual and so 
forth" (Du Gay 2000 p2). From this perspective, bureaucratic culture "is assumed 
to be based upon a series of 'foundational separations and exclusions' - between 
reason and emotion, pleasure and duty, public and private and so on - whose 
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'absent presence' erupts on to the organizational surface in the. form of 
cumulatively disabling dysfunctions" (du Gay 2000 pp2-3). The bureaucracy is 
ethically and emotionally empty. Elsewhere, du Gay challenges this argument, 
pointing out that as an institution of government, the British administrative system 
performs not only bureaucracy but also politics, diplomacy, and forms of 
enterprise. It was instrumental in the creation of a National Health Service, a 
social security system and the nationalisation of major public utilities that 
involved managerial initiative and enterprise. As he points out, however, 
"reduction to anyone of these various ethical capacities and comportments alone 
would undoubtedly damage the purposes the public administrator is charged with 
fulfilling" (du Gay 2005 p4). The bureaucracy can only survive by finding the 
middle ground between dispassionate administration and political or managerial 
purpose. 
The third strand of criticism is the 'new public management' or public choice 
critique that became popular in North America and the UK in the 1980s (as 
embodied in, for example, Osborne and Gaebler 1992). In the UK, the 
bureaucracy was scrutinised by the Conservative government, intent on cutting 
public spending on unnecessary services, and found to be inefficient, wasteful of 
resources, inflexible and lacking effective management. The solution to this 
problem ~as found by introducing business principles to the civil service, 
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employing managers from the private sector and creating executive agencies that 
would be run in the manner of ordinary profit-making companies. Attacks were 
aimed at both the structure of the administrative system and the culture of those 
who worked within it. Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT), designed to 
ensure value for money in local service provision, exemplified this approach, 
forcing providers with established contracts to compete more openly and helping 
to overcome the suspicion that civil servants and the professions were "the source 
of vested interests, obstacles to change, and inefficient and self-serving working 
practices" (Gamble and Wright 2004 p3). The chief crime of the bureaucracy 
under this conception, then, is that the procedures and principles that Weber 
cherished have failed to keep up with the changing priorities of government. 
Rationality, for the bureaucracy, should mean operating in a cost-efficient, 
business-like manner. 
There are many stories, then, about being a civil servant, both in popular culture, 
academic commentary, and government itself. Are these depictions fair? Do civil 
servants recognise them? In this section I explore the stories told by both civil 
servants and the others who worked with them (whether vets, scientists, or others) 
about what it is to be a civil servant (or policy-maker) in Defra. Unsurprisingly, 
their stories do not fit neatly with those caricatures of pen pushers and bowler-
hatted men described above. However, they do describe a world filled with 
frustrations and fleeting moments of success, procedures to be followed and the 
shock of an emergency that disrupts them. The policy-makers are all too aware of 
the inefficiencies and illogical aspects of their work, but it does not prevent them 
striving to do the best job they can. Their stories, then, amount to a narrative of 
policy-making, of being a civil servant, as a constant battle for meaning and worth 
in their everyday jobs. Success and results are achieved against the odds, in a 
situation where even their own management seem to misunderstand them and 
make their lives more difficult. It is a tale of heroism as individuals take risks and 
face emergencies with imagination and determination to succeed. 
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Telling stories about the bureaucracy 
People 'outside' of Defra - especially those who are attempting to hold Defra to 
account - such as members of auditing bodies and external advisory panels, feel 
frustration at the difficulty of doing so. Bureaucracy, to them, means a system of 
anonymous workers and decisions made by committee, making it extremely 
difficult to pinpoint who was responsible for a decision, or who should be 
contacted if a complaint was to be made. Staff in liaison roles (for example, in the 
Science Directorate of Defra, which co-ordinates dialogue between Defra and the 
Chief Scientific Adviser) commented that many months were spent, upon taking 
up their position, simply understanding the structure of the Department, 
identifying who had responsibility for which policy areas and functional tasks, 
and meeting the most ~mportant Defra staff members. They saw Defra a~ a 
monolithic, highly complex Department where even identifying and locating 
people was an almost impossible task. Even when contact is made, there is 
frustration at the way Defra seemed able to elude 'capture' by their critics. The 
Science Advisory Council (SAC) is a good example of a group with a scrutiny 
function that occasionally struggles to engage satisfactorily with Defra officials. 
The Science Advisory Council was created to monitor and challenge the scientific 
advice being used by Defra. Much of their work involves writing reports about an 
aspect of Defra's policy-making (either pertaining to governance or the handling 
of a particular issue) that are then put to the relevant Defra staff for them to 
comment and take action if necessary. When Defra receive such a report, there are 
three categories of response available: accept, accept in principle, or reject. 
Accept in principle is often used. One of the members explained that: 
Accept in principle is Sir Humphrey speak for we don't want to be 
seen to be saying this isn't right, but we don't want to actually do 
anything. 
Sir Humphrey (to whom other interviewees from the SAC secretariat also referred 
when talking about Defra civil servants) is, of course, a principal character in the 
television series Yes, Minister; a Permanent Secretary who utilises every 
bureaucratic obstacle available to prevent the Minister pressing ahead with new 
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policies. He is famous for creating endless policy reviews and complex 
bureaucratic processes until the Minister is forced to giv{up his policy. Therefore 
the tendency to repeatedly choose 'accept in principle' is seen as evidence that 
some people within Defra merely want to obstruct progress and maintain the 
status quo. The same SAC member wondered whether the details of their 
meetings with Defra officials ever permeated through the rest of the Department. 
He felt that many Defra staff were hostile to the Science Advisory Council 
holding them to account, and suggested there are some of them who: 
regard us with a bit of suspicion and some who just think we're a 
bit of a nuisance because we keep asking questions and they took 
over our meeting so for the social science one we sawall the 
science coordinators and they tum up dutifully and most of them 
read themselves up for the ten minutes that they're there or the half 
an hour they're there, but you got the distinct impression that they 
then go away and forget about it, they've done their bit, they'll see 
the report, they'll see the response from Defra and they'll carryon. 
Although people outside the division interpreted their difficulty in penetrating 
bureaucratic procedures as a deliberate attempt by Defra to prevent a transparent 
decision-making process, policy-makers took a different view. They did not talk 
of intentional obfuscation and opacity in procedures, but of a more benign state of 
inefficiency and disorder within the division. All the features of bureaucratic life, 
they felt, are against them: from the way staff are recruited and trained, the way 
people move within the department, to the difficulty of piecing together scraps of 
information to make policy and the need to fit work around an excessive amount 
of meetings. From the moment they enter the civil service, life is difficult as 
people are recruited to work areas that they usually have no qualifications for or 
experience in.9 A Higher Executive Officer (HEO) who had recently taken over a 
new work area described the usual way in which new staff are inducted: 
9 Page and Jenkins' (2005) extensive survey of middle-ranking civil servants found that although 
70% of respondents had a bachelor's degree before joining the service, the subject of the degree 
rarely corresponded with the policy area they worked in. 
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You definitely do get help from people I mean everyone's very 
supportive and the standard approach is to point you at the website 
and give you a box of papers to read but people are obviously very 
happy to give you briefing sessions to try and get you up to speed I 
mean things that I've found very useful are just looking at 
powerpoint presentations that people have done in the past. Even if 
you can't speak the speak there's quite often notes on the 
presentation and it's the key messages very succinctly and you can 
pick up the gist. 
New policy-makers are expected to 'pick up the gist' and then hone their 
knowledge through attendance at meetings (however resented they are), by 
dealing with queries, a!ld by experience of the job. However, the reality, is 
somewhat different. Many of the papers, reports and minutes created within the 
division are anonymous, and while it may be possible to find out who wrote a 
particular document, more often than not the author will have moved on to 
another division or even Department. Staff turnover in the exotic disease division 
is rapid and continuous. The papers are anonymous because it is seen as 
unnecessary to include peoples' names; they are, after all, the product of many 
people's efforts and they will rarely be seen by anyone outside of the 
organization. There are more problems than simply tracing the author, however. 
Defra internal papers do not follow academic conventions. They are not 
referenced, and there are no hints as to where a figure or a 'fact' has been 
obtained. Minutes or notes of meetings are vague, omitting the details of 
discussions and failing to attribute opinions to particular individuals. This causes 
problems for new staff who may be reading them many months after the event. I 
told the HEO I had been surprised, during my placement in the division, to find 
that papers were not referenced as academic papers are so scrupulously 
referenced. He replied: 
It's true, I guess, it would be better if things were referenced. I 
agree with you, but if it's meeting notes quite often they would be 
referenced with a name, I guess in some of the larger meetings like 
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ADPG10 you would reference with a name but I guess some of my 
larger stakeholder meetings rather than minutes as such we take 
more of a note which reflects what was discussed rather than a 'he 
said, she said' account because quite frankly we'd never get that 
cleared by all the people that are at the meeting. I can understand 
where you're coming from, when you're looking for a file and you 
find a particular document it's probably best to speak to the author 
and see what they did and if they're not around you have to take it 
with a pinch of salt, hopefully you'll be able to guess some of the 
sources just through speaking to other people or just from the 
content itself but you're right, when you open a file of papers it 
could all be true, couldn't it, or not. 
A Grade 7 agreed that it was difficult to piece together a decision-making process 
retrospectively. He described a process like that of putting together a jigsaw 
without necessarily having all the pieces: 
There are some records [of the policy-making process] but not the 
whole story. You've got little snippets like I've got snippets from 
one of the Grade 6s who looks like they were the one who started 
--
this about putting advice to Ministers about different ways to 
approach it, but then the next thing I've got is a draft consultation 
that doesn't seem consistent with any of our options. So you don't 
necessarily get the full story and when you talk to the people who 
were involved they obviously don't quite remember how they got 
there. 
The problem is just as acute for those who are providing the advice, as they find 
that their recommendations and reports are sucked into a void and never seen 
again. The scientists tend to see this as a result of the high staff turnover; in their 
view, the Division was struggling to maintain any sort of continuity when people 
were constantly leaving and being replaced by inexperienced administrators who 
10 Animal Disease Policy Group. The function of this group is explained in detail in Chapter Six. 
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need months of training and time to get on top of the job again. One scientist 
described his frustration at having to repeatedly get in touch with policy 
colleagues to find out what was happening to a project, when overseeing the 
progression of the project should be the policy staffs responsibility: 
There's a constant change, a throughput, but there is a continuum 
of people who have got the knowledge whereas sometimes if you 
do get a bit of a gap things can fall through the gaps as it were. 
You get in touch with them [policy-makers] and say 'what's 
happening with this?' and they go 'Oh God, I don't know, that was 
my predecessor' and they obviously didn't pass on everything 
before they left and so that can be tricky. So a bit more continuity 
in personnel [would be desirable]. 
For another scientist, this issue of information and knowledge falling through the 
gaps is inevitable because of the disorganization evident at the advisory meetings 
he attends. The frequent turnover of staff, the long period of time it takes to train 
newcomers, and the inability to ensure that information is passed on means that 
the scientists themselves are constantly called upon to re-educate staff in the 
basics of the issues they are dealing with: 
Quite often it's the same people in [different meetings] and you're 
surprised to find everybody in the same meeting. And other times 
you're surprised to go to the same meeting and find there are 
different people in who haven't heard what the hell was said at the 
previous meeting. And sometimes you get people who are 
completely clueless about the science and you think why the hell 
are they in it now? They've worked here for the last seven months, 
where's 'bloggins minor' who at least understood some of the 
science? 
Policy-makers and their advisers identified many features of their working life 
that make efficiency and effective working difficult, as I have described above. 
By far the most frequently mentioned difficulty faced by division staff, in their 
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view, is the number of meetings that feature in their working week. It is 
something that interviewees from the highest to the lowest rank felt strongly about 
and they all commented on feelings of frustration at the meetings that everyone 
else (and it was always everyone else) insisted upon calling. When I asked a civil 
servant at HEO level how he divided his time during the working week, the first 
thing that came to mind were the meetings which dominate his diary: 
Unfortunately there are quite a few meetings to discuss various bits 
and pieces. Do you want an hour total [of time spent in meetings] 
for the week? 
KW: If you could give a rough idea 
I'd say worryingly it's probably ten to fifteen hours per week 
which is quite a lot. Maybe that's a harsh week. Ten would be 
standard I'd say. I'm just thinking of Friday, at least five hours 
were spent in meetings and that's horrendous really. 
There was a feeling of one-upmanship in the division with regards to the length of 
the meetings endured and the lack of purpose they held. It is certainly not unique 
to this division, or even to Defra. A recent scandal involved a civil servant, 
thought to be in the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), who wrote a blog 
about her working life under the pseudonym Civil Serf. Before it was removed 
following investigation by the DWP, one of her entries described a meeting that 
she was obliged to attend: 
I've received a meeting request that probably deserves a mention 
in the Guinness Book of Records," she writes. "It is for something 
called the 'People Action Team' (don't ask) and it is scheduled to 
last for a staggering seven hours ... Truly there is no God. 
(Source: Oliver, 2008). 
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Similar experiences were talked about in the division. A Grade 7, when asked 
how his working week was spent, replied: 
A good half of [this week] would have been in meetings of which 
maybe half of them were useful meetings. It's probably an unfair 
comment, that, but half of, probably quarter of the meetings, 
quarter of the week I have spent in meetings that were of value to 
me in doing my outcomes, the things I was trying to achieve. The 
other meetings I attended were usually about corporate issues 
which weren't always a good use of my time compared to what I 
should have been doing. 
Grade 7s and Higher Executive Officers (HEOs) are often at meetings along with 
their superiors simply because the Grade 6s who manage them feel that it would 
be good for them to attend (in order to remain informed, for example, or to 
provide back up in case a question is asked about their policy area). They are 
often not at liberty to refuse to attend, particularly if a senior member of staff has 
called the meeting. Their time is the most dispensable of all those in the Defra 
hierarchy (except the administrative officers) and they are expected to fit in 
around the less available senior staff. However, even those higher up the hierarchy 
were not exempt from the tyranny of meetings. The problem is considered to have 
reached such epidemic proportions that at times the only thing that could be 
achieved between meetings was to prepare for the next ones. I put my question a 
third time to a senior policy manager, and asked him how he spent his working 
week. Again, the topic of meetings dominated his thoughts: 
It's difficult to see how the week develops. The days are stacked 
full of back-to-back meetings; it's a matter of how many you do 
because you've got to have time out of meetings to prepare for the 
next ones or to write papers or consult or discuss, write things up 
At least the senior manager enjoyed the lUXUry of delegating his attendance at 
meetings to lower ranking staff. Of course, it is not only the civil servants who are 
required to be present at meetings. The scientists who are giving advice are also 
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burdened with many hours spent in meetings. In fact, they report many of the 
problems faced by their policy-making counterparts, insofar as they have to deal 
with meetings, report writing, bureaucratic procedure and obstruction from 
higher-ranking officials. A typical remark came from a scientist who no longer 
carries out scientific research but heads a team of researchers. For him, the job 
was virtually identical to that of a policy-maker, in that he spent more time 
communicating with non-scientific colleagues than actually dealing with the 
research side: 
Most of my week? My God, I spend a lot of my time actually 
meeting stakeholders, it's very important to keep stakeholders 
informed on what's going on and getting soundings and that stuff 
from them and then the rest of it a lot of the rest of my time is 
spent producing reports [laughs]. 
When I asked him who the reports were intended for, he replied with the same 
mixture of frustration and resignation that characterized the policy-makers' stories 
about the civil service. He emphasized that without careful attention, the end of 
one meeting would signal the start of preparations for the next: 
the board will get to see virtually all of my reports yeah I suppose 
most of them are for the programme board and the programme 
board meets four times a year so I've got to get all of the papers 
and stuff ready for that so there's a bit of filtering. Early on the 
programme board's agenda wasn't very full but there's a hell of a 
lot happening now so as the secretary to the board I have to be a bit 
clever on how we run the business of it otherwise you know they 
wouldn't get anything done so some things have to be either held 
over to the next meeting or scrapped or given in a very truncated 
form. So a lot of time is spent putting together all the papers for 
that we have maybe 10 or 12 papers for each most of which I will 
put together. The reports are a mixture of sort of meeting reports 
and what I've achieved at them and yeah lots of bloody things it 
can be a right pain in the backside sometimes. 
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All those involved in the division's policy-making process, on both the policy and 
scientific sides, described their frustration at the number of meetings they are 
required to attend. In Chapter Six, I explore an alternative interpretation of these 
meetings, as sites where negotiation of position and influence occur, and argue 
that meetings are vitally important to an organization as sensemaking activities, 
regardless of whether substantive 'business' is done within them. However, the 
interpretation recounted in this chapter, of meetings as meaningless time-wasting, 
is equally important as it gives us an insight into perceptions of the way the 
division - and indeed the Department - is run. Meetings appear to embody some 
of the negative features of life in the civil service more generally. Endless, 
pointless meetings called by those in authority speak of the demand to fulfil 
administrative obligations rather than get the job done. The culture of writing 
reports to present to meetings, which will themselves be written up as reports, 
presents a strong image of an inefficient civil service. The meetings also present 
an image of the civil servants themselves: as people who endure difficult, adverse 
circumstances and battle on to get the job done. They finish their jobs despite their 
meetings, not because of them; they get the real work done in between this 
obligatory report writing. The negative feelings towards meetings are bound up in 
negative feelings towards other elements of working in the division. At the time of 
the interviews, the Department was undergoing a reform programme called 
Renew Defra, of which many people were very sceptical, and which seemed to 
exemplify the failings of Defra management. 
Managing in the middle 
Renew Defra was initiated in December 2006 as a programme of reform that 
would change the structure of the whole of the department. The overarching aim 
of the Renew Defra programme is "to transform the Department into an 
organization that is more collaborative, flexible and effective in developing 
policies which deliver the right outcomes" (NAO 2008 p11). The Renew Defra 
programme has 5 distinctive work streams: Building a high performance culture; 
Seeing ourselves as the customer sees us; Defining the Defra way of doing things; 
Delivering the Right Size, Right Shape, Right Skills organization; and Managing 
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the programme. In practice, Renew Defra is a form of matrix management 
designed to enable more flexible movement of staff to~the areas where they are 
needed. It separates work into 'core' functions and 'programme' functions 
depending on whether they are ongoing essential matters or temporary projects. 
Although it was slow to be implemented, Renew Defra meant significant upheaval 
for many staff. The names of the Directorate Generals changed, along with the 
names of the divisions, individual job descriptions and in many cases, the area of 
work being covered by an individual was split into two work packages and/or 
combined with another individual's work. A later stage of the reform programme 
involved moving staff from their office in Page Street to one in Nobel House, and 
introducing so-called smart working with hot desks, rather than permanent, 
personal workstations which were the norm for most staff. There were a number 
of job cuts and early r~tirements during the initial reform period, leading to a 
degree of uncertainty and "jitteriness" which many interviewees commented on. 
Despite the extensive organizational changes that appeared to happen under 
Renew Defra, there was a high degree of scepticism that substantive change in 
working practices would occur. Among the scientific advisors, the name changes 
and restructuring were something of a joke as they happen fairly frequently (the 
pre-Renew structure of the exotic disease division had itself only been in place for 
a short time; before that staffhad been organized into teams based on the different 
diseases for which they were responsible). They felt that it was unhelpful to keep 
changing the names of the divisions (because it causes confusion) and for the 
majority, the changes were superficial: 
I mean Defra is always changing their names and no sooner have 
you got used to working with whatever it is, animal health, then 
they change it to something else. The divisions I've worked with in 
Defra in ten years have probably changed their name 6 or 7 times 
and of course it was MAFF originally when I was first involved 
and then it's become Defra. 
I think because the individuals in the organization are still broadly 
the same the key individuals that I contact, whether their 
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organogram or responsibilities fluctuate or change it hasn't had a 
major impact for me. 
Policy-makers agreed that despite the upheaval caused by the re-organization, the 
changes to working practices were at best, superficial, and at worst, actively 
damaging to productivity and morale. Some felt that the re-organization 
symbolised the lack of communication between high level management and 
middle ranking policy-makers (who were most affected by the changes). If they 
understood how the divisions actually worked, ran their argument, they would not 
have started to meddle in the organization in such a way. Undoubtedly, the 
feelings of my interviewees were exacerbated by the circumstances they were 
dealing with at the time: in 2007 there were three separate outbreaks of Avian 
Influenza, an FMD outbreak and the emergence of Bluetongue disease, all at a 
time when the re-organization was beginning to be implemented. The 
circumstances were fraught and the stress of coping with a heavy workload 
coupled with a lot of name-changes and movements to new offices did not help to 
improve the morale of staff in the division. Two policy-makers described their 
understanding of how Renew Defra would affect the division, expressing a 
mixture of confusion and a laissez-faire belief that ultimately the changes would 
be minor: 
For some reason, Animal Health and Welfare decided they were 
going to change things and restructure so they did and they 
restructured pretty much around programmes and core but the real 
change in this area was very minimal. [ ... ] What did change was 
they re-Iaunched the disease prevention programme and defined 
things as core and they tried to separate people out either into 
programme or core and then half the people ended up being ha.lf of 
each. It kind of makes sense in a theoretical way, but when you 
think the programmes dealing with stopping disease coming in, 
reducing the risk of it spreading till you know you've got it, 
detecting it early then being prepared to control it when you get the 
disease outbreaks and then clearing up afterwards, that's the 
control framework if you like and therefore the programme is 
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about how do we reduce risks in all those areas [ ... ] But also 
you've got a core function that day to day is dealing with exactly 
the same issues. 
We have been working, Animal Health and Welfare have been 
working on a programme/project style of working for ... well ever 
since I joined really, I think that was about 2003. So even perhaps 
before that, they've always worked in projects. I guess that's one 
of the big changes in the work that might have affected other 
people. We are moving over to smart working very shortly so that 
will be another change in Renew when we all move back to the 
headquarters building in Nobel House [ ... ] Its going to have hot 
desks, and that will be a big cultural change but hopefully it 
shouldn't be too much of an issue. 
These remarks show a feeling of ambivalence towards the management of the 
Department, who were perceived to be imposing unnecessary changes onto the 
middle-ranking officials who knew that no substantive improvement in working 
practices would occur. The feeling that the management staff were out of touch 
with the needs of their juniors was expressed even more strongly when the topic 
of meetings arose. Some people interpreted the number of meetings they were 
required to attend as another feature of overbearing hierarchy. One Grade 7, when 
I asked him why he was expected to give so much of his time to meetings that did 
not help him to get his work done, claimed that it was: 
Because the management structure requires us to have meetings. 
There's a weekly team meeting which is half an hour but often 
ends up being an hour on a Monday. In theory it's to discuss key 
issues for the week, you know, if anyone needs to raise anything 
and pick up any corporate stuff, but it tends to be a lot of corporate 
stuff. We're just getting back to "business as usual", I should have 
got my diary but this week we had Monday morning team meeting 
for an hour, Monday afternoon it was a meeting about business 
planning for an hour or an hour and a half or something, Tuesday 
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there was another meeting about lessons learned, lessons learned 
was on Tuesday for two hours. So "business as usual" this week, in 
the first two days of the week I've probably spent the best part of a 
day in meetings and had to go to those meetings, particularly 
lessons learned. I had to sit down and read a wadge of papers, do 
some thinking, prepare my thoughts about what my lessons learned 
would have been, and so on, so you're talking about probably a 
day and a half of this week on things which aren't actually helping 
me to move forward. 
Studies into middle ranking groups in private companies have highlighted the 
difficulties faced by these workers who often suffer because they have to take 
responsibility for those lower in the hierarchy but lack the power to determine 
broader strategy that could help them with their tasks, which is reserved for those 
higher up. Gouldner (1968) argues that the middle is the most awkward position 
within a bureaucratic organization, both socially and professionally: "The 'top 
dogs' have friends because they are powerful, the 'underdogs' have friends 
because they are powerless, but the middle dogs remain largely friendless. Those 
at the top make the rules, those at the bottom simply apply them, but what the 
people in the middle do is harder to understand, as is the mix of creativity and 
constraint by rules and expectations that characterises their work" (cited in Page 
and Jenkins 2005 p 18). Fry et al (1981) argue that middle groups struggle to 
establish an identity for themselves within the organization. Whereas top-level 
groups have highly stressful, but also highly rewarding tasks like setting overall 
organizational missions and strategy, and the lower levels have clearly defined 
tasks, making their performance easy to judge, middle groups enjoy neither of 
these benefits. The middle group, they argue, are "often fundamentally unclear as 
to whether their goals are, or should be, fuzzy and abstract, or concrete and 
operational. Partly this results from unclear or inconsistent expectations 
communicated by top management. Even with clear mandates, however, most 
middle groups are still faced with the challenge, ultimately, of interpreting higher 
level expectations and moulding them into an acceptable statement of their 
group's core missions, goals, and priorities for others to use" (Fry et al1981 p45). 
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These conflicts are recognisable in the remarks made by Defra policy-makers: 
they too struggle with the ambiguity of having their overall goals set at a higher 
level, and being expected to implement them with some (but not total) flexibility 
and discretion. One policy official commented that re-organizations only worked 
because the middle ranking officials involved have to be effective and get their 
work done; therefore, regardless of the difficulties posed by changes to the 
structure of the department, they will make it work. However, there was a feeling 
that this devotion - or duty - on the part of lower ranking policy-makers was not 
understood or appreciated by those higher up. The Defra policy-makers I 
interviewed also suffered from the ambiguity in the degree of responsibility they 
held, particularly when disease outbreaks occurred. While they commented about 
the extreme pointlessness of some aspects of their work - the meetings, memos 
and reports described above - at other times, they were crucial to the operation of 
the department, and helped to successfully bring disease under control. The 
contradiction of disease outbreaks is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
Overall, both policy-makers and their scientific and veterinary advisers have 
described the exotic disease division as a typical bureaucracy with all the 
problems that such organizational styles bring. In particular, they feel that their 
jobs are a battle against the circumstances they find themselves in: having to make 
policy when their time is limited by the amount of paperwork to do and meetings 
to attend, and having to make decisions with imperfect information because 
papers have been lost and staff have moved on. They have described the 
frustration at working in an extremely hierarchical organization where they have 
little option but to attend meetings when required by their superiors, and where 
organizational changes are made with little consultation with middle-ranking staff 
who are often the most seriously affected. 
Bureaucratic culture and the individual 
Despite telling stories about occasions when they have been involved in ridiculous 
or convoluted decision-making situations, the policy-makers were very critical of 
this culture, appearing to feel that they usually had no choice but to conform to it. 
The relationships between bureaucratic organization and the individuals who 
work within it has been characterised as one in which the distinctive nature of the 
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working environment has a clear effect on the workers. Weber (1978) believed 
., 
that bureaucracy could be tenned a vocation because of the particular demands it 
makes of those who choose it as a profession. He argues that bureaucrats have a 
"duty" to their organization and that taking a job with that organization "is 
considered an acceptance of a specific duty of fealty to the purpose of the office in 
return for the grant of a secure existence. It is decisive for the modem loyalty to 
an office that, in the pure type, it does not establish a relationship to a person, like 
the vassal's or disciple's faith under feudal or patrimonial authority, but rather is 
devoted to impersonal and functional purposes" (Weber 1978 pp958-959). Taken 
to extreme, bureaucrats become devoted to the means of work - the ritualistic 
completing of fonns and following procedures - rather than the ends. 
Following Weber, Merton (1957) famously characterised the 'bureaucratic 
personality' as one of ritualistic behaviour strictly controlled by the nonns of the 
working environment. He argues that the nature of the bureaucracy exerts a 
constant pressure upon the official to be "methodical, prudent, disciplined" and 
attain "an unusual degree of confonnity with prescribed patterns of action" (1957 
p 198). The bureaucrat is highly disciplined, with a keen sense of the limitation of 
their authority and competence, and focused on the methodical perfonnance of 
routine activities. Hill argues that although Merton's argument is applied to 
bureaucratic organizations in general it is especially applicable to public 
administration because civil servants are under a high degree of pressure to 
confonn to rules. Firstly, this is because "They may be putting into practice 
political decisions with which they disagree; they are facing a public who cannot 
nonnally go elsewhere if their demands are unsatisfied, as they often can with 
private enterprise; and the justice of their acts is open to public scrutiny, by 
politicians and sometimes by courts of law" (Hill 1972 P 129). As a result of this 
scrutiny they must ensure that they act in a regular way in confonnity with rules. 
Secondly, the careers of civil servants have to be strictly ordered because there is 
a need for fairness in selection and promotion and for the public service to be able 
to withstand criticism. It becomes difficult to justify dramatic or unconventional 
promotions and this career structure "obviously puts an onus upon confonnity, 
and will tend to create a situation in which if a public servant becomes 
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conspicuous for disregarding rules it will be more likely to hamper than enhance 
his career" (Hill 1972 ppI29-130). / 
Crozier (1964), in his study of the French bureaucracy, argued that in addition to 
Merton's 'ritualism', bureaucrats displayed retreatism. He argues that in 
circumstances where individuals are confronted with a highly demanding 
situation, but with no expectation of reward for their efforts, "individuals will 
choose to reduce their involvement and to commit themselves as little as possible 
to the organization. The pattern of impersonality and centralisation brings great 
pressure in this direction. On the one hand, it deprives people of the possibility of 
personally influencing decision-making, and thus precludes any hope of 
recognition. On the other hand, it does not demand anything but formal 
compliance from individuals. People are not invited to participate, and, if they 
retreat, they risk little punishment" (Crozier 1964 ppI98-199). Defra's middle 
ranking policy-makers frequently find themselves in this difficult position: with a 
high degree of responsibility for ensuring that policy is developed and 
implemented successfully, but with little chance of reward as they are anonymous 
to the public and those higher in the hierarchy take credit for the more important 
over-arching goal-setting work. 
Deal and Kennedy (1999) also talk about the implications of bureaucrats working 
in an environment where criticism is more common than positive feedback. They 
have characterised various styles of organizational culture and apply the term 
"process culture" to the way of working commonly found in bureaucracies. In a 
process culture, they argue, there are few links between the work done by most 
employees and the people they are actually affecting through their work. There is 
very little positive feedback, and often the immediate consequences of their 
actions are unclear, but there is also a high risk of dramatic failure, as they 
explain: 
no one transaction will make or break the company - or anyone in 
it. [ ... T]he employees here get virtually no feedback. The memos 
and reports that they have written seem to disappear into a void. As 
a result, they have no idea how effective they are until someone 
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blames them for something. In a government agency, for instance, 
employees may work like crazy, but the only time they get any 
recognition is when a legislator decides to kill their agency or 
indicts it for violating the public trust or for promoting inefficiency 
and corruption. 
(Deal and Kennedy 1999 ppl19-120) 
Deal and Kennedy argue that this permanent fear of attack leads to extreme 
caution in bureaucrats' behaviour; it is not personal caution, however, but relates 
to the end product, such as a policy. Echoing Weber and Merton, they argue that 
bureaucrats learn to focus on how neatly and completely they do a task, rather 
than on what they are actually doing. An element of self-sacrifice is expected, as 
the people who are valued in this culture are "those who are trying to protect the 
system's integrity more than their own" (Deal and Kennedy 1999 p120). 
While the arguments in favour of a 'bureaucratic personality' seem compelling, 
they are not necessarily applicable to the contemporary Defra setting. Weber's 
notion of bureaucracy as a 'vocation' does not match the experiences of the 
division where there is a very rapid staff turnover and people are keen to take 
.. 
advantage of opportunities to move jobs, both for personal satisfaction reasons 
and because it may enhance their career. As one senior manager described, the 
UK is quite different from its European counterparts in this respect: 
What is noticeable when you go to Brussels is that round the table 
you have policy colleagues from other countries that have probably 
been in the job twenty or thirty years and they really are strong 
because they know everything about it. I'm not sure many policy 
officials here would like to sit in the same job for twenty or thirty 
years. So the UK has gone down this route of having generalist 
administrators and under Renew Defra people move around more 
rapidly and actually subject expertise is going to be less important 
than sort of functional expertise, being able to run a project [ ... J 
You have a turnover of staff so you bring in skills sets and 
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different experience and different worldly experiences, if you like, 
of working across Whitehall in different jobs~and that is really 
important. Otherwise you find yourself in a very blinkered 
approach as to the ways you approach things. There are different 
parts of the department which develop different ways of working, 
and you need to bring that on board and you bring in wider 
knowledge. 
There is a cross-government consensus that if a civil servant stays in hislher job 
for longer than two years it can be damaging for their career; in their study of 
middle-ranking officials Page and Jenkins found that among their interviewees, 
Grade 7s and SEas had been in post for an average of only 18 months, and HEOs 
only 16 months (Page and Jenkins 2005 p43-44). In addition, the sense that civil 
servants are effectively passive in their adoption of the working culture that 
surrounds them does not tally with the accounts given by Defra staff. Crozier 
(1964) criticises Merton for his simplistic approach, arguing that people can hold 
more complex sentiments than he allows for: in his study of French bureaucrats he 
argues that in addition to ritualistic behaviour he identified actions and sentiments 
which could be characterised as rebellious and innovative. The notion that 
workers conform to ritualistic behaviour because it is expected of them, but resent 
it and seek opportunities to rebel against it, is supported by the accounts offered 
by Defra policy-makers. They feel that it is possible to overcome the characteristic 
obstacles of working in a bureaucracy in the right circumstances and make real, 
tangible impacts in their work as opposed to their ordinary feelings of producing 
documents that disappear into a void. The following section discusses the actions 
they take to move from bureaucratic inertia to bureaucratic 'heroism'. 
Bureaucratic heroism 
John Law, in his study of the Daresbury Laboratory, writes of the 'technical 
heroes': the people who are able to physically mend the machinery when it goes 
wrong, who are therefore, at times, much more important than the scientists and 
engineers who design and operate the same machines. Law describes how, at the 
end of the normal working day, the workers go home leaving a group of shift 
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workers in charge of the machine (1994b pp130-131). He argues that these 
.. 
workers relish this time because they have unsupervised responsibility for running 
millions of pounds' worth of machinery. The rest of the building is empty and the 
night workers identify with and become a part of the machine and the laboratory 
as they watch the equipment through the night. The situation is quite different for 
Defra's exotic disease heroes. In fact, in many respects, it could not be further 
from this scenario. The vignette in Chapter One describes the atmosphere in what 
is a minor and short-lived disease outbreak. There is heightened supervision, 
interference by managers and politicians, intense public scrutiny of the policy-
makers' actions. Rather than being left alone, they have more meetings, with more 
people present and more colleagues, .stakeholders, journalists and bosses 
clamouring for information. Yet in other respects, there are significant similarities 
between Law's 'technical heroes' and the policy-makers. They are relied upon 
like no other employees. Their expertise and knowledge of the job are 
indispensible. They are in charge, have responsibility for dealing with 
emergencies, and their failure to act could be catastrophic. 
Heroism does not mean single-handedly saving the organization from catastrophe 
or putting in superhuman effort to ensure a piece of work gets done; it can be 
simply innovating to avoid behavioural or procedural obstacles to success. For 
example, one of the problems described by policy-makers as a barrier to effective 
working is people 'toeing the line', and being unwilling to speak out when they 
think there is a problem. A Grade 7 suggested this was because people are afraid 
of looking stupid in a technical area where they have only generalist 
administrative expertise. He was able to transcend this tendency because, as he 
said: 
I personally don't have a problem because I'm willing to sound 
stupid and ask stupid questions and generally they don't always 
tum out to be stupid questions and you often look around the table 
even when they are stupid and people go 'Oh, so that's what it 
meant.' So I don't have any problem. 
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The same Grade 7 told me a story about his experience of taking over a new piece 
of work within the division, and described similar feelings of resentment at the 
fact that established procedures went unchallenged. The proposal, he said: 
Had been out for consultation, been consulted on, they'd had some 
comments back, and they wanted to put it to the lawyers. I sat 
down and read it and said 'What's this mean? Why's that in there?' 
[And the lawyers replied] 'Oh, I don't know, it's always been in 
there, I wasn't involved at the start'. 
Well, you know, what the hell does it mean? You sit down and go 
back to the vets and say 'Why do we need this?' 
[And the vets replied] 'Well, I don't know if you do, I'm not sure 
actually.' 
So heroism in this context means having a certain personality, and opposing the 
civil servant stereotype (bold, honest, willing to take risks, willing to 
communicate openly with other groups of people). Deal and Kennedy (1982 
pp51-52) write about 'outlaws' who are similar to Law's heroes in some respects: 
they are eccentric, contradict the usual ways of doing business, and make their 
own rules. They are also deliberate violators of cultural norms, however, and may 
become whistleblowers and attempt to subvert the organization. The story of Civil 
Serf, mentioned earlier, could be described as the story of an 'outlaw' for whom 
her Department had no sympathy. In Defra, however, the positive notion of 
heroism can be much more strongly identified because there is a common factor 
which gives almost everyone the opportunity to be a hero: when crisis strikes. 
During a disease outbreak, the usual framework of policy-making still applies. 
There is a hierarchy of the civil service that needs to be followed; experts 
meetings are still called; notes and reports are still written. However, the feeling 
inside the division changes. Decision-making is much faster. There is no time to 
sit and discuss an issue from every possible angle. Meetings are convened on an 
ad hoc basis, as quickly as possible, with many scientists telephoning from their 
regional offices. As the vignette describes, these meetings may be confrontational 
and even boring for some, but they are necessary, and they take the place of less 
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important meetings in people's schedules. The priorities of the division are 
different during these periods. Keeping a flow of information in to and out of the 
department becomes crucial. Communicating with stakeholders, journalists and 
Ministers is essential. Updating the website becomes more pressing than filing 
minutes of a previous meeting. The division feels tight knit as everyone -
regardless of official status - is called to a bird table for briefing. People are 
united in their stress, and in their share of the extra workload. Everyone works 
longer hours to ensure that they contribute to the 'battle.' Indeed, the terminology 
that is used during outbreaks - "battle rhythm" (following a sequence of 
procedures and timings), "war-time" and "peace-time" (disease outbreaks and 
disease-free periods) - all contribute to the sense of urgency and determination to 
d · . d' 11 succee m stampmg out Isease. 
For many actors in the policy process, disease outbreaks are seen in some ways as 
a blessing, because they made it easier for such 'heroism' to occur. They give 
some purpose to the job, because if people fail to act then there can be serious 
consequences (which, interestingly, policy-makers seemed to think was not 
nonnally the case). A Grade 7 explained that in one of the latest disease 
outbreaks, there could have been a serious economic impact ifhe hadn't been able 
to quickly take action: 
during the outbreak you're under a lot of pressure, certain meat 
legislation was complex and you had to get things done. You had 
to make certain things happen otherwise meat wasn't going to 
move around the country, we were going to have supermarket 
shelves without meat on and so on, they were going to start 
importing it, taking away UK industry share of the market, things 
like that 
He contrasted this with peace-time, when there is much less urgency, and less is 
achieved. During an outbreak, he argued, the work 
II This tenninology, and the use of organizational tools such as bird tables, became commonplace 
after 2001. For a detailed analysis of how the war metaphor emerged during the 2001 FMD 
outbreak see Nerlich (2004). 
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had a good point to it and secondly you didn't have any faffing, 
you focused on the issues and solved them and got on with it. Get 
back to 'business as usual', suddenly, I've got a very important 
issue you know, if we don't get [this regulation] finished we're 
going to end up getting infracted, and so [it's] very important from 
my point of view, yet instead I'm spending a third of the week or 
whatever it is doing general management stuff. 
A senior policy manager agreed that outbreaks enabled things to happen, because 
the usual barriers to effectiveness - hierarchy and unnecessary meetings - were 
taken away: 
outbreak management is very different from peace-time work. In 
an outbreak it's a very very flat structure, work is produced at 
extremely high pace and papers for meetings are one page, one to 
two pages, whereas in peace-time we tend to try to like to cogitate 
and analyse to a great extent more, but papers at this stage tend to 
just raise the issues and see conclusions and even writing up 
meetings is very very brief, it's to keep the pace going. You don't 
want to waste your time writing things up. 
During outbreaks, Defra both makes and implements policy, meaning that there 
are occasions when officials really do 'make things happen', in contrast with their 
peace-time work when the production of a report will, at best, lead to action being 
taken in several months' time. The scientific and veterinary advisers also feel that 
they benefit from disease outbreaks in that they became indispensable. Their usual 
barriers to having real input into policy - lack of access to the right people, lost 
infonnation - are removed as they become key to the management of the disease. 
Policy-makers are unable to act without the necessary infonnation, whether 
disease test results or epidemiological advice. The decision-making process 
becomes more rapid and focused in contrast with the deliberations of peace-time. 
Two scientists described Defra's need for scientists during an outbreak: 
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quite often these guys are sitting at Defra hopping up and down 
there cos they want to know whether to shoot them [animals] or 
not shoot them, move them or not move them, so you can't really 
wait for official reports. 
I sit on this experts group and those groups meet, well in peace-
time they rarely meet to be honest, but in war time they're meeting 
almost on a daily basis. So as a scientific question comes along, or 
as they need to review policy, modify policy in terms of the control 
of the disease then that group needs to provide regular 
recommendations. 
This is a contrast with the difficulty scientists encountered when communicating 
their advice to policy-makers in peace-time. There is an issue of proximity: not 
simply geographical closeness to policy-makers, but being able to give relevant 
advice as a result of communicating regularly with officials. During an outbreak, 
scientists are drawn into the heart of decision-making, woven into the process 
rather than periodically asked for advice or information. One scientist 
commented: 
it's quite clear when you're in an outbreak it's hands to the pump 
and you engage with all manner of people at Page Street and 
provide the advice they need because people are deployed in 
response to that emergency. What happens in peace-time lS 
perhaps more worrying to me because contact becomes less 
frequent, you need to make sure you're contacting the right people 
and the mechanism for actually communicating changes in the 
structure. 
The organizational studies literature provides some insights as to why disease 
outbreaks revolutionise the way scientists and policy-makers feel about their 
work. Steele and Jenks (1977 pp93-94) asked a group of business and government 
executives "what makes an organization exciting for you?" Their replies included 
time pressure, a sense of achievement, recognition from above, creativity, non-
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routine personal contributions, lasting consequences to actions, a special phase in 
the life of an organization, unpredictability, freedom to 'act, feeling responsible. In 
a similar vein, Barlew (1974) identified types of opportunities which can be 
sources of "meaning" in an organization and included a chance to be tested; a 
chance to do something well; a chance to do something good (for others, for 
society); and a chance to change the way things are (cited in Steele and Jenks 
1977 p98). Animal disease outbreaks, by these definitions, create both excitement 
and meaning for policy-makers. They create an environment where heroism can 
occur, because people who are usually seen as part of a large, homogenous group 
of middle and lower ranking officials become key to the operation of the division, 
and are given their own responsibilities and capacities to act. Law argues that, in 
his observations of the Laboratory, outsiders (and one can presumably include the 
management of the Laboratory in that category) tend to 'delete' the work, and 
particularly the heroism that is involved in the efforts of the everyday staff. They 
tend especially to delete the work of subordinates, and "assume that technical or 
low-status work gets done 'automatically', as if people were programmable 
devices" (Law 1994b p 131). In an outbreak, the usually invisible (or deleted) 
work done by junior staff becomes highly visible, and has important 
consequences, which the management (or critical outsiders) cannot deny. Even 
junior staff are indispensable in a large outbreak, when situation monitoring and 
administrative tasks need to be done continuously. 
This recalibration of power relationships is also seen in the changing nature of 
meetings. Rather than a series of small meetings where policy-makers of similar 
grades discuss issues relevant to their status and remit, in outbreaks non-
hierarchical 'bird tables' take place where everyone is able to attend and be part of 
the outbreak response. There is a sense that everyone is contributing to the "war 
effort" and even those tasks usually deemed insignificant - such as updating the 
Defra website - become crucial to the overall success of the division. There is a 
sense in which, to use Barlew's label, the civil servants are able to do something 
good in a disease outbreak, because there will be genuine (and more importantly, 
immediate) negative consequences if they fail to bring the disease under control. 
Farmers' livelihoods, the national economy, the reputation of the Department, and 
even the reputation of the UK within the EU may be jeopardised by a badly 
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handled outbreak. In many ways, disease outbreaks - although they are potentially 
very damaging for the Department - bring benefits to staff in tenus of imp~oved 
morale, feelings of achievement, and internal cohesion of the division. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have used excerpts from interviews with policy-makers to tell 
their stories about what it means to work in a bureaucracy. Their accounts include 
generalisations similar to popular public conceptions of life in the civil service, 
such as the tendency to hold endless meetings at which nothing is achieved, and 
the feeling that memoranda and reports are disappearing into a void, never to be 
consulted again. They also tell more nuanced stories, however, about their identity 
as middle-ranking policy-makers, the difficulty of retaining corporate memory, 
and the challenges of working in a department where high staff turnover means 
that few people ever reach the status of 'expert' in their policy area. Scientific 
advisers also give accounts of their impressions of working in and with a 
bureaucratic organization. Their responses range from sympathetic (because they 
understand that policy-makers have no choice but to follow certain procedures) to 
frustrated, as they find themselves having to re-educate policy staff about basic 
issues and compete to make their voices heard. These stories about the 
bureaucracy create an impression that to work as a policy-maker is a constant 
struggle to get things done in a culture offering little reward and many barriers to 
success. There is also an issue of blame in these stories. Staff feel they are at the 
mercy of the management structure and management imposes particular 
behaviours on to the staff. There is resentment at the number of meetings 
seemingly dictated by the management structure and the inflexibility that means 
that they cannot be avoided. This blame and resentment is exacerbated by the 
feeling that ordinary workers are effectively prevented from having meaningful, 
productive jobs. 
These frustrations provide a motive for people to rebel against the bureaucratic 
culture and the behaviour expected of them, instead choosing to be aggressive, 
critical, or subversive. The Grade 7's strident questioning of a policy document 
("What's this mean? Why's that in there? [ ... J Well, you know, what the hell does 
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it mean? [ ... ] Why do we need this?") displays his anger at being expected to 
" 
follow a particular procedure rather than use his intelligence and initiative to 
devise a better course of action. His attitude during a disease outbreak is markedly 
different. He recalls: "There were important things to deal with and you got on 
and you did them and you might have done long days but you knew damn well 
what you were doing." Policy-makers are able to display their personal qualities 
(such as expertise, charisma, leadership, initiative), which their formal roles may 
not usually allow them to do. During disease outbreaks Defra more closely 
resembles what Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) term an "adhocracy": a 
bureaucratic organization which is able to innovate, combine experts in effective 
teams, operate with less hierarchy and direct supervision, with diffuse 
distributions of power. This is clearly what the Renew Defra programme is trying 
to achieve, but the difference between this management-led initiative and a 
, , 
disease outbreak is that staff feel there are benefits involved in changing their 
behaviour to deal with an outbreak. 
While I do not agree with Merton's argument that people are conditioned to 
behave in an obedient and unquestioning way simply by joining the civil service, 
it is clear that the situation in which policy-makers find themselves has a profound 
impact upon the way in which they do their jobs. As the division deals with 
animal disease, there is a culture of infrequent rewards for staff coupled with a 
tendency for them to receive high levels of criticism and blame when an outbreak 
occurs. The potential for litigation by farmers, infraction by the European Union, 
or criticism by Parliament, means that policy-makers inevitably develop ritualistic 
behaviour to ensure that they consistently work 'by the book'. Bureaucratic 
culture, in this sense, has a power to control individuals' behaviour which few are 
able to resist, and constitutes a fundamental component of Defra employees' 
identities. To work in Defra is to be the bureaucracy, with all that such a role 
entails. The effects of these contradictory forces - the need to follow bureaucratic 




On Being 'Expert': What it Means to Give Advice 
I think more scientists should go and do a stint in policy. It's just 
fascinating, you know, the deadlines and the 'Oh my God the 
minister's ringing in and needs an answer this afternoon', this sort 
of stuff is fascinating. I find it superb. 
Consultant Scientist 
You'd be a terrible scientific adviser if you didn't understand the 
politics of an issue. 
Chief Scientific Adviser 
Introduction 
In Defra, it is clear who is an expert and who is not. The tenn is frequently used; 
people are invited to participate in 'Experts Groups' or 'expertise networks' on 
the basis of their professional qualifications and experience. In the exotic disease 
policy area, there is a split between 'experts' and policy-makers that is clearly 
defined and rigorously maintained. Scientific matters are discussed in the many 
experts groups that exist. There is a Diseases of Poultry Experts Group, a Foot and 
Mouth Disease Experts Group and a range of other specialist groups that are 
convened when necessary. At an FMD Experts Group meeting that I observed, the 
composition of the group was as follows: four scientists from the Institute for 
Animal Health (which is the reference laboratory for FMD), eight veterinarians in 
different capacities (including the Chief Veterinary Officers for the UK, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland; two senior Animal Health agency staff; an 
epidemiologist from the National Epidemiology Group, and two staff from 
Defra's Veterinary Exotic I?iseases, Research and Official Controls Division 
(Verod), while the meeting was chaired by one of Defra's Science Co-ordinators 
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(who is also head of Verod). Interestingly, there were also seven policy staff at 
.. 
this meeting - excluding the designated 'note taker' .;;:... and a memorandum was 
circulated shortly afterwards criticising the unacceptably high number of policy 
staff in attendance. Many policy staff attend in order to educate themselves about 
the area in which they work, as there is a high turnover of policy officials in the 
division and newcomers have to learn quickly. They certainly would not be able 
to contribute to the scientific discussion, which is highly technical, involving 
discussions of the merits of different vaccines, or the epidemiology of a recent 
outbreak elsewhere in Europe. But both the scientists and the senior policy staff 
discourage their asking policy questions at these meetings. This is not the place to 
debate policy; this is a scientific group. As a chair of one experts group described: 
We get experts together and we decide from an expert's point of 
view the answer to specific questions that are raised by policy 
colleagues [ ... ] so there are essentially there is a role for bringing 
together or knowing who you need to bring together to be able to 
get a consensus view on what the scientific and veterinary issues 
are and then being able to explain that coherently to policy-makers 
who can then choose to accept or ignore the advice that has been 
given to them. Their role is to seek advice from whatever sources 
they believe necessary and then to recommend what a particular 
policy should be. 
The experts groups produce reports and recommendations that are then presented 
at their policy counterpart, the Animal Disease Policy Group (ADPG). Few expert 
advisors attend in person, and never give presentations; their reports are enough. 
ADPG describes itself as "the key strategic decision-making body. It takes expert 
advice from the National Experts Group, decides on control strategies and makes 
recommendations on major policy issues to Defra Ministers" (internal document). 
It changes its composition depending on whether it is formed during an outbreak 
or 'peace-time', but its composition at a typical peace-time meeting was sixteen 
policy staff (including staff from the communications and legal divisions in 
addition to disease policy staff), two in-house scientific advisers, the Chief 
Veterinary Officer and the Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer. Other staff may 
152 
attend as observers - and many do, if the discussion is relevant to their work area 
, " 
- but they are not permitted to contribute to the meeting. At ADPG meetings, any 
scientific or veterinary staff are there to provide clarification of the 
recommendations that have been brought from the experts groups. It is not a 
forum for scientific debate but the place to set priorities, to formulate policy, and 
to create recommendations for ministers. 
The reason for this split is obvious and logical for Defra staff. Scientists discuss 
the technical issues of a particular disease in an objective and value-free forum; 
they do not consider the policy or political implications of their work, but 
concentrate on the scientific details alone. In this way, they are able to provide the 
best possible advice to Defra policy staff who can then discuss how to proceed 
with policy in their own, separate group. As one senior manager explained: 
The experts groups are very carefully chaired in that they are not 
policy groups. Obviously its very easy to slip from one to the other 
but they are meant to provide an independent science rationale for 
action, which doesn't take account of the policy imperatives and 
very often decisions have to, there's never a clear answer and very 
often you have to then bring on board when it comes to the high-
level meetings the politics and the policy options. 
Some of the scientists shared this view of their role in the policy process, and 
believed that they were able to remove themselves from political debates, as one 
member of an expert group commented: 
Sometimes even in the course of an expert group debating an issue 
sometimes one of our policy colleagues will throw in something 
that's not science driven. To give you an example, 'is it 
appropriate that we ban shooting in an area where we've got an 
outbreak?' Now we can say well ok, behind that is if you disperse 
wild birds you could potentially be spreading the virus, so you 
might increase the risk of spreading it into poultry as a 
consequence of that. However the policy [staff] may say well 
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actually [we need to consider] the stakeholders, is it appropriate to 
shut that industry down, people's livelihoods· might rely on it. 
That's got nothing to do with the science, and I think ADPG and 
how those issues are balanced, how they're weighted, is obviously 
a matter for the policy colleagues. I think sometimes you do have 
to detach the science and you should not be thinking about those 
other aspects. It's not our job in the experts group to do that so I 
actually can see some benefits [of keeping science and policy 
separate]. 
This separation of scientific and policy debate reflects a particular understanding 
of science as objective, neutral and able to offer definitive explanations of the 
natural world. Collingridge and Reeve (1986) call this the 'myth of science', 
arguing that "myths of two kinds are interwoven in traditional thinking about the 
relationship between science and policy: the myth of rationality demands that 
political decisions be made only when all rational facts have been gathered, [the 
myth] of the power of science insists that science can fulfil this role. A fruitful 
marriage is therefore promised between knowledge and power" (Collingridge and 
Reeve 1986 p7). In Defra, the belief that depoliticised, objective science exists 
has resulted in a particularly extreme version of the standard model of evidence-
based policy-making, whereby officials believe that it is possible to incorporate 
expertise at the appropriate juncture of the decision-making process. Not all of 
Defra's scientists support this model of policy-making, however, and even among 
those who believe it is possible to provide objective advice there are those who 
disagree with the practice of separating scientific and policy discussions. Some 
scientists feel that the format serves (either deliberately or unwittingly) to exclude 
scientists from the policy-making process and weaken the strength of their advice. 
There was dissatisfaction among some of the scientists who sit on experts groups 
with the fact that their views had to be represented by a single person; they would 
prefer to attend in person and discuss their recommendations with the whole 
policy group. As one expert commented, as the split between scientific advisers 
and policy staff becomes more rigid, the less control the scientists have over the 
way their recommendations are used: 
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Because there is less immediate contact between the two there is 
less expert contact between the two and we don't know how well 
whoever is putting the case for science is putting the case for the 
science. If they happen to be a person who is not hugely au fait 
with the science or has a particular stance already because 
everybody has a particular stance in policy, then I'm sure that 
colours the way they describe what the expert committee has 
recommended. And there have been many occasions when we've 
sent advice through to core group, the policy group, and it's come 
back saying that they didn't do that, they decided not to on 
reflection, which is irritating because its happening more often 
than it was when things were less rigid. So I would say that's a bad 
move. 
The simple format of an expert group meeting followed by a policy group 
meeting obfuscates a significant power struggle between the experts and policy 
staff. The experts give a report or a set of recommendations to the policy group 
but then relinquish control over the way in which these recommendations are 
interpreted and used. As one policy-maker commented, this was necessary 
because policy-making is about making effective choices, not extensively 
debating the many sides to an argument, therefore scientists were excluded from 
the process when their initial advice has been given: 
At the end of the day, the experts only make recommendations and 
it's actually the policy groups that make the decisions. So I think 
it's also better to go to the policy groups with a recommendation 
from experts [group] and let them make the decision, because I 
think if the experts started having all the different arguments you'd 
never actually reach a decision in the meeting because it would be 
too confusing, too long-winded. 
However, the scientists often saw this quite differently, particularly as they felt 
they could make valuable contributions to policy debates. As one member of an 
expert group commented, 
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We give scientific advice but we also tell them if their policy is 
unlikely to be successful. That's quite often accepted in the expert 
committee and sometimes around some of the policy groups but 
when it gets up to the final committee it gets watered down. You 
may have a trail of three different committees before it goes to the 
Minister. By the time it gets to the final bloke who goes to see the 
Minister it's been watered down by two or three committees, [the 
Minister] probably gets 'oh those scientific fellows want us to 
spend more money but it's not important'. That's the impression 
we get. 
For the scientists, the issue of physical proximity is a crucial one. The task of 
attending the endless meetings scheduled by Defra was an onerous one for the 
scientists who work in small laboratories rather than large offices like the policy-
makers, yet the disadvantages of not being there in person were considered too 
great, as one scientist describes below. His team is the only group of scientists 
working on a particular virus and it is a very small unit so although they were all 
expected to go to London to form an experts group on the virus, in reality it would 
take far too much time away from the actual scientific research which needs to be 
done: 
If there were five of us going to London twice a week that takes 
two whole days out, that's just not sustainable. So when it started 
to get a very onerous burden then we started to talk on the 
telephone, which is much less satisfactory, much less satisfactory, 
but it's the way we have to work because you just don't have the 
time [to go in person]. If there is a really important one then we 
may all go to Page St and sit down and make more of an impact. 
The scientists felt that being at meetings was absolutely crucial to ensuring their 
advice had a real input into the policy-making process, and that being there in 
person was much more effective than participating by teleconference, for the 
same reasons as were mentioned by the staff of the devolved administrations. It is 
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difficult to participate fully when you cannot see the other members of the group 
and engage in non-verbal communication. Even in a formal or 'boring' meeting, a 
lot of informal communication takes place in the form of meaningful glances, 
note-passing and so on, which those who are not in the room will miss. The 
emphasis put on meetings by my interviewees as the crucible of organizational 
activity is supported by other academic analyses including Schwartzman (1987, 
1989, 1993) who argues that meetings are very important sites of negotiation for 
determining hierarchy. Although as the previous chapter described, policy-makers 
frequently deride the amount of time they are expected to give to meetings, the 
sheer number of meetings that exist give testimony to their importance within the 
process of policy-making. It is important to recognise, however, that meetings are 
not simply a time when the business of the organization is discussed. The policy-
makers' sense of the futility of many such meetings testifies that some are utterly 
worthless as a means of making progress with work. However, meetings play 
another (arguably more important) role; they help organizations to organize 
themselves. 
Negotiating Roles and Status 
Meetings, argues Schwartzman, are important for sensemaking within 
organizations because they "define, represent, and also reproduce social entities 
and relationships [ ... ] As a sensemaking form, meetings are significant because 
they are the organization or community writ small. There may be other competing 
symbols for an organization or community, such as individual leaders, a building 
or territory, an organizational chart or logo. However, a meeting is a powerful and 
ongoing social symbol because it assembles a variety of individuals and groups 
together and labels the assembly as organizational or community action" 
(Schwartzman 1989 p39). Boden agrees, suggesting that "Meetings are where 
organizations come together. They may be preceded, arranged, complemented, 
augmented and cancelled by other forms of organizational communication such as 
telephone calls, memoranda and reports, but meetings remain the essential 
mechanism through which organizations create and maintain the practical activity 
of organizing. They are, in other words, the interaction order of management, the 
157 
occasioned expression of management-in-action, that very social action through 
which institutions produce and reproduce themselves" (Boden 1994 p81). 
Meetings are sites of ordering and re-ordering as individuals negotiate their roles 
within the organization. In the process of negotiating and accepting the frame of a 
meeting, individuals are able both to create a series of social relationships (which 
mayor may not last beyond the confines of the meeting boundary) and mark and 
reinforce their social relationships with each other. Therefore, "the meeting form 
provides individuals with a structure to use to metaphorically mix their formal and 
informal relationships and feelings with community or organizational issues, 
problems and solutions" (Schwartzman 1989 p41). As Boden suggests, "When 
people talk they are simultaneously and reflexively talking their relationships, 
organizations, and whole institutions into action, or into 'being'" (Boden 1994 
pI4). Boden argues that meetings are "ritual affairs, tribal gatherings in which the 
faithful reaffirm solidarity and warring factions engage in verbal battles [ ... ] 
Agendas, actors, times and places may vary, but meetings are the proper arena of 
organizational activity for management, locating and legitimating both individual 
and institutional roles" (Boden 1994 p81). 
It follows that the calling of a meeting, and the decisions to include and exclude 
certain individuals, is a significant action within an organization. The act of 
holding a meeting involves negotiating and accepting social relationships which 
define someone's right to call a meeting, the ways to start and end the meeting, 
the rules for talking, etc. (Schwartzman 1989 p41). Once a meeting has been 
constructed, "the event becomes a vehicle for the reading as well as validation of 
social relations within a cultural system" (Schwartzman 1989 p41). They offer an 
invaluable insight into an organization's culture because they embody abstract 
concepts. As Schwartzman puts it, "Structure and culture, insofar as they have. any 
meaning at all as theoretical concepts, are only realised within these occasions, 
and so it is in the occasion that we must locate our analyses. Another way of 
making this point is that, whereas no one has ever seen a 'hierarchy' or a 'value' 
everyone (almost) has been to a meeting" (Schwartzman 1989 pp 34-35). 
158 
Therefore, everyone involved in the policy-making process is able to 'read' their 
position within the hierarchy, as the devolved administrations' interpretation of 
their inability to call an ADPG meeting when needed, demonstrates. Meetings are 
one location where the disparity between the formal organization chart and the 
'lateral hierarchy' of the informal organization becomes apparent. The role of 
meetings as sites of negotiation also explains why - despite their often tedious 
content - many people (especially those with less power and influence) are 
extremely keen to attend meetings. To be excluded from a meeting (either 
explicitly, through not being invited, or as a consequence of being physically 
remote) is to miss out on a key component of the informal organization. Although 
meetings are formally called and constructed, the most important work conducted 
within them is often of an informal nature as participants test out ideas, gauge the 
receptiveness of their colleagues to a particular scheme, find out insider 
information about a future project and so on. 
This alternative function of meetings as sites of negotiation means that official 
accounts such as attendance lists and minutes should be seen only as one 
interpretation of the event in question. Much of what we know about the role of 
scientists in policy-making comes from official documentation: organization 
charts, documents outlining the roles of different committees, records of meetings 
and so on. They tell us the official status of different groups and individual 
advisers, and the routes by which advice is fed into policy. It is easy, as an 
outsider, to study the minutes of Defra meetings, to compare the list of attendees 
and conclude that a certain number of scientists, or veterinarians, or policy staff, 
are represented there. Yet the picture we get of the discussion that has taken 
place, of the atmosphere within the meeting and the contributions made by 
different parties, is bald and inferential at best. I asked a senior veterinarian 
whether or not enough veterinary advice was used in policy-making. On the 
minutes of every ADPG meeting and Experts group meeting I saw, vets were well 
represented. The reply was 
I think if you ask somebody within Defra to draw a· diagram of 
how it [policy-making] works, you'd come away quite satisfied 
that there is adequate veterinary input into policy-making. 
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What was implied is that such a diagram does not give an accurate picture of 
reality. Defra has a clear fonnal organization, as depicted in its organization 
charts. 12 These charts show the hierarchy of the Department, and the lines of 
communication between groups. They show which agencies and bodies are 
'owned' by Defra, and which people are responsible for different policy areas. 
Yet behind these sterile charts is a more fluid and complex reality. Despite the 
fixed creation of 'expert groups' and 'policy groups', establishing membership, 
hierarchy and influence within these structures is an ongoing process of 
negotiation. This was hinted at in a report into Defra's use of scientific advice, 
which concluded that regarding internal sources of advice, "how people behave 
and their (geographic) location appear more important in facilitating close 
policy/science co-operation than who appears where on an organization chart" 
(Taig 2004 pIS). This chapter explores this statement by looking at the 
implications of proximity (or lack of it) and the importance of behaviour and the 
credibility, status and influence, which can be cultivated through acting in the 
'right' way. 
Firstly the notion of proximity - in its simple sense of geographic location -
suggests that those who are physically marginalised risk being marginalised in a 
broader sense: being excluded from decisions, or not consulted over policies, or 
ignored when they attempt to communicate with others. It also suggests a notion 
of core and proximity; if some people are geographically 'remote' they must be 
removed from the place where the action is perceived to be happening. An inquiry 
into the handling of the 2007 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak contained 
complaints from Scottish Government staff that they had been marginalised by 
the 'core' - Defra in London - due to their physical remoteness from the centre of 
decision-making: 
During the course of the outbreak a range of regular policy 
meetings were held. These included the ADPG, National Disease 
12 See www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/who-are-we/OrganisationChart.pdffor a more detailed and 
interactive version of the diagram in Chapter Three. 
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Control Centre (NDCC) Birdtables and the CCC13 of the UK 
Cabinet. Scottish Government officials participated in many of the 
meetings either in person or via teleconference. The latter did not 
facilitate satisfactory involvement as the external participants 
could not judge the reaction of the other participants nor the most 
appropriate time to intervene in the discussion [ ... ] Once the 
outbreak was confirmed on 3rd August the ADPG did not meet for 
the first time under outbreak conditions until 5th August after 
which the meetings were held at ad-hoc intervals. Scottish 
Government officials felt that the meetings were not timely and 
were often either overly technical or discussed a large number of 
issues relevant to England which were of little interest to the 
Scottish Government. If ADPG had met more regularly during the 
outbreak on more focused issues it would have facilitated a more 
joined-up approach to GB policy. 
(Scudamore and Ross 2008 pp62-63) 
One can imagine the frustration of the Scottish Government policy-makers, forced 
to participate by telephone and unable to gauge the appropriate tone and 
behaviour to use at the meetings. The participants in the room, sharing office 
gossip or the latest news on the outbreak over coffee before the meeting begins, 
not considering that there are others sitting isolated at their desks throughout the 
UK waiting for the teleconference to start. As I discuss later on, meetings are a 
significant site for negotiating status within the organization and influencing 
decisions. Not being able to fully participate can have serious consequences in 
this regard. Proximity, in the sense of being able to participate in person at the 
'core' of the organization, is an important factor in success at achieving personal 
objectives. 
This is not umque to Defra. Farris (1981), who has studied a range of 
organizations, identifies 'proximity' as a key factor in determining 
13 Civil Contingencies Committee 
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communication in a variety of settings. He suggests that at least five types of 
proximity can be identified: physical, professional,~ task, social, and f~nnal­
organization-created. The first two are most pertinent to this chapter. Physical 
proximity refers to the fact that individuals are more apt to interact infonnally 
when they are geographically closer to one another. People are more likely to 
discuss ideas with the colleagues in their office or across the hall than those in 
different buildings, who, in tum, are more likely to talk than colleagues in other 
regions of the country. Proximity of this kind may arise spontaneously, as in the 
case of a government agency he studied where an inefficient elevator system in 
their high-rise office building frequently caused groups of people on each floor to 
congregate in front of the elevators for several minutes at a time. A great deal of 
social and business interactions occurred among those waiting for the elevator 
(Farris 1981 pl06). Professional proximity means that people of similar work 
backgrounds find it easier, or are more likely, to interact infonnally than people 
with different professional backgrounds because it is easier to discuss matters 
with others who share similar approaches to work, have similar cognitive styles, 
or share interests in similar problems. The ways in which people are able to create 
and encourage proximity of different kinds is discussed later in the chapter. 
If we accept that the phenomenon of proximity influencing interaction is common 
to many organizations, it may seem that its manifestation in Defra does not 
deserve special mention. However, it is significant because it reveals the gap 
between fonnal organizational charts and the reality of working in a bureaucracy. 
The conventional picture of bureaucratic hierarchy is overturned by the 
understanding that it may be people of different rank who communicate more 
regularly than those in the chain of command set out by the organization. The 
fonnal arrangement of 'expert groups' and 'policy groups' giving and receiving 
advice through established channels has no meaning if some people are routinely 
ignored and others dominate the decision-making process. It is crucial that we 
understand the 'infonnal organization' that exists alongside the fonnal 
organization and understand whether the infonnal complements or supplants the 
fonnal. 
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Informal organization has been defined in various ways ranging from those who 
see formal and informal as polar opposites (e.g. Simon et al 1991) to those who 
see formal and informal as a continuum of behaviour (e.g. Hill 1972 pp35-36). 
Formal organization is defined by Weber as "A continuous organization with a 
specified function, or functions, its operation bound by rules. Continuity and 
consistency within the organization are ensured by the use of writing to record 
acts, decisions, and rules. The organization of personnel is on the basis of 
hierarchy, the scope of authority within the hierarchy is clearly defined, and the 
rights and duties of the officials at each level are specified" (cited in Hill 1972 
p35). Informal organization, on the other hand, has been defined by Simon et al as 
"the whole pattern of actual behaviour - the way members of the organization 
really do behave - in so far as these actual behaviours do not coincide with the 
formal plan" (Simon et al 1991 p87). Although it is a neat distinction, 
organizational situations are usually much more complicated than this division 
implies. For example, it is significant whether behaviour that contradicts formal 
organization charts is deliberately deviant (stemming from a lack of authority in 
those who devised the chart, perhaps) or unintentional (for example, as people try 
to pursue goals that cannot easily be met by following conventional routes). 
It is wrong to assume that outside of the formal organization, people act without 
structures to guide their behaviour. Within the informal organization, there is a 
hierarchy in the same sense as the one that structures its formal counterpart. This 
is obvious, argues Farris, because some individuals are more influential than 
others within the informal organization. What is less obvious is how the hierarchy 
is created: those with low 'formal' status may have an enormous informal 
influence. Farris (1981) uses the flippant example of the mistress of a chief 
executive - who gives her ideas straight to that executive - having more influence 
than an 'official' of the project team. In Defra it is possible that the Chief 
Scientific Adviser has less influence than a contract scientist working in a 
laboratory, as will be discussed later. The hierarchy in the informal organization 
may be called a "lateral hierarchy", in contrast to the vertical hierarchy of the 
formal organization (Farris 1981 p 105). The lateral hierarchy is organized by a 
variety of factors. I have already discussed how proximity of various kinds can 
exert a greater influence over staff interaction than formal organization charts. 
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Other causes of non-deliberate departures from the chart include staff with strong 
leadership qualities exercising more influence than the chart suggests; conflicts 
with deep-seated habits or existing routines which make staff reluctant to change 
their behaviour; and when following the laid-out channels are too complicated or 
meaningless for staff to agree with (Simon et al 1991 p88). Some of the factors 
that influence the lateral hierarchy within Defra's exotic disease division are 
explored in the following section. 
Performing expertise 
The discrepancy between 'paper' and reality as far as the use of expert advice is 
concerned, and the role of meetings in creating and embodying that discrepancy, 
suggests that expert status relies on more than professional credentials: it relies on 
performance. It is not enough for a scientist to be invited to a meeting; once there, 
they have to establish their credentials by performing the role of expert adviser, in 
ways that are described below. Mieg (2001 p43) argues that we need to 
understand 'expert' "as a form of interaction rather than as a person". Becoming 
recognised as an expert does not rely on particular types of qualification or 
position; rather "almost anyone can - under certain circumstances - act as an 
expert. We see, even if there is sometimes a mystical note attached to experts, that 
the interaction involved in consulting an expert or, respectively, being consulted 
as an expert is based on a simple fact: There is somebody who seems to have 
knowledge that someone else is in need of' (Mieg 2001 p43).14 Using experts, in 
his view, is simply a time-efficient use of knowledge: anyone could become an 
expert in something if they have long enough to study the subject but it is quicker 
to consult someone who already has such knowledge: the 'expert' in that context. 
By this understanding, those who crave expertise (or the power associated with 
expert positions) must persuade those who are in the position to employ them that 
they have the requisite knowledge. Latour and Woolgar (1986) describe cycles of 
credit in their study of scientists in a laboratory. The scientists, they argue, create 
credit by producing information which other scientists or laboratories then have 
14 It is interesting to note that Defra staff were interested in my social scientific expertise, based on 
my academic qualifications, but that the relationship that developed during the placement (as 
discussed in Chapter Four) meant that I did not come to occupy an 'expert' role. 
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demand for, and in this way the scientist accrues credibility. A scientist, they 
suggest, is probably not aware of their individual citation rating, or some other 
indicator of professional esteem, but they are aware of their credibility because 
success in producing valuable findings means that "people phone him, his 
abstracts are accepted, he is believed more easily and listened to with greater 
attention, he is offered better positions, his assays work well, data flow more 
reliably and form a more credible picture" (Latour and Woolgar 1986 p207). 
Expert advisors in Defra likewise need actively to create and promote their status 
as experts if they are to be successful in influencing policy; paper qualifications 
are no guarantee that they will be listened to. The scientists involved in experts 
groups do not necessarily have to persuade Defra that their particular advice is 
worth more than the advice offered by others - as described earlier, in some cases 
there is only one research centre or group working on a particular virus. However 
it is in their interests that their advice is used, not ignored, and this requires more 
than simply emailing reports to policy-makers or sitting passively in meetings. 
They must perform the part of an expert adviser, which means doing a variety of 
things. It means being knowledgeable about the politics of a disease or situation, 
being part of the 'loop' of internal communications and on good terms with the 
main policy players, giving 'sensible' advice which doesn't contradict existing 
policy commitments or require a team of interpreters to allow policy-makers to 
understand it, and a host of other characteristics. A cautionary tale again comes 
from the devolved administrations about the possible consequences of failing to 
perform in an acceptable way. One member of a devolved administration 
described how, although on paper it was apparently routine to invite 
representatives from all the devolved administrations to a certain regularly held 
meeting, in reality there was a degree of negotiation that took place. The 
representative had to 'perform' in a way acceptable to Defra in order to be 
regularly invited to participate, meaning: 
Not just sit at that seat and be a part of that discussion but to 
contribute in a constructive and helpful way and not just constantly 
be the voice saying 'don't forget [us]' which obviously is not well 
received. It's to try and earn your position there not just physically 
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but in terms of what you have to contribute. It's quite a challenge. 
[ ... ] I think we have a challenge in trying to get the right balance 
between asserting ourselves as a devolved administration and not 
appearing to be bloody-minded about it, you know, there's this 
balance. We've all got the potential to do our own thing [as 
devolved administrations] but we need to tum that into positive 
action rather than just being different for the sake of it. 
An ex-Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) recounted how one of his first tasks had 
been to embed scientific advice more effectively into policy-making processes. He 
tried to do this by recommending that some scientists be moved from their offices 
near Victoria to the main policy headquarters in Westminster. His intention was 
that by scattering scie~tists throughout the policy building, the physical proximity 
that would be created would bring about greater communication between the two 
groups. What actually happened, he said, was that Defra put all the scientists: 
Up on one floor all together! That upset me a bit. All they did was 
they moved from Cromwell house to Page Street en masse, they 
didn't distribute themselves among the various divisions as I was 
hoping they would do. 
As this CSA learned, physical proximity is no guarantee of greater 
communication and integration between groups. Other factors are equally 
important; in Defra the performance of credibility is perhaps foremost. For the 
devolved administrations, as described above, credibility relies on the ability to 
see the 'bigger picture' of policy-making and not be obsessed with parochial 
concerns. The picture created is one in which outsiders with a tenuous place in the 
policy process must avoid irritating core Defra who have the ability to exclude 
them from future meetings. For scientists, credibility means different things to 
different groups. In the following section I describe three types of scientific 
adviser (the Science Advisory Council, Defra's Chief Scientific Adviser, and 
members of the divisions expert groups) and explore how they need to perform in 
order to be 'acceptable' to Defra. 
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The Science Advisory Council was fonned in 2004 as one of Defra's responses to 
0' 
the criticisms made in the Phillips Inquiry and Anderson Inquiry into the handling 
of BSE and FMD respectively. It is an independent Non-Departmental Public 
Body which "helps guide Defra's scientific priorities and work across the 
complete range of the Department's policy activities, including horizon-scanning 
and long-range planning as well as dealing with immediate risks and 
opportunities". It also advises Defra's Chief Scientific Adviser. The SAC includes 
senior academics from the fields of veterinary science, epidemiology, 
mathematical biology, marine science, social science and others. Although the 
Council is made up of eminent scientists, many of whom are professors in their 
fields, their role and involvement with Defra is contingent and liable to fluctuate. 
One member described how SAC are viewed by Defra, claiming that the advisory 
council is regarded as transient: 
I think the perception of SAC across Defra is varied. The science 
coordinators, particularly in animal health and welfare think SAC's 
a good thing, but there are others who regard us with a bit of 
suspicion and some who just think we're a bit of a nuisance 
because we keep asking questions [ ... ] so for the [subgroup] report 
we sawall the science coordinators and they turned up dutifully 
and most of them read themselves up for the ten minutes that 
they're there or the half an hour they're there, but you got the 
distinct impression that they then go away and forget about it, 
they've done their bit, they'll see the report, they'll see the 
response from Defra and they'll carryon. 
A senior policy manager from the division offered an explanation as to why the 
Science Advisory Council are not always taken seriously despite the eminence of 
its members. He argued that they were not in touch with the needs of policy· 
makers and because they didn't have the latest infonnation - for example during 
an outbreak - their comments were simply not contributing to policy debates: 
[The advice SAC gives] IS not always totally relevant, it's 
sometimes way behind the curve you know the issues they raise 
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are things that have been picked up or dealt with separately. But 
that's not to say that at times some of the things they are saying 
aren't things that we'll be looking at or working on but very often 
there's nothing that they say that is surprising or unknown but 
there might be reasons why we're not approaching an issue or a 
problem in the way that they suggest. Probably they're not close 
enough to the issues even though they are all very eminent and 
capable scientists if you're not actually working directly on 
something you don't know all the ins and outs. So they're not 
saying anything that's ridiculous or stupid, far from it, but they are 
saying things that have already been considered and possibly 
discounted. 
This discord appears to stem from the mismatch between the operation of the 
committee and the level at which they are engaging with divisions in the 
department. For example, SAC only has a full meeting on a quarterly basis, at 
which a range of high-level issues must be discussed. When they need to engage 
with the exotic disease division (which is often during an outbreak when people 
are under pressure and defensive) they have to meet staff from the division who 
deal with exotic disease all day, every day of their working life and are fully 
immersed in the detail and current status of each disease. Inevitably, there is 
resentment that outsiders who are not involved in the day to day running of the 
division are 'interfering' in the business of those who are intimately involved. 
Indeed, a member of the SAC secretariat argued that Defra staff see SAC as 'the 
police' who only become involved when things are going wrong. This was 
exacerbated, she argued, by the fact that Defra staff are not forced to engage with 
SAC when a request is made for information or attendance at a meeting; it is an 
optional extra, and one which Defra staff would often rather forgo. 
The Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) also has a contingent position in relation to 
the division. The main role of the CSA is 'to provide ministers with the best 
possible scientific advice and build on existing measures to ensure that science 
and technology are used to inform policy' (Defra 2007b). However, the CSA also 
engages with individual divisions of the Department. Disease outbreaks are a 
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good example of where and why this occurs; the CSA may sit in on ADPG 
meetings to offer scientific advice in addition to that which is coming from the 
experts groups. The Defra CSA has engaged with the exotic disease division to a 
far greater extent than any other part of the department as a result of their 
problems in controlling disease and the frequent disease outbreaks which 
occurred in 2007/2008. There are other reasons for the close links between CSA 
and animal disease, however: the position of CSA was created in large part to take 
responsibility for the science of animal disease away from the Chief Veterinary 
Officer following criticisms of the handling of BSE, the 2001 FMD outbreak and 
so on. The role of Chief Scientific Adviser is one that has particularly great 
pressures to create and retain credibility. While the position is advertised to attract 
academic scientists, once recruited they find they are expected to understand 
scientific issues which are well outside of their experience and understanding, and 
in addition to grasp the political and policy implications of accepting or rejecting 
a piece of advice. As a former CSA commented: 
I think right from the very beginning it became pretty clear that 
people were expecting you to know an incredible amount about 
everything, and that was a steep learning curve and what I found 
that was fascinating was having to learn a whole load of new 
science which was clearly alien to me and I mean certainly issues 
such as climate change, long environmental issues, pesticides, 
fertilisers, farming issues all of which were quite alien to me. I 
mean I know a little bit about animal disease and what the impact 
of that might be on the farming industry but nowhere near as much 
as I ought to as chief scientific adviser and I suddenly realised that 
you're chief scientific adviser, you're the person who ministers are 
going to tum to for advice on absolutely everything. 
It was not possible to simply admit a lack of knowledge about an area, because 
personal credibility would be ruined by the implication that the most senior 
scientific adviser in Defra didn't understand a scientific issue. He went on: 
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The media and stakeholders out there want answers. What's quite 
difficult to do is to resist the temptation to give an answer to a 
question asked by [Jeremy] Paxman on Newsnight and you just sit 
there and say well I don't have enough information at my 
fingertips to be able to give you a sensible answer and they say 
'why not? Who are you, what's your job, why are you here?' That 
sort of thing is an issue. I remember having some of my media 
training by people like Paxman and one of the questions was 'well 
you're the Chief Scientific Adviser, don't say you don't know the 
answer to this, why do we employ you? Why are you employed by 
this department as a Chief Scientific Adviser if you don't know the 
answer to a scientific question?' 
While these questions were coming from a hostile journalist, even within the 
Department there were expectations that the CSA would have a grasp of an 
enormous range of issues, including the non-scientific aspects of a particular 
policy area. Another CSA explained: 
You'd be a terrible scientific adviser if you didn't understand the 
politics of an issue. As an advisor, my credibility comes from my 
understanding of science and technology but it's equally important 
to understand the politics, otherwise you'd just come across as 
being naIve. 
Defra sets out its expectations of the CSA in helping the department to achieve 
"public trust of Defra on scientific issues" and "the respect of the science 
community" (Defra 2007b). Clearly, Defra are expecting the individual holder of 
the position to have a range of expertise so extensive as to be, arguably, 
unachievable. However, the CSA is able to counteract this knowh~dge deficit to 
some degree by cultivating relationships with other Defra scientists, as described 
later in this chapter. The second issue, that of knowing the politics behind a 
particular policy issue, is recognised by other scientific advisers as well; it is not 
restricted to those who take "a 'high level' view and provide advice to the higher 
levels of government. The scientists who sit in expert groups also recognised the 
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importance of being aware of non-scientific factors that would influence the 
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situation with which they are dealing. For them, the issue is not of being able to 
take a high level view but of avoiding their stereotype as academic 'ivory tower' 
types with no understanding of the 'real world' conditions in which their policy-
making counterparts have to operate. 
Salter (1988) argues that all scientific advisers implicitly agree to take contextual, 
political and practical factors on board when providing expertise. The scientists 
themselves are chosen to sit on advisory committees because they are seen as 
being free from the pressures of interest groups and so on, but because they are 
operating in a policy environment they must make choices about which 
recommendations to give and which policies to provide support for. As Salter 
(1988 p9) explains, 
The intention is that those choices will be informed by scientific 
understanding and that their interpretation of the scientific 
literature will be sensitive to the norms of science and its particular 
limitations. Nonetheless, we believe that in accepting their task, the 
members of the expert committee agree to recognise constraints 
that scientists publicly claim to abide by. They agree to recognise 
the implications for society of the conclusions they draw from 
scientific data. They agree to consider moral questions, at least 
obliquely. And they agree, in most cases, to go beyond the normal 
activities of science in translating scientific conclusions into 
recommendations for policy 
A recent report on scientists working on the Common Fisheries Policy supports 
this argument, as the authors claim to have found pressure on scientists to "inflate 
the science boundary" and deal with problems which are not strictly scientific. For 
example, they were asked to model the allocation of fish stocks as well as 
assessing biological condition, which is their usual role (Wilson and Hegland 
200S p.iv). Majone calls this type of science "trans-science" because it deals with 
"questions that can be stated in the language of science but are, in principle or in 
practice, unanswerable in purely scientific terms" (Majone 1984 pIS). The way in 
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which scientists involved in policy give advice or recommendations also differs 
from standard scientific reporting (for example, in academic journals) because 
government seeks science that can be explained and justified to public audiences. 
The science must facilitate clear choices and constitute a body of evidence upon 
which decisions can be based (Salter 1988 p5). 
As a result of these particular pressures, the way in which scientific advisors carry 
out research, debate issues, and arrive at conclusions can be very different from 
academic procedures. Salter suggests that scientists learn to use different language 
for their different audiences: "In order to maintain their credibility as scientists, 
participants in mandated science must adhere closely to conventions of scientific 
debate that are acceptable to other scientists. They must speak as if they were 
speaking with other scientists. To be effective in the policy arena, however, these 
same scientists are often also required to do otherwise. They must speak with an 
awareness that others - whose preoccupations and interests are quite different -
will use what they say to further goals that are unrelated to science" (Salter 1988 
p8). For Defra's scientific experts, being sensible (and co-operative) is a concern. 
In their case, being sensible means giving advice that can be used, implemented, 
rather than 'blue skies' academic research. Two scientists, one a member of an 
experts group, the other an employee of one of Defra's scientific agencies, 
described their perception of Defra's attitude towards scientists. The first said that 
his research group would be criticised for giving advice which did not offer a 
clear choice for policy-makers, or which could not be reconciled with the political 
situation within which the policy-makers were operating: 
I suppose sometimes they [Defra] think 'all these blue eyed 
scientists look into the sky with their "castles in the air" situation 
they don't know what they're talking about, we're in the real 
world'. 
The second agreed, and saw a positive side to the demand for 'policy relevant' 
recommendations, although he acknowledged that this might be a problem in 
areas with a higher degree of political interference: 
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The agencies don't do 'blue skies' research, that's not what we're 
about. We're doing research with a practical aim to input into the 
policy-making process to my mind, to facilitate them making the 
right decision and the fact that you're not doing research for 
research's sake is good. I think it's good because it's not just 'let's 
do this for some airy-fairy reason' - you're actually doing it for 
some end. But the area I work in is fine, there's no real political 
push or imperative to bias anything in any way or to interpret the 
research in a funny way, it's pretty straightforward really. 
One danger for these scientists, which is not applicable to the Science Advisory 
Council or CSA, is that their work often depends on Defra for funding so in 
addition to wanting a place in the policy process, they need to ensure they are 
putting forward research proposals that Defra will approve of. Again, scientists 
need to speak the policy-makers' language and ensure that they were putting 
forward sensible proposals, as the Defra agency scientist commented: 
I think the way the scientists, for instance in the agencies or 
perhaps even more so from universities, put together [proposals] 
they don't really show an understanding of what policy people 
really want [ ... ] I think policy people tend to want clear-cut 
answers and they want the caveats in there but the scientists tend to 
talk scientist-speak so much. I've seen so many tenders for funding 
and it's gobbledygook to me, never mind to a policy person who 
doesn't have more of a grounding in science. 
Occasionally a situation will arise where scientists are able to disregard these 
norms and behave 'badly' while still having an impact on Defra policy. A notable 
recent example was the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak, when 
epidemiological modellers engaged in a battle for credibility with the Minister of 
Agriculture. On 11th March 2001, the Minister of Agriculture Nick Brown said in 
a television interview that he was "absolutely certain" that FMD was under 
control. This message was repeated in the following weeks as MAFF sought to 
reassure the public and industry that the disease was being dealt with. Advice was 
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being sought from epidemiological modellers who were attempting to predict the 
spread of the disease and the effects of different control strategies. On 21 sl March 
the modellers had a meeting about the outbreak and prepared to send the findings 
to MAFF so that government officials could make a policy announcement. 
Despite an agreement that individuals would not talk to the media, Professor Roy 
Anderson, Head of Infectious Disease Epidemiology at Imperial College, stuck to 
a pre-arranged appearance on the BBC's Newsnight that evening where he said: "I 
think everybody is in agreement, both government, the farming community and 
the independent scientific advice, that this epidemic is not under control at the 
current point in time." He went on to say, "If this cull is applied vigorously and 
effectively enough you could turn the epidemic in to a decaying process hopefully 
within a month to two months. Doing something even better than that 1 am not 
convinced is possible at the moment" (cited in Anderson 2002 p92). 
Anderson's remarks were instrumental in changing the public mood regarding the 
outbreak and ensuring that his favoured culling strategy was pursued. However, 
the circumstances were very unusual. FMD was a very high profile issue - much 
more so than the diseases more routinely dealt with by scientific advisory groups 
in Defra - and the situation was rapidly turning into a crisis for Government and 
industry. Moreover, the scientists involved were academics who did not rely on 
Defra for funding, and who stood to gain from their profile being raised as a result 
of the epidemic (Anderson went on to become CSA to the Ministry Of Defence 
from 2004-2007 and was knighted in 2006; another of his team, Neil Ferguson, 
was awarded an OBE in 2001 and has since become a member of Defra's Science 
Advisory Council and the Department of Health's Pandemic Influenza Science 
Advisory Group). They were experts external to MAFF, brought in for the very 
reason that in-house scientists were not felt to be providing the best advice at the 
time, and the success of these external scientists led to a drive to institutionalise a 
role for outsiders to advise policy-makers. The situation for the majority of 
Defra's exotic disease experts is very different to that of these opportunistic 
academics, and their attitude quite the opposite of Anderson's combative, media-
based approach, as one agency scientist explained: 
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You have to be careful how you manage that process and 
sometimes if it's a sensitive area I will actually involve 
communications directorate or colleagues at Page Street before I 
provide a direct response to stakeholders and say 'are you 
comfortable for me to answer this question?' or 'this is the answer 
I propose, are you ok with that?' because the last thing I want to do 
is cause difficulty for Defra policy in dealing with stakeholders. 
It is equally rare for scientists who persist in putting forward unpopular ideas to 
win the plaudits that were subsequently awarded to the FMD modellers. An 
economist who worked for the division on a consultancy project tells a more 
mundane story. He described his feelings following an experience where his 
advice to the division did not fit with the policy agenda they were pursuing at the 
time. He said that his meetings with policy colleagues became increasingly 
difficult as their different points of view could not be reconciled: 
[the disputes] made it not a nice place to work and particularly 
stressful and if I was working for them on a long term basis that 
wouldn't have been sustainable. 
Ultimately, however, it was not the arguments that signalled his exclusion from 
continuing participation in the decision-making process, but his being ignored. He 
described the situation after he had completed the consultancy project: 
I'm sure [my recommendations] haven't been taken on board at all. 
I haven't heard from Defra since I did my work for them. I kind of 
expected to hear from them because despite what I've said and 
everything, [Defra staffJ seemed keen on having me back to do 
some extra stuff, which I found strange, but I haven't heard 
anything from them since. 
Being ignored by the Department - in a situation where expert status, research 
funding, and input into policy depends on their notice and favour - is a disastrous 
outcome. As the experiences of these scientists show, possessing the right 
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qualifications and even being invited to participate in discussions is no guarantee 
that their advice will be accepted and that they will be invited back to Defra. 
There have been high profile cases of scientists claiming that they have been 
deliberately excluded from Defra scientific committees. Notable examples include 
Dr Stephen Dealler and Professor Richard Lacey who, during the BSE crisis, 
insisted that their advice was ignored by what were then MAFF officials, and that 
they were prohibited from having access to data about the disease. Their 
retaliation was to appear in the media criticising government policy and 
advancing their own theories through publications. The situation in the exotic 
disease division is often less dramatic, because few exotic diseases catch the 
public interest. BSE was an extremely serious human health risk and a novel 
disease with enormous repercussions for both government and veterinary science, 
but Newcastle Disease and Classical Swine Fever do not hold the same power. 
Scientists working in these areas may not be considered when tenders for research 
projects are sent to Defra, and may not be invited to expert group meetings, and 
may not have their advice taken as seriously as others, but serious conflicts like 
those between the BSE scientists and MAFF are never seen. Nevertheless, the fact 
that exclusion occurs has strong implications for a study of how scientific advice 
is used in policy-making. The subtlety with which research agendas are steered, 
voices ignored, and expertise weighted means that it is easier to overlook than in 
high profile policy domains, but the cumulative influence on the policy-making 
process is just as important. 
Cultivating Credibility 
The problems that arise for these scientists derive from a number of causes. For 
some - particularly the SAC who have no place in the routine business of Defra -
it is a lack of any kind of proximity with Defra policy-makers, whether 
professional, physical or otherwise. As a consequence, they have no means of 
obtaining the latest information, or understanding the culture of the division, or of 
informally finding out where the priorities, weaknesses, and concerns in the 
division lie. For the CSA and for the scientists in the expert groups, there is the 
challenge of understanding the complex contexts in which their advice will be 
used, whether pragmatic or political. While their advice concerns different levels 
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of policy (one strategic, one detailed), their credibility rests on both an ability to 
.. 
see matters from a policy as well as a scientific perspective. The CSA, SAC and 
the experts groups are all able to employ a combination of strategies to overcome 
their particular problems, cultivating proximate relationships where none formally 
exist and so creating alternative networks of communication to obtain insider 
information. Their strategies highlight the importance of personal contacts, 
alternative means of communication, and informal meetings as a supplement to -
or replacement of - formal channels of organization and communication. 
As mentioned above, scientists can lose credibility if they are not up to date with 
the latest policy developments, or are not 'in the loop' of routine Defra 
communications. Often, this exclusion is not deliberate, but scientists struggle to 
keep up with what is happening within Defra when the bulk of their time is spent 
in research laboratories physically removed from Defra headquarters, perhaps 
even working on projects that are unrelated to Defra policy. One means of 
ensuring access to information is cultivating networks of professional contacts, 
usually scientists from other agencies or laboratories. The Chief Scientific 
Adviser, who has difficulty keeping up with so many different areas of science 
and policy, described how he had spent months, upon taking up the post, visiting 
Defra's agency laboratories and other research centres, meeting scientists and 
hearing about the work they were doing. The rewards of this approach were clear 
during disease outbreaks or when advice and information was needed quickly: 
If there's an issue over Bluetongue disease, I would call up the 
guys and say 'look I need briefing, I need a lot of information on 
Bluetongue, tell me what I need to know'. So that helped quite 
effectively and so I built up a good rapport with the scientists at 
VLA1S and IAH16 on animal disease issues which was important 
because if we're going to deal with animal disease on a big scale, 
and we do, I need to know all the big players and know them well. 
So like I had all their mobile phone numbers and they had mine 
and they could call me up and talk. 
IS Veterinary Laboratories Agency 
16 Institute for Animal Health 
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The CSA recalled how, during one disease outbreak; the informal conversations 
held with an agency scientist to keep him informed of the latest developments, 
outside of normal office hours and outside of the formal channels of 
communication: 
We were on the mobile phone all the time. I remember Sunday 
morning, I went to see my brother and I was calling [the Agency 
scientist] up and he was on his bicycle cycling through Richmond 
Park or somewhere and it was just a bizarre situation of him and 
me just talking to each other in strange places but you had to do 
that in order to stay on top of what was happening and I found that 
really quite important, forming a good close relationship with the 
scientists so they could always phone me up and say 'well this is 
what's going on'. 
By cultivating professional networks, the scientists are able to create their own 
forms of 'proximity', either to other scientists with whom they can share 
information on a particular disease, or the latest news coming out of Defra, or 
simply gossip or unconfirmed rumours about something happening in the 
division. The CSA is in an unusually isolated position as someone who is not 
formally part of the division and so is liable to be (unintentionally) left out from 
updates during disease outbreaks. Moreover, as a relatively new position created 
to challenge the dominant role of the Chief Veterinary Officer in influencing 
disease control policy, the CSA has to work hard to establish a presence in policy-
making circles. By getting information from the scientists he is able to maintain 
proximity to events without waiting to hear from Defra. His advice can therefore 
be more effectively targeted. 
When building up contacts, many respondents spoke of the factors that influenced 
who they would call for information. Often, there seemed to be little logic in who 
they spoke to as they were not directly (i.e. hierarchically) linked on organization 
charts. One agency scientist spoke about his network being comprised of people 
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he had worked with in the past, who would not fonnally have had a reason to 
interact with him since changing jobs: 
There are colleagues that I might not deal with on such a frequent 
basis but they still come to me because historically we've built up 
a working relationship and they might come back and ask me my 
opinion on something or they tap into infonnation. I'll give you a 
good example: Defra currently writes risk assessments, they 
review continually the risk of disease coming in to the UK [ ... ] 
One of the colleagues from International Animal Health is always 
interested to know what we know about how the virus is changing 
in Europe so he taps into the fact he knows we have access to 
international infonnation so he comes to me and I think its, you 
could argue it is fonnal, but I think a lot of that's infonnal as well. 
Others had networks of contacts based on friendship. This is not to say that they 
only spoke to those they got on with but that it made them more disposed to speak 
to them and to contact them infonnally. A consequence of this friendship-based 
communication was some reservations that if their friends left Defra, they were at 
risk of losing their network of contacts and their input into the policy process 
running less smoothly, as a veterinary advisor explained: 
If during the summer [i.e. during an outbreak] I started to get 
worried that we were being left out of the loop I might ring [the 
Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer] on my way home from work or 
give [the Chief Veterinary Officer] a text or something, that's fine 
while you've got characters in place that you have got that working 
relationship with, but you take me out of the equation, take them 
[out of the equation] ... we've got to have a system that works that 
doesn't just rely on personalities. 
Scientists had networks within the policy divisions of Defra too, which were 
particularly valued by those who relied on Defra for funding, as it helped them to 
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keep up to date with the division's policy needs. An Agency scientist explained 
that he had regular contact with a few people within the division, in the form of 
Frequent meetings or even a telephone conversation ad hoc or an 
email exchange - it could be through many forums, formal or 
informal, I'll always discuss new concepts or new directions for 
the research to take because clearly it doesn't make any sense for 
us to produce a research proposal, we might think its addressing 
policy but actually Defra colleagues might actually attach their 
own weighting to it. So when we do have what we call the 
programme meetings like we've got this week there will be issues 
that come out and [Defra will] give us pointers and they'll say this 
for us is an important aspect for policy and if we don't have an 
answer to question x we cant do policy so they do provide feed in 
to us. 
When giving advice, scientists also adopted a strategy of trying to find out what 
Defra would be receptive to, and pre-empting their concerns or criticisms. A 
member of the Science Advisory Council described a strategy of building up good 
will towards a set of recommendations before actually making them: 
In all our reports the majority of all the key recommendations have 
been accepted. There's some pragmatic politics to play here, so for 
example in the social science one I let [some people in Defra] and 
some other people see an early draft of it knowing that it was only 
going to fly in Defra if they supported it and -gave them the 
opportunity to say something but also gave them the opportunity to 
think about it and not be surprised by what we said. As I said this 
is just the pragmatic way of getting things done. If you go for the 
glory of the big surprise - gosh what a fantastic report, we hadn't 
thought of that etc etc - you'll actually force people into positions 
they may not wish to be in. But if you give them some 
forewarning, [that doesn't happen]. So actually what happened 
when [some people] came to see the SAC subgroup they almost 
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read back to us some of the things that we'd started to put into our 
draft report so they then had ownership of some of the ideas. Ok, 
there'll be occasions when you'll need to say to somebody 'this is 
our advice, you may not like it, you may not want to do it, and you 
may disagree with us, but this is our advice'. But if you can, it's 
much better to push at an open door by not surprising people too 
robustly. 
Scientists recognise that their position depends on more than their formal status -
they have to maintain their reputation and do so by building networks of contacts 
and collaborating with Defra. The role of communication is clear and scientists 
exploit a number of informal means - texting, ringing colleagues on their mobiles 
at the weekend - which are a stark contrast with the formal, Defra-controlled 
meetings held in Page St. The use of informal meetings with Defra officials, as 
described by the SAC member, allows negotiations to happen without either party 
'losing face' in the formal meetings that follow. Other informal dialogue, such as 
that between scientists seeking guidance on which areas of work Defra are more 
likely to fund, enable the scientists to avoid putting in pointless and time-
consuming bids for work that Defra will not support. By successfully negotiating 
the informal organization, scientific advisers are able to avoid being marginalized 
and have an impact upon Defra's policy process. 
Conclusion 
The stories told by Defra's scientific advisers in this chapter suggest that expert 
status relies on more than academic qualifications and experience. Of course, 
qualifications are a necessary first step to gaining access to Defra, for the 
department ensures it has the most eminent and relevant advisors on its expert 
groups and committees. However, as this chapter has shown, personal, less 
tangible qualities such as credibility, political acumen, professionalism, 
networking skills and the ability to negotiate are equally important. It is not a new 
idea to suggest that scientists are judged on more than just their paper 
qualifications. Fleck (1998) has suggested that there are as many as six 
components of knowledge, including formal, informal, instrumental, contingent, 
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tactic and meta-knowledge, upon which judgements of expertise are based. 
Collins and Evans (2007 pSI) have coined the tenn --' external meta-expertise' to 
refer to the phenomenon of non-specialists judging a person's expertise not by 
understanding the expertise itself but by understanding the expert. What is 
significant for this study is not that the scientists are judged per se, but by what 
criteria their expertise is assessed. Collins and Evans (2007) argue that "scientists 
in white coats" hold authority over many areas because they resemble the image 
of an academic expert, removed and esoteric in their experimentation. Yet the 
experience of Defra's science advisors is exactly the opposite: those perceived to 
be too 'academic' are eschewed in favour of those with a better grasp of 
pragmatic politics and real-world conditions. 
This situation contrasts with Defra's portrayal of a neat science/policy split 
wherein the scientific advice given is unsullied by consideration of political and 
practical factors. However, even if we acknowledge that the notion of 'pure' 
scientific advice being fed into policy and used in an impartial way is not an 
accurate portrayal of Defra, it does not necessary lead to the critical position of 
Salter (1988) and others who argue that scientific advisory committees are 
inevitably peopled by biased, political individuals. That the scientists would like 
to find out what Defra want and to understand the way policy people think is not a 
sign that they are willing to unquestioningly bend their advice to that which 
policy-makers want to hear. Many spoke of the importance of personal integrity 
and professionalism, even though these sentiments could make life difficult at 
times. A veterinary adviser described a disease outbreak when an infected animal 
became a mascot for opponents of the slaughter policy. Despite clashes with 
policy officials, throughout the episode: 
I didn't, I couldn't, change my veterinary advice. It was never 
going to change, whereas the policy - the minister may have 
decided to let that animal live, then it would have been my job to 
fathom out a way of allowing it to live safely. That would have 
been tricky for me and I wouldn't have liked doing that because I 
really believed in what I was doing. [ ... ] Basically I'm a vet and I 
need to know that I can look at myself in the mirror in the morning 
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and say I gave the best veterinary advice that I could and I have to 
then accept that if there is a political reason for not accepting that 
advice then I have to live with that. That's tricky. 
The role of scientific advisers remains a unique one that is quite different to the 
experiences of academic scientists or those in private sector research institutes. 
They are expected to understand non-scientific issues even when they do not 
explicitly comment on them; they must use policy-makers' language in their 
recommendations and avoid appearing as esoteric white-coated academics. In 
summary, they must perform the role of the expert, which means acting in a way 
that is consistent with Defra's expectations. It can be argued that to be a scientific 
adviser for Defra it is not sufficient to 'have' expertise; one must be an expert, by 
behaving appropriately. It is interesting to note the difference between the 
scientific advice Defra professes to want - impartial and objective - and the more 
politically and pragmatically-oriented advice which the scientists believe they are 
expected to give. This tension is explored in the following chapter that draws 
together the stories told about expertise in this chapter with those about 
bureaucracy in Chapter Five. It discusses the differing interpretations of the 
policy-making process offered by the two groups, and the implications for 
decision-making within the division. 
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Chapter Seven 
Organizing Policy-Making in Defra 
Introduction 
The previous two chapters tell of the activity of policy-making, describing it in 
tum as mundane, heroic, formulaic, opportunistic, complex, and clear-cut. These 
descriptions come from government officials and their advisers as they talk about 
their experiences of working in Defra, telling stories about occasions when they 
achieved success or were thwarted for one reason or another. The stories in 
themselves give us an insight into the way people think about their work and their 
colleagues. But what is the wider significance of studying the meaning that people 
attach to certain events and experiences, and the ways in which they talk about 
those phenomena? We know from the organization studies literature that people 
engage in sensemaking activity by talking about their shared experiences, and in 
doing so create a common vocabulary for understanding the past. But is there a 
bigger role still for storytelling within the organization as not just a means for re-
thinking what has gone before, but also shaping the present and the future, too? 
Many proponents of narrative or story analysis argue that they are 'sensemaking' 
devices or 'schemas' for making sense of past experience (on sensemaking, see 
for example Balogun and Johnson 2004; Weick 1995; Weick et al 2005; Maitlis 
2005; on schemas, see Lord and Foti 1986; Harris 1994) but my observation of 
their function in Defra suggests that stories are also future-oriented, in the sense 
that they convey preferences for how the organization should be ordered. In this 
chapter I suggest that these stories can be grouped together into three broad 
narrative strands or discourses, which have an organizing function. They are, to 
use Law's (1994b) terminology, "modes of ordering" the organization. 
First, it is necessary to recall what is meant by "modes of ordering." Modes of 
ordering are stories told by members of an organization, which are not only verbal 
accounts but are performed or embodied in a concrete non-verbal manner (Law 
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1994b p20). Modes of ordering are not 'mere talk', but generate materials, spatial 
. ." 
arrangements, performances and, together with these artefacts, they generate 
effects. Law argues that 
these modes of ordering, which are embodied in and constitute a 
series of materials including talk, agents, devices and 
organizational arrangements, may be seen as ordering syntaxes, 
recursive modes for telling and performing, and embodying the 
organization. [ ... ] the argument is that there is no organization 
outside the uncertain processes by which it chronically produces 
itself. 
(Law 1994a p250) 
By studying how and why particular stories are told, the researcher gains insight 
into the values and beliefs of the tellers. By understanding the ways in which 
organization members tell stories about their individual circumstances, it is 
possible to see how they would like to organize the organization in a wider range 
of circumstances, and the beliefs they hold about how the organization should 
operate. 
This explains how modes of ordering are brought into being; participants are 
influenced by existing images, objects and vocabularies, such as organizational 
symbols and the rhetoric of management, and in tum create artefacts and 
vocabularies and participate in shared understandings of how things are and how 
things ought to be. But it does not explain how these modes of ordering, once 
created, are able to endure. At certain times a mode of ordering may lose its 
explanatory power, as a result of experiences that contradict expectations and 
cannot be included within the story's network of meaning. Despite this, the 
evidence shows that modes of ordering persist over time within organizations. 
One of Law's suggestions as to how this works is that organizations develop 
multiple stories and multiple strategies for organizing. Law argues that when 
several modes of ordering co-exist they work together or temporarily replace one 
another to ensure a level of obduracy in the status quo. He states that 
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when one strategy, one mode of ordering, runs into the sands, then 
another comes to the rescue. For (here is the fatal flaw of simple 
solutions, single strategies) any single ordering mode will reach its 
Waterloo, discover its nemesis, and come unstuck. Which means 
that if the organization were to depend on that strategy alone, it too 
would come unstuck. 
(Law 2001 p4) 
Rather than operating in isolation, a number of orders function within a wider 
economy of sensemaking, interacting creatively to support the overall group of 
modes of ordering, the organization. What initially appear as contradictory or 
rival narratives actually lend support to one another, offering a range of 
explanations through which to comprehend diverse events and circumstances. 
Instead of collapsing in the face of incongruity, a mode of ordering may 
temporarily slip into remission - where participants no longer draw on it - but it 
may return at a later point. 
Law's second argument is that modes of ordering survive because they are not 
only drawn from materials, but also anchored in them, or "materially delegated." 
In other words, what might have been purely social relations are transferred into 
other materials. Law does not argue that there are either such things as purely 
sociaJ relations or objects that have an immutable fonn independent of their 
network of social relations. Rather, the two reinforce one another (Law 2001). 
Material objects help to anchor social relations, and social relations help to 
interpret the material objects. An example drawn from Law's study of Daresbury 
laboratory is the accounting system, which takes various material fonns (office 
procedures, paperwork, account books, calculators, computers) but which together 
with the social relations of the people in the laboratory enact a particular strategic 
order that Law tenns "administration". Although Law does not explicitly say that 
a mode of ordering must be materially delegated in order to persist, he 
acknowledges that "thoughts are cheap but they don't last long, and speech lasts 
very little longer. But when we start to perfonn relations - and in particular when 
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we embody them in inanimate materials such as texts and buildings - they may 
last longer. Thus a good ordering strategy is to embody a set of relations in 
durable materials" (1992 p6). 
It is straightforward to claim that each mode of ordering enlists and incorporates 
materials to ensure its own survival, but how do materials facilitate the 
complementarity of different orders? Like words, objects have different meanings 
for different people: the meaning is created intersubjectively, and consequently is 
not fixed. Latour (1991) discusses the creation of hotel keys with large key fobs 
attached, designed to encourage guests to leave the key at reception, and argues 
that if the hotel manager did not tell people to leave the keys, some guests would 
carry their enonnous key fobs around all day. Materials alone are not enough to 
ensure the persistence of a mode of ordering; vocal interaction is also required. 
But the same materials can be reinterpreted and appropriated as modes of ordering 
disappear or mutate. As this chapter demonstrates, while it is possible to identify 
materials that anchor modes of ordering in Defra, few are exclusively used, and 
the contradictory embodiment of materials to support different ordering attempts 
can be observed. 
Structure of the chapter 
In this chapter I am going to set out the three modes of ordering that can be 
identified in Defra's exotic disease division. I have tenned them rationalism, 
bureaucracy and expediency. For each of the modes of ordering in tum, I am 
going to indicate the images, events and ideas that prompt the development of the 
mode of ordering, referring back to the stories of Chapters Five and Six, and 
describe the way in which each mode is created and used by the participants. I am 
also going to consider how each mode of ordering is derived from other images 
and sensemaking devices such as documents, corporate images, public 
conceptions and so on, and the extent to which each mode is recognisably 
materially delegated. Throughout the chapter I will highlight instances of the three 
modes of ordering interacting creatively with each other to sustain this division of 
Defra in its current form. Having described the three modes of ordering, the 
evidence for them and their effects, I will discuss the differences and similarities 
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between them. In particular I am interested in the different scales at which they 
.' 
operate, and the different effects they bring about such as creating different 
hierarchies of people and values. 
Rationalism as a mode of ordering 
The first mode of ordering, which I have termed rationalism, is based on the belief 
commonly held by officials (and to a large extent by advisers too) that policy-
making should proceed along the lines of the rational models of decision-making 
so prevalent in academic analyses and policy documents. As I set out in Chapter 
Three, the rational (or "textbook") view of the policy-making process is 
characterised by the presence of distinct and identifiable stages through which a 
decision should pass. These stages generally include problem identification, 
consideration of available options, decision-making, and finally implementation, 
and the expectation is that 'good' policy-making should flow smoothly from one 
part of the process to the next. The most recent of these models, 'evidence based 
policy-making' includes a stage at which scientific advice can be incorporated: 
typically after the problem has been defined and before the solution has been 
agreed. While it would seem obvious to the outside observer that policy-making 
seldom follows this neat and bounded course, we can see in the comments 
recounted in Chapters Five and Six that the notion of policy-making as a 
sequential and cumulative activity is strongly held in Defra. 
Although neither policy-makers nor scientific advisers explicitly refer to a model 
of stages through which they pass when reaching a decision, the existing 
conventions - such as the routine separation of scientists from policy domains -
implicitly supports the notion of a sequential policy process. Officials talk about 
experts groups providing "an independent science, rationale for action, which 
doesn't have to take account of the policy imperatives" and which are chaired so 
as to exclude discussion of political or economic factors. Policy-makers see 
experts groups as a preliminary evidence-gathering activity, and that later in the 
process other, non-scientific considerations will be brought to bear on the policy 
problem. Scientists also talk about themselves using a very rational decision-
oriented representation. When I asked them to explain their work as scientific 
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advisers, their responses accorded with the role they are given in formal models of 
evidence-based policy, and in the rational and bureaucratic modes of ordering. For 
example, scientists described their roles as deciding "from an expert's point of 
view the answer to specific questions that are raised by policy colleagues [ ... ] and 
then being able to explain that coherently to policy-makers who actually can 
choose to ignore the advice that has been given to them". They talk of detached 
science and recognise the mutual benefits to themselves and the policy-makers of 
keeping scientific and policy discussions separate. In addition to these positive 
comments, there is frustration among the scientists at the way in which their 
advice is seemingly taken out of their hands and swept up into a system that can 
and does modify, water down, or ignore their recommendations. This suggests 
that they see themselves as part of an early stage in the policy process and that 
they have no place in the later stages, where the decisions will actually be made. 
The materials and arrangements generated by the rational mode of ordering 
support the separation of policy from scientific and other interests, and the notion 
of a policy process that can be divided into neat and bounded parts. For example, 
the so-called expert group meetings are held in the basement of the building, far 
from where the policy-makers work. The scientists attending must apply at the 
reception for a temporary access pass, reinforcing the fact that they do not 
'belong' to Defra, and must seek permission to come in, even though many of 
them are effectively employed by the Department and receive all of their funding 
or salary to work on research and testing for the exotic disease division. Meetings 
take place round a large table but for those physically remote from London there 
are teleconferencing facilities; the scientists forced to use these arrangements 
spoke of their dissatisfaction in Chapter Six. For the stakeholders (members of 
pressure groups and so on) the split is even more pronounced; they are met in a 
separate building altogether, the Defra 'headquarters' where the rooms are much 
grander and the seating arrangements even less democratic than in the experts 
groups. The separation of the stakeholders' input from policy-making is complete; 
they are not even in the building where policy is made. They are present at the 
invitation of Defra only, and only the most important stakeholders are invited to 
sit around the table; everyone else must sit around the edges of the room, 
physically excluded from the inner circle. Within the building where the exotic 
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disease staff work, they are separated into clusters; sets of desks for each work 
~ .. 
team, with a sign hanging overhead in their open plan office to denote the area 
where 'prevention' work is done, for example. The division is confined to a single 
floor, with in-house scientists on another, and endemic disease staff on yet 
another, and so on. The building is arranged rationally, not to foster informal 
communication and pragmatic networking, but to promote people working in their 
designated team, on their designated work area, and separate from those whose 
input into the process is contingent. 
Embodying and performing rationalism 
To understand how rationalism has become established as a mode of ordering in 
Defra it is necessary to consider the prompts and images that policy-makers 
receive from the organization and elsewhere. At the heart of all descriptions of the 
policy process as rational, logical, sequential and goal-oriented is the implication 
that policy-makers are, in essence, decision-makers. While the stages of problem 
formulation and evidence gathering are important, they are all leading up to the 
climax of the process: a decision. Policy-makers recognise and absorb this image 
of themselves as decision-makers, and organizational life reflects their 
preoccupation with decisions. As Laroche (1995 p97) argues, in the context of 
other organizational settings but equally applicable to Defra, 
A striking characteristic of organizational life is that there is a lot 
of talk about decisions, decisions that have been made, are to be 
made, will be made, should be made, will never be made; talk 
about who makes decisions, when, how, why and with what 
results. Organization members interpret a significant part of 
activities around them in terms of decisions. Numerous 
organizational devices (planning systems, committees, assemblies, 
votes, etc.) are developed, implemented and operated for the 
purpose of producing decisions. Managers look at themselves as 
decision-makers. 
190 
Managers (or in this case, middle-ranking policy-makers) see themselves as 
decision-makers for two reasons. The first is simply because they are encouraged 
to do so by Defra's recruitment and training programmes. Just as managers in 
private sector organizations are taught using courses and textbooks that aim to 
give the decision-maker tools to make decisions, which are "their responsibility 
and their prerogative" (Laroche 1995 p65), Defra officials are given handbooks 
and web resources on 'better policy-making' that emphasise their duty to consult 
widely, obtain evidence rigorously, and make decisions wisely. A parallel 
socialisation happens among advisors to government officials whereby they are 
encouraged to think of themselves as supporting actors in this decision-centred 
process. Feldman (1989), in her study of policy advisers (or 'analysts') in the US, 
describes a situation similar to that of the scientific advisers in Defra, whereby 
advisers draw up reports that may very rarely, or never, be used. Yet despite this 
apparent futility in their work, they persist in their jobs because these advisers are 
surrounded by colleagues who reinforce the image of their role as providing 
solutions for policy problems. As Feldman argues, the possibility of contributing 
directly to policy generates much excitement because of the perceived rewards 
including attention from high-level officials~ superiors, and peers, recognition 
awards, and offers of better and more interesting jobs, as well as the intrinsic 
rewards of having an influence on policy. Therefore, although opportunities to 
contribute directly to policy decisions may not happen often, the reward is such 
that the prospect of such opportunities exerts a strong influence over the analysts 
and they seize upon stories of other people making a breakthrough. Consequently, 
the bureaucratic system encourages belief in problem solving even when there is 
little evidence that it occurs (Feldman 1989 pl07). 
It is inevitable that Defra's scientific advisers, too, speak in the language of the 
textbook policy process; they are prompted to do so by the structures and 
documents of the department into which they are being drawn. The language of 
Defra's recruitment documents makes clear the view that scientists provide a very 
particular service to Defra; one which requires packages of objective advice to be 
provided at discrete junctures in the policy-making process. A recent 
advertisement on the Defra website to recruit new Scientific Advisory Council 
members listed in its 'essential criteria' that applicants must have "capacity to be 
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independent, to provide impartial, objective advice and be prepared to support 
views with well-argued scientific evidence as necessary." The Department states 
that it funds research to "investigate specific problems, to develop policy options, 
to implement solutions and to assess their effectiveness" (Defra 2009). The 
guidance notes on submitting tenders for research to Defra warn scientists that 
"Defra funds research to inform its policies. It does not fund research for the sake 
of the science alone. It is important that the science proposed is sound, but also 
that the research is relevant to the Department's policies, as described in the 
specification" (Defra, undated). Those who give advice are strictly segregated into 
'expert groups' to reinforce their status as both appointed expert and as distinct 
from policy-makers. 
It seems, then, that both officials and advisers are drawn into believing that they 
operate in a textbook policy environment, even though reality seems to contradict 
this. Policy-makers are aware that many of their meetings do not lead to 
resolution and that, at the time, it is very difficult to say with authority that a final 
decision has been 'made'. Moreover, they are frequently engaged in activities that 
have nothing to do with decisions but are being undertaken for other (often 
unclear) purposes. Likewise, advisers recognise that their reports may go unread, 
their present actions ignored, their research findings filed away and never used to 
contribute to policy. Yet they continue to view their tasks as building an evidence 
base upon which decisions will be based. These discrepancies help to explain the 
second reason why the middle-ranking officials see themselves as decision-
makers: because it gives purpose and structure to their actions. As Laroche (1995 
p69) argues, 
Managers see themselves as decision-makers because making 
"decisions" is a way of being an actor in the world of 
organizations. Managers make "decisions" because "decisions" 
give meaning to the processes which surround and concern 
organization members. Organization members explain what they 
are participating in and what is happening around them in terms of 
"decisions" which are made, which will be made, etc. 
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As people frame their work in tenns of decision-making, they create and 
.. 
participate in a world of problems, choices, and key meetings and events. In short, 
then, they start to structure their work around the idea of making decisions, to the 
point where the vocabulary and organization of their environment revolves 
around the decision as its key outcome. 
Participants in the rational mode of ordering co-construct what they think a 
'decision' ought to be, retrospectively designating a particular meeting as the 
meeting where the decision was made, and bracketing a period of activity as the 
'evidence-gathering' that led to the decision, and tenning everything that happens 
after the decision has been made as 'implementation'. Thus there is a constant 
stream of activity occurring that, it is argued, continues without the need for 
specific goals towards which this activity must be directed. Policy-makers are able 
to follow set procedures and fulfil expected tasks almost unconsciously and then 
make sense of this activity at a later date by strategically tenning certain activities 
as 'decisions'. As I set out in Chapter Three, this retrospective interpretation of 
events, which is often referred to as "sensemaking", involves "the ongoing 
retrospective development of plausible images that rationalize what people are 
doing" (Weick et al 2005 p409) using "a conversational and narrative process 
through which people create and maintain an intersubjective world" (Balogun and 
Johnson 2004 p524). Policy-makers see themselves as 'decision-makers' (because 
they operate in a rational process that leads to a decision) and therefore look for 
moments of 'decision' in their past actions. 
In other words, there is a mutually-reinforcing cycle of policy-makers 'acting' as 
decision-makers because they are told that they operate in a rational policy-
making style, and the policy-makers perpetuating the image of rational policy-
making by interpreting everything they have done as part of a decision-making 
process. Thus activity is directed towards decision-making; participants have the 
feeling of taking part in or being witness to 'decisions' because the world of 
policy-making is represented to them as being a world of decision-making. 
However, policy-makers actively seek to construct a rational decision-making 
environment by structuring their working day around meetings where decisions 
will be made, keeping records of the decisions that have been reached, and writing 
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press releases that announce their decisions. For example, if a group of people 
/ .-
think there is a decision to be made, they will call a meeting in order to make this 
decision, and at the end of the meeting they will have a sense of whether or not 
the decision was reached. They believe a decision has (or has not) been made 
because they expected the decision to be made, since that was the reason for the 
meeting in the first place. Other colleagues who were not in the meeting, but 
know it took place, think that a "decision" was at stake and will eventually find a 
reference to this meeting in a report, note or conversation. They will interpret this 
meeting as the time and place of the decision (Laroche 1995 p70). 
Obduracy and delegation 
Although it is obvious to Defra staff that policy-making in the Department does 
not often follow the textbook model, rationalism endures both as an aspiration and 
an expectation of life as a policy-maker. In fact, the image of the rational policy 
process is so deeply ingrained throughout the civil service that some policy 
analysts feel they will be ignored or dismissed by policy-makers if they try to 
write about the policy process in any other terms (Nakamura 1987 p152). Laroche 
(1995 pp71-72), drawing on social representation theory, offers an explanation for 
this, which is that managers are usually proactive and tend to look forward rather 
than back. In other words they do not dwell too long on considering whether the 
course by which they arrived at a decision resembled the rational process they 
expect. When discrepancies are noticed, they are downplayed and managers 
pretend that they are an exception rather than the norm. However, this argument 
does not work particularly well when applied to Defra. The division has been the 
subject of numerous reviews such as the two FMD inquiries (Anderson 2002, 
2008), Newcastle Disease inquiry (Defra 2006b) and many other internal reviews 
of the policy-making process. These inquiries explicitly set out to uncover 
instances where policy-making did not follow the expected course, where 
evidence was not taken on board or policies were not implemented correctly. 
Consequently, Defra officials are very much aware of how serendipitous the 
policy-making process is, and yet their view of themselves as decision-makers 
persists. 
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Material delegation offers one possible solution, as we can identify many 
, " 
instances where the textbook rational model of decision-making is supported by a 
range of technologies and artefacts that have been created because officials 
believe they should be acting in a rational manner. Examples include the texts that 
accompany policy documents setting out models of EBP and guidelines on the 
responsibilities of policy-makers, the meetings that form the core of 
organizational life and the minutes and agendas that anchor them into 
administrative systems, and the computer databases filled with folders of 
'evidence'. All these give real expression to the notion of policy-making as a 
rational, decision-focused activity. The argument for multiplicity is even more 
persuasive. Rationalism doesn't have to be successful all of the time because 
participants are able to find alternative ways of understanding their experiences. If 
rationalism were the only mode of ordering, the organization could not survive 
because reality would not match expectation. One of the most common reasons 
that rationalism loses its explanatory power for the participants is because they 
attend meetings where decisions are not made, produce documents that are not 
read and which do not contribute to any decision-making process. In the following 
section I explain how these experiences are interpreted as part of another mode of 
ordering, bureaucracy. 
Bureaucracy as a mode of ordering 
As I suggested earlier, working in Defra does not live up to the expectation of 
rational policy-making. The reality of life in Defra is one of small, incremental 
steps towards ever-changing goals. Progress is thwarted by the rapid replacement 
of staff, changes in political circumstance, poor information management systems, 
financial constraints and the bureaucratic demand for 'due process'. The current 
vogue for private sector management techniques means that Defra officials are 
moved between jobs regularly and have little time to become 'experts' in their 
field. As a consequence, they feel they are often 'playing catch-up' and are 
condemned to a treadmill of keeping up with new developments in their field and 
understanding both political and scientific issues relevant to their policy areas. 
Many scientists and other 'outsiders', when they perceive that their advice or 
criticism is unheeded, blame Defra for being deliberately obstructive. Defra staff, 
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on the other hand, feel that reform of the system to achieve more efficient 
working is beyond their control. The middle-ranking~officials have a particUlarly 
difficult time because they are responsible for neither agenda setting nor 
implementation, but must occupy a difficult role co-ordinating the activities of 
others. When an out-of-touch top management imposes weak and ill thought-out 
reforms, policy-makers find ways to implement the proposed changes with as 
little disruption to their existing ways of working as possible. Management also 
impose an exhausting series of meetings on the middle-ranking officials, who 
describe with amused frustration the number of hours spent in meetings compared 
with the small amount oftime 'getting something done'. 
Bureaucracy, then, is another of the mUltiple ordering strategies that enables the 
organization to survive. By bureaucracy I am referring to the practice of officials 
believing the procedural, routine and onerous aspects of their work to be 
consequences of working in a bureaucratic organization and in doing so blaming 
others for their inefficiencies by constructing these duties as inescapable burdens 
foisted upon them by the organization and its hierarchy. The way in which I am 
using the term bureaucracy corresponds closely with the negative stereotypes and 
cliches I outlined in Chapter Five: bureaucracy is a byword for inefficiency, 
obfuscation and so on. It also has a more neutral meaning in the sense that it refers 
to a procedural and hierarchical means of organizing work and people. 
Bureaucracy is utilised as a sensemaking device by officials because it de-
personalises activity. Policy-makers and scientists alike express their 
powerlessness at the hands of bureaucratic procedure, suggesting that when they 
fail to act in a rational manner it is not their fault but the result of being swept up 
into the bureaucratic machine. This is a particularly useful sensemaking device 
because as Laroche (1995 p71) argues, in most cases in organizations it is not 
clear why, when failure occurs, things did not tum out in the way they were 
expected to. This is certainly true of the various Lessons Learned reports, which 
often struggle to attribute blame or even causality to the actions of Defra officials. 
Laroche (1995 p71) also hypothesises that "the feeling of not having an active 
part in the flaws of the process allows participants to readily acknowledge these 
flaws" though they may be quite bitter about it. This certainly seems true of Defra 
staff and advisers who openly complain about the constraints of their working 
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environment and their inability to circumvent the fixed procedures that are an 
essential part of bureaucratic decision-making. 
The policy-makers, who complain that they are forced to attend meetings even 
though they would get more work done if they were permitted to be absent from 
them, echo this feeling of frustration. The implication is that attending meetings is 
an inescapable feature of working in a bureaucracy; work is done despite the 
onerous burden of routine meetings that are forced upon the workers. In 
particular, the types of meetings that are identified as pointless are the meetings 
that could most obviously be described as 'bureaucratic necessity'. One of the 
Grade 7s lamented the need to attend the weekly 'team meeting', which always 
runs over its allotted time and which only exists to discuss general corporate 
issues that bear no relevance to that particular official's daily work. These sorts of 
meetings are not events where officials expect decisions to be made; they are 
catch-up meetings or information-gathering meetings for the benefit of others. 
This 'structural maintenance' work is accepted as an essential part of keeping the 
Department functioning smoothly, however, and most officials accept it as an 
inevitable feature of their working week. 
The materials of bureaucracy are not difficult to identify. That ultimate symbol of 
the bureaucrat - paperwork - is to be found everywhere in the division. The 
farming of livestock and the controlling of disease is a very bureaucratic business. 
Farmers must register their premises to obtain a holding number; for cattle (and, 
in a recent development, sheep and goats too) each animal must be tagged, its ear 
tag number recorded and used to obtain a passport to allow it to be moved on and 
off the premises. There is a poultry register to keep a record of poultry producers, 
administered by Defra staff. Those transporting livestock with vehicles need the 
relevant paperwork signing off to prove that the vehicles were disinfected after 
the movement; likewise animal gatherings such as markets and shows must have 
licenses, and be inspected, to ensure cleansing is properly carried out. In the event 
of an outbreak, there are forms for reporting suspected cases of disease, 
movement licences must be issued to farmers wanting to move their livestock, 
and so on. All of these forms, licenses and other documents pass through the 
division in one way or another, either directly as they are checked and filed, or 
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indirectly as other agencies report to the division about their progress. 
Bureaucracy has a centralising tendency, drawing many areas under the oversight 
of the division through materials such as documents. But bureaucracy in the sense 
I am using it here - as a derogatory term denoting excessive regulation of 
procedure and its attendant inefficiency - generates other materials, too. Consider 
the regulation of the buffet lunch, which can be ordered by staff to sustain them in 
long meetings. Because lunches can only be ordered for meetings of several 
hours' duration, a suspicion arose that staff were deliberately scheduling longer 
meetings than were strictly necessary, and a memo was circulated from 
management discouraging this practice. Or the use of powerpoint presentations -
with the inevitable accompaniment of broken projectors, and forgotten USB 
sticks, in supposedly short briefings. These seem innocuous, but during disease 
outbreaks they are tellingly abandoned in favour of rapid oral presentations with 
no supporting powerpoints, pre-circulated documents or handouts. 
Embodying and performing bureaucracy 
I argued that rationalism gives Defra officials a sense of purpose by equipping 
them with the vocabulary and tools of decision-making in an otherwise uncertain 
and complex organizational environment. What attraction does bureaucracy hold 
for officials (and advisers)? The key seems to be in the sense of powerlessness 
described above, and the opportunity it affords officials to abdicate responsibility 
for the Department's failings. It also helps these frustrated decision-makers to 
retain a sense of place and worth in the organization: the bureaucratic mode of 
ordering gives all participants a place in the bureaucratic system that does not 
depend on the subsequent utility of their contributions. For example, even the 
scientific advisers whose expertise is rarely used have a place in the bureaucratic 
organization; whether their advice is used or not, they have fulfilled their 
'function' simply by existing and providing advice. Bureaucracy does not weight 
the different contributions of its participants; the emphasis is on procedural 
regularity and order. Thus rather than becoming disillusioned when they are 
ignored, scientific advisers can make sense of events by believing that they have 
nevertheless provided a necessary service as a fixed component of bureaucratic 
procedure. As one scientist commented, after giving advice, "there have been 
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many occasions when we've sent advice through to core group, the policy group, 
and it's come back saying that they didn't do that, they decided not to on 
reflection." In other words, what happens 'downstream' from the provision of 
advice has no bearing on the ability of scientists to give advice, and does not 
diminish the value of that advice. The same argument could be made of policy-
makers who are attempting to carryon their activity without being clear of the 
objectives of the division, or of the end-point of their project. They can continue 
to go about their business because they are validated by the existence of a 
bureaucratic organization in which they have been assigned a role and a place in a 
hierarchy. 
Bureaucracy also puts the emphasis on process; on means rather than ends. When 
goals are ambiguous, officials can carryon with their everyday work without 
feeling that their raison d'etre (making a decision, which implies having a goal) 
has been compromised. In this way the emphasis on process clearly complements 
the rational decision-making representation by enabling policy-makers to interpret 
their role in the organization even when their apparent function (decision-making) 
has been taken away. An emphasis on process means that policy-makers are given 
templates for action: templates for documents; criteria that have to be met before a 
project is deemed complete; lists of issues to consider when carrying out a risk 
assessment. Feldman gives the example of writing a report that frequently follows 
a pre-defined template both for writing and gathering information to inform the 
report. The process of producing a report 
takes on the appearance of a routine, not in the sense that the same 
thing is produced or in the same manner, but in the sense that a 
pattern of behaviour exists that helps people figure out what needs 
to be done next given what has already happened. People may be 
working on very different types of papers under very different 
circumstances, yet they are guided by the general knowledge of 
how to write a report, how to push it through the concurrence 
process, and so forth. In the absence of a larger goal, the goal of 
completing this task at hand becomes the focus of attention 
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(Feldman 1989 p95) 
The primary objectives of the policy-maker may be directed not towards ultimate 
ends, but towards successfully completing the part of the process that they have 
been allocated. In Chapter Five I discussed the criticisms of bureaucratic 
government, which alleged that this process-focus led to an inefficient and 
procedure-obsessed civil service. However, I am not arguing that a focus on 
procedure is in some way glorified in Defra; rather that it offers a means for civil 
servants to conduct their work even in a situation where goals are poorly defined 
and the immediate relevance of their work is unclear. 
The emphasis on process has other implications, too. The bureaucratic style of 
structuring discussion serves to minimise conflict and simplify complex debates. 
The bureaucratic process (by which I mean dividing labour so that policy-makers 
have responsibility for different tasks, following a set of procedures in order to 
complete these tasks and operating within a hierarchy of responsibility where 
those in higher authority have the job of co-ordinating action) creates a highly 
structured environment in which ambiguity cannot be accommodated easily. 
Individuals and groups must state their positions, views and evidence so that these 
positions can be fed into a structured discussion process. In this way complex 
arguments are simplified into usable forms such as 'the Minister favours x' and 
'the evidence supports y'. Laroche argues that in this way bureaucratic decision-
making "reframes violent political struggles as useful and normal debates -
though maybe a little too passionate ones - that give more depth to collective 
deliberation" (Laroche 1995 pp71-72). The process of decision-making manages 
to contain disputes by reducing them to a set of arguments that can be normalised 
and fed into a seemingly more objective decision-making process. 
Obduracy and delegation 
How does bureaucracy persist as a mode of ordering? It could be argued that 
bureaucracy is materially delegated into the normal organizational form, as the 
civil service is essentially a bureaucratic organization, but this needs careful 
consideration. For the last twenty years the civil service has undergone numerous 
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refonns to eliminate those elements of the bureaucracy that seem to constitute this 
mode of ordering. Successive refonns have attempted to reduce inefficiency and. 
waste, to pare back personnel to the minimum, to introduce private sector 
management techniques that will be more effective and save time, and to flatten 
and rationalise hierarchies. In other words, the conventional material delegation of 
bureaucracy has been utterly undennined. Even though Defra staff recognise that 
hierarchy, inefficiency and the other characteristic features of bureaucracy persist, 
it is not reflected in their literatures, in the memos and strategy documents that 
come down from management level. However, the division of labour, although it 
is now purportedly more rational and streamlined, invites Defra staff to view 
themselves as segmented groups, playing one part within a machine. The 
administrative system encourages policy-makers to file, copy, and circulate every 
document they are given, and recent scandals (such as BSE) have increased the 
need for obsessive paper trail maintenance. 
Bureaucracy as a mode of ordering also thrives because of its interplay with the 
rational decision-making mode of ordering. The priority given to each seems to 
vary by group and by situation. The bureaucratic order comes to the rescue for 
middle-ranking officials when they have no decision to make; it offers a process 
to follow and in doing so legitimises their actions and their very existence as a 
group within the organization. Likewise it offers an explanation to scientific 
advisors when their advice is not used to influence a decision directly. However, 
as Law (2001) has pointed out, when an organization relies on one mode of 
ordering, both the mode and the organization itself run the risk of failure. Other 
modes must come to the rescue, and occasionally the decision-making order does 
just that. In times of crisis, particularly animal disease outbreaks, the bureaucratic 
mode of ordering is insufficient. It fails to deliver results. Defra officials cope 
with this by altering their perspective and reframing themselv~s as decision-
makers first and foremost. If we consider again the comments of policy-makers 
talking about a recent disease outbreak and we can see how this occurs. They said 
that during the emergency, they eliminated "faffing" and concentrated on solving 
problems; meetings were kept to a minimum and nobody "wasted their time" 
writing up the minutes of these meetings in detail. The emphasis is on decision-
making as the primary function of the middle-ranking official; bureaucratic 
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procedure becomes "faffing" and the officials state the need to solve problems and 
/ 
see results. They reject bureaucratic procedure -and take decisions without . 
recourse to the usual channels and processes. To understand how bureaucracy 
survives as a mode of ordering despite the fundamental challenges to its validity 
during times of emergency, it is necessary to introduce a third mode of ordering: 
expediency. 
Expediency as a mode of ordering 
It appears, then, that Defra officials are told, and expect, to behave as rational 
decision-makers, but that their general experience is of frustrating bureaucratic 
inertia. However, there are exceptional circumstances when officials do not 
behave in a strictly rational manner, nor are they bureaucratic, rather they are 
efficient, effective and purposeful. These circumstances are disease outbreaks. 
During disease outbreaks, officials get things done. They talk about 'stepping out 
of line', asking controversial questions, avoiding bureaucratic procedure, and 
'speaking out of tum.' During a disease outbreak, recognisable elements of the 
peace-time policy process remain: meetings still have to be called, of course, and 
reports must continue to be written. However, meetings are convened 
spontaneously, on the basis of need, with priority given to those that will actually 
contribute to bringing disease under control. Expediency, in this context, means 
acting in such a way as to circumvent unnecessary paperwork and meeting 
attendance, cutting down the distractions of everyday policy-making to focus on 
achieving results. As one policy-maker argues, it is appropriate to completely 
subvert the conventional values of bureaucratic government in order to ensure that 
work gets done during an outbreak. Hierarchy, debate, meetings, report-writing 
are seen as an obstacle to progress rather than a facilitator of good decision-
making. 
The overriding sentiment in times of disease outbreak is that officials and 
scientists alike have a duty to get the disease under control as quickly as possible, 
and this governs their behaviour. Defra officials feel obligations towards many 
different groups: an obligation to the Government to implement policies 
successfully, an obligation to the public to avoid overspending and maximise their 
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use of resources, an obligation to the fanning industry to protect livestock against 
/" 
disease, to protect the consumer from hann, and to ensure continuity of the food 
supply. Although these demands are always present, they are specially prioritised 
during disease outbreaks. Concerns that are usually abstract, such as the food 
supply, become exigent when livestock cannot move across a protection zone to a 
slaughterhouse or when meat products cannot be transported from warehouses to 
supennarkets because of movement restrictions. The long-tenn state of the 
fanning industry is extremely difficult for policy-makers to control or even 
discuss in meaningful tenns, as it endeavours to do in peace-time, but finding 
ways to restore international trade following an outbreak is a specific and pressing 
problem that they are to resolve as swiftly as possible. 
Scientists expressed similar sentiments about being governed by a sense of duty, 
both to policy-makers and to the scientific community. Their unique capacity as 
scientific 'experts' gave them a sense that they were under an obligation to be 
useful to policy-makers, to offer something in return for the research funding 
given to them by Defra. There was also a sense that in times of national 
emergencies like disease outbreaks they, as an elite group with specialist 
knowledge, had a duty to make themselves available as providers of advice and 
infonnation. Disease outbreaks give an impetus to the scientists in much the same 
way as they do to policy-makers, in that they feel their advice is needed urgently 
and could have a significant impact on the handling of the disease. As one 
scientist described, the lives of animals depended on the advice given, and policy-
makers were dependent on their infonnation in order to proceed. This feeling of 
being obliged to assist in emergencies is tied to a broader sense of duty to provide 
useful and relevant advice, and to be at the disposal of policy-makers. As one 
veterinary adviser explained, he felt an obligation to be accessible to policy· 
makers and make his recommendations easy to understand. By his. understanding, 
being paid to advise policy-makers means putting communication first and 
minimising academic or scientific jargon. However, it should also be noted that 
scientific advisers expressed a sense of duty to themselves or to the scientific 
community more widely not to give misleading or false advice. As another 
veterinary adviser explained, although there is occasionally pressure to give 
advice that will support a particular policy or at least avoid making alternative 
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proposals, advisers should not compromise their integrity as scientists and allow 
themselves to be drawn too far into politics. In other words, advisers can give . 
useful advice, but only insofar as they do not contravene their own beliefs of what 
constitute the hard scientific facts of the case. 
Disease outbreaks provide the right conditions for expediency to occur; they are 
time-pressured, goals are clear (getting meat on shelves rather than 'protecting the 
nation's food supply') and there is a high degree of accountability. The effects of 
officials' actions are seen straight away and there is a strong link between 
decisions taken in Westminster and results in the field. For the scientists, too, 
disease outbreaks provide an opportunity to enjoy heightened control and 
presence in the policy-making process. Their advice is indispensable and their 
recommendations cannot be ignored. The usual constraints such as departmental 
budgets and the need to communicate through written reports and presentations 
are reduced as the need for rapid information flow and effective solutions 
becomes more important. Scientists talk about the need to get information to 
policy-makers as quickly as possible and enjoy the notion that their often esoteric 
research has genuine and immediate policy applications. Scientists are more 
successful in gaining access to policy-makers and getting their advice accepted 
during disease outbreaks because they are asked to provide advice on specific 
situations, relating to decisions of a more technical nature. They are giving 
information, rather than the more vague 'expertise.' 
To the extent that expediency has an affinity with efficiency and enterprise (as 
they are used in the New Public Management sense), some of the materials and 
arrangements generated by expediency are the same as those engendered by 
management consultants in large organizations everywhere: the open plan office, 
for example, and most recently the move to 'hot desking' in the division. But 
there are other more interesting materials that are specific to this part of Defra. 
The most striking is perhaps the large map, spread out on a table at the centre of 
the room where 'bird tables' are held during disease outbreaks. The desired effect 
of this arrangement is to conjure up the spirit of the control room during battle. 
The reality is rather more mundane, in the sense that it is a group of civil servants 
in an open-plan office in Westminster, rather than officers on a battle field, but the 
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feeling of a united group, surveying the state of operations by clustering around a 
map showing infected premises and protection zones'is the same. The materials of . 
battle can seem rather laughable. For example there are instructions for the 
biosecurity teams in Local Disease Control Centres during a disease outbreak, 
stating that they should: 
1. Set up desk as directed by Divisional Operations Manager [ ... ] 
2. The following list of stationery is minimum: blue-tack, stapler, staple 
extractor, pens, marker pens, highlighters, telephone pad, post-it pads, 
spare paper. 
3. Identify Team by putting a'Biosecurity Team' sign in a prominent 
position 
(Defra, cited in Donaldson 2008 p1555). 
Although they seem silly, Donaldson makes the serious point that these artefacts 
"denote a performance that is vitally important in mobilising emergency 
biosecurity. Put into practice, they enact a site for managing biosecurity through a 
list of mundane materials that also, literally, make the biosecurity team visible." 
By putting signs and desks in place a routine practice is transformed into a visible 
component of the battle against disease (2008 p1555). 
Embodying and performing expediency 
Much of the sense of duty expressed by Defra staff, which prompts them to ignore 
bureaucratic norms, comes from stimuli generated by the Department and its 
critics. Defra has a clear set of objectives at a variety oflevels (whole Department, 
directorate general and so on) that are clearly communicated both to staff and 
stakeholders. These objectives refer not only to specific areas of responsibility 
(such as safeguarding the food supply and ensuring a thriving farming industry) 
but also to protecting the general reputation and functioning of the Department. 
For example, one of Defra's current Departmental objectives is to be "A respected 
department delivering efficient and high quality services and outcomes." As the 
website explains, "Respect is gained and maintained in the long-term by doing the 
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day-job well, developing and delivering good policy [ ... J But it's also lost easily 
/ 
by messing up in any of our areas: policy, delivery'or corporate" (Defra 2008) .. 
There are, of course, formal Public Service Agreements relating to animal disease 
that everyone in the division is aware of. In addition to the heavy emphasis placed 
on objectives and targets by Defra, the many critical reports written since the 
Department was created in 2001 emphasise what they think Defra should be doing 
and the ways in which they are failing to do it. There have been National Audit 
Office reports into whether Defra has learned the lessons from the 2001 FMD 
outbreak (NAO 2005), Defra's management of expenditure (NAO 2008) and its 
management of animal health services (NAO 2009). The Lessons Learned-style 
reports mentioned previously require Defra staff to devote time from their 
working week to reflect upon what went wrong and what went right in recent 
outbreaks. Cumulatively, these stimuli prompt Defra staff to regularly consider 
the objectives of their working lives and whether they are achieving them, both 
personally and as a division. Moreover, the number of critical reports written on 
Defra help to cultivate the conception that it is a Department with a history of 
failure, particularly in the area of animal disease management, strengthening 
officials' desire to break out of this cycle of failure and improve. 
The demand in government for a more streamlined and responsive civil service 
has also had an effect. Recent reports have emphasised that civil servants should 
optimise public expenditure and that they are increasingly being recruited and 
trained as 'managers' using techniques formerly associated with private 
companies. There are also conceptions of what the civil servant is employed for, 
and in particular the sense that they are employed as public servants. It is this 
rhetoric that has been used in government campaigns to cut personnel numbers 
and reduce expenditure on the civil service. The civil service should be working 
for the taxpayer, and not enjoying the perks of public sector employment without 
a corresponding duty to act for the public good. There are echoes here of the 
sentiments expressed by Weber that working in the public sector should be seen 
as a vocation for the dedicated, with civil servants willing to embody the desires 
and goals of the organization in order to maximise their personal utility. In 
Chapter Five, policy-makers described their frustration at some of the constraints 
imposed upon them, particularly the onerous number of meetings to be attended 
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and the labour of producing written reports of every meeting and task completed. 
- .' 
There is a sense that this bureaucratic red tape can be accepted as part of life as a . 
civil servant most of the time, but at moments of real emergency it must be 
discarded to ensure that the public good is not sacrificed to bureaucratic 
procedure. 
Finally, the professional background and the career trajectories of Defra staff 
themselves must be considered. Staff are frequently recruited from management 
or project management backgrounds and it is inevitable that they bring with them 
the expectations and techniques of managerial work. However, this is frequently 
at odds with the reality of working as a civil servant. As quoted previously, one 
official with a project management background commented that in project 
management the projects are "generally much more focused; you're clear what 
you want to deliver, you're clear on the cost. Projects that fail and ones that don't 
are clear. So you're clear what you want to do, you're clear what your costs are, 
you're clear what your deadlines are and generally you know who's going to 
make decisions." Policy-making, on the other hand, does not enjoy these 
characteristics. He described his shock at joining Defra and finding that on his 
new project the Department "hadn't got the buy-in they needed. They knew 
roughly what they were trying to achieve, but they were going into all sorts of 
detail about detailed recovery mechanisms and hadn't got the sign up to actually 
recover it." Even for those officials without a management background, they are 
quickly initiated into the mindset of private sector management by the frequent 
reforms of the Department that take place and the ethos behind those reforms. To 
recall Renew Defra, for example, the aims of this programme as communicated to 
staff are "to transform the Department into an organization that is more 
collaborative, flexible and effective in developing policies that deliver the right 
outcomes" through five work streams: Building a high performance culture; 
Seeing ourselves as the customer sees us; Defining the Defra way of doing things; 
Delivering the Right Size, Right Shape, Right Skills organization; and Managing 
the programme. Defra staff are taught to think in the way a manager thinks and 
consequently to reflect upon how objectives will be met and work carried out in 
the most effective and efficient way. 
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Obduracy and delegation 
The interaction between expediency and the other two modes of ordering is clear 
but complex, particularly its function as a flip-side to bureaucracy. Expediency as 
a mode of ordering has become established because it helps officials and scientists 
to find meaning in their work, something that is lacking from their everyday 
bureaucratic lives. As was discussed briefly in Chapter Five, the feeling that their 
policy choices have a tangible impact on the public gives great comfort to Defra 
officials who otherwise may feel that their working life consists of writing reports 
that no one will read and attending meetings where nothing is decided. During 
peace-time, the meaning of their work is closely associated with the continuous 
and routine tasks of government. During disease emergencies, however, the work 
that Defra officials do is connected to an end product (the eradication of disease 
and a return to normal trading conditions) and to the external world. These short 
bursts of pressured, high-risk activity revitalise the division at times when it is 
ground down by routine and ambiguity of purpose. When life feels pointless for 
the policy-makers they have recourse to stories of the time when their decision 
allowed meat to move around the country or prevented disease from spreading. 
There is also interplay with the rational mode of ordering, with its emphasis on 
'everyone in his or her place.' In an organization with a rigid formal hierarchy that 
disenfranchises lower-ranking staff and external advisers, (because they have no 
place in policy formation) the sense of a 'war effort' during disease outbreaks 
makes them feel that their expertise is valued and that they had a tangible role in 
policy formation. The division feels united as everyone - regardless of official 
status - is called to a 'bird table' for briefing. People are united in their stress, and 
in their share of the extra workload. Everyone works longer hours to ensure that 
they contribute to the 'battle.' Disease outbreaks are a temporary suspension of 
the normal order of things and expediency is the way that officials and advisers 
tell stories about these anomalous times, thereby making sense of their place and 
their feelings towards the work and to others. Expediency captures the excitement 
of working in a division a~ the heart of the action, crucial to Defra's reputation, 
and it does this by portraying their actions as, in a way, beyond rational. They are 
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so rational (in the sense of not expending unnecessary energy, matching inputs to 
outputs) that they shorten chains of command and make new communication. 
channels based on pragmatism. Rationalism is about' getting things done', but it is 
also about achieving this through pre-ordained processes of evidence gathering 
and decision-making. Expediency is about getting things done by any means 
necessary, and if the 'rational' way is not the quickest, or the cheapest, or the most 
effective, it will be discarded. 
For rationalism and bureaucracy, I have argued that material delegation plays a 
role in ensuring their survival over time. It is less clear how this takes place in the 
case of expediency. Indeed, most of what seem to be attempts to materially 
delegate expediency (by writing lessons learned reports and so on) are wildly 
counter-productive .. 1 will come back to this point in the following section. 
Expediency does endure over time, despite the fact that by virtue of its association 
with disease outbreaks, expediency is not constantly present in Defra. I observed 
one disease outbreak during the period of my participant observation, and 
conducted my interviews during another outbreak, a year later. The same 
sentiments could be heard, and similar actions observed. Perhaps expediency 
survives because it is an aspiration, so even when circumstances challenge it (e.g. 
there is an outbreak where for some reason it is impossible to be expedient) that 
does not mean it is undermined. The prompts for expedient behaviour - the sense 
of duty to stakeholders, the critical reports - endure, and each outbreak is seen as 
a fresh opportunity to perform well. To paraphrase the argument made by 
Feldman (1989 pl07) about advisers quoted above regarding rationalism, 
although opportunities to act expediently do not happen often, the reward is such 
that the prospect of such opportunities is attractive and officials seize upon stories 
of people being heroic. 
Creative interaction and an economy of sensemaking 
In this chapter I have set out three possible ways in which Defra officials and 
advisers interpret their experiences and order themselves. I have set out that 
modes of ordering interact insofar as when one fails because its explanation loses 
power as a situation changes, then another mode of ordering steps in with an 
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alternative explanation. But is that all there is to it? No, they have different effects 
as well; they deal with phenomena of different sizes; react to different stimuli, and . 
enact different hierarchies. Thus their interaction is more creative than simple 
sensemaking. 
Scale and granularity 
Following Law (1994b p 11 0), I would like to suggest that the modes of ordering I 
have identified in this chapter perform phenomena of different sizes in standard or 
regular ways. In particular, the scale of expediency is much smaller than that of 
bureaucracy and rationalism. Bureaucracy and rationalism are responses to an 
enormous system of organization, not only that of Defra but of the entire civil 
service as it is constituted in central government. These two modes of ordering are 
ways for participants to articulate abstract concepts such as policy-making and 
indeed the civil service and relate these concepts to their daily experience. So 
rationalism is a way for policy-makers to understand what is expected of them as 
government officials, a way of making clear what the overarching goals of the 
civil service machine are. Bureaucracy· is a way of understanding the 
inefficiencies of this system and accounting for the mysteries of its operation. In 
short, these modes of ordering are ways for officials and scientists to understand 
the system of which they are a part, for them to reconstitute that system and their 
roles within it. As such, the impetus is internal to the organization; Defra creates 
the situation, both in terms of management personnel dictating the need to attend 
excessive meetings, and middle-ranking officials creating opportunities for 
decision-making. Bureaucracy and rationalism are internally created and as such 
officials can flip between the two on a daily basis, when for example interpreting 
a memo or meeting. 
Expediency, on the other hand, deals with 'small blocks.' Unlike bureaucracy and 
rationalism, which are group responses to large phenomena, expediency deals 
with the particular and is associated with individuals rather than groups. Of 
course, a mode of ordering could not be sustained if only one person believed in 
it; but expediency is not universally held as a desirable mode of ordering. As I 
will discuss later, there are those who want to be expedient and who look for and 
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create opportunities to do so, and there are those who do not share this vision. It is 
not the same as Law's order of "vision" - it is nofthat people are 'born' to be 
expedient - but a personal response to the crisis situation is required and is not 
given by everyone. Expediency is also a mode of ordering the small and particular 
in terms of the phenomena of which it tries to make sense. While bureaucracy and 
rationalism are modes of ordering that deal with generalities - rationalism tells of 
how people should behave 'in an ideal world', while bureaucracy deals with the 
largely faceless enemies of managers and administrators - expediency is largely 
generated by specific situations, disease outbreaks, that are bounded in time and 
space. A 'war effort' can be stimulated and sustained precisely because the 
situation will not last forever; it is a temporary state that presents an opportunity 
for heroic behaviour. In this sense, then, expediency is not a response to systemic 
characteristics, but to external events that have suddenly encroached upon their 
world. 
Because it is prompted by external events, expediency is a more contingent and 
fleeting order than both rationalism and bureaucracy. As I mentioned above, it is 
difficult to pin down how expediency endures because it is less obviously 
delegated into durable materials. Attempts to materially delegate expediency fail 
precisely because Defra officials, particularly senior management officials, try to 
make it an internal (and essentially rationallbureaucratic) order when it needs to 
be the opposite. One of the most obvious attempts to materially delegate 
expediency is in the writing of "lessons learned" reports after disease outbreaks. 
Perhaps the most prominent in MAFF/Defra's history was the 2001 FMD report, 
commissioned from an independent expert, Dr lain Anderson. The report is 
significant because of its very broad scope and its attempts to capture as much 
oral and informal evidence as possible. It is a "lessons learned" report in the sense 
that it is not so accusatory as, for example, the Phillips inquiry into BSE. Since the 
Anderson report these lessons learned documents have become an almost 
mandatory feature of the post-crisis period in Defra, with reports being produced 
after most significant outbreaks of exotic disease. Some are clearly for public 
consumption, such as the second Anderson inquiry report into FMD in 2007 but 
there are a lot of less formal, less publicised reports that are primarily intended for 
internal use. The language of these reports is becoming less formal and more and 
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more people are being drawn into making contributions. Indeed, as the policy-
makers commented in Chapter Five, the burden of producing lessons learned and . 
reporting them to the relevant committee has become a bureaucratic task like all 
the others. 
And this is where the tension lies. Attempts to materially delegate expediency are 
essentially attempts to bureaucratise it. In addition to these lessons learned reports 
there are documents saying who should attend 'bird tables' and the order they 
should speak in, documents about Defra's 'battle rhythm' during times of crisis 
and documents about stress and the need for senior staff to recognise the 
contributions of 'heroic' juniors (although this language is not explicitly used). 
The point is that officials do not consult these reports in times of emergency; the 
very essence of eXl?ediency is acting 'on the hoof, not wasting time digging 
around in the administrative system. Perhaps it is true that the writing of these 
lessons learned reports and other documents slowly and incrementally contributes 
to a 'corporate memory' that officials can draw upon in emergencies without 
actually needing to consult the documents themselves. But having observed the 
turnover of staff in the division it seems unlikely that any but the longest serving 
would be aware of and have read them all. Expediency remains, at its heart, a 
response that is created anew with each new disease outbreak. 
Enacting hierarchy 
Just as the different modes of ordering are responses to phenomena of different 
sizes, and prompted alternately by internal and external stimuli, so they also 
generate different effects, one of which is hierarchy of personnel. Here, the modes 
of ordering are split along different lines than when talking about size and scale. 
Rationalism enacts a hierarchy that ranks those who make policy above those who 
advise, whereas bureaucracy and expediency rank those who want to be heroic 
above those who want to follow procedures. Rationalism enacts the hierarchy 
between scientists and policy-makers because the rational order is very policy-
centred. This is the mode of ordering that 'puts scientists in their place'; 
expediency and bureaucracy are more equalising in this sense, because they rank 
officials and scientists alike on the basis of their 'usefulness', rather than simply 
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placing policy-makers in a position of power over advisers. When Defra staff talk 
about scientific advice and expertise as part of their rational mode of ordering, 
they describe the need to keep science and policy separate, to maintain a rigid 
distinction between policy-makers and scientific advisers. This is for a mixture of 
ideological and pragmatic reasons; on the one hand, because they feel that 
scientific advice should be impartial and unsullied by considerations of politics 
and practical situations, and on the other because Defra officials want to retain 
control over the policy-making process and feel they are in the best position to 
make balanced decisions. The scientists feel disempowered by the rigid science-
policy split that prevents them from attending policy meetings, and feel that once 
they have submitted their reports and recommendations they are powerless to 
control how their advice is used. 
There is a parallel here with a situation that Law analyses in his Daresbury 
Laboratory study, where the crew of technicians responsible for maintaining the 
equipment are ranked below the physicists and treated as inferiors. The crew 
members are prevented from knowing the broader strategy of the laboratory and 
even the details of the equipment and what it is to be used for. They learn what is 
happening, Law reports, on a "need to know" basis (1994b pp122-124). In the 
same way, the scientific advisers are treated as of lesser importance than policy-
makers in Defra, not required to know the details of political discussions and 
policy implications. Law suggests that the technicians are "being performed by the 
physicists into a set of restricted roles", where the technicians are not passive as 
such, but the modes of ordering performed by the physicists leave little room for 
initiative on the part of the technical crew (Law 1994b pp 123-124). The scientific 
advisers in Defra are not passive either, as the defiant comments about not 
changing advice to suit political ends indicate, but they are performed as an 
adjunct to the policy process, and in this role they have no place. for shaping the 
definition of problems or advocating radically new approaches. 
Bureaucracy and expediency rank people according to their desire to be pragmatic 
and efficient. They tell that there is nothing wrong with being forced to act 
bureaucratically, but you shouldn't want to do so. Perhaps there is an implicit 
suggestion that there are people incapable of being expedient because it demands 
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higher skills and personal commitment, but this is not prominent. Policy-makers 
describe wanting to speak out, challenge received wrsdom, "not be afraid to look 
stupid", while scientists talk of not being academic. In other words, they explicitly 
challenge their own stereotypes, whether of process-obsessed civil servants or 
'head in the clouds' academics. They do not deny that these stereotypes exist; on 
the contrary say that they do exist, and that they themselves are sometimes forced 
to act in that way, but they do not want to, and they seek opportunities to break 
out of the stereotypes. In this sense, then, bureaucracy and expediency are more 
meritocratic than rationalism, which categorises people according to their role and 
job description before ranking them accordingly. Under rationalism, scientists can 
never be equal to policy-makers, although within the category of scientists those 
who are credible and give usable advice are more esteemed than those who are 
esoteric and remote .. Under expediency, on the other hand, anyone can in theory 
be part of the elite who want to challenge stereotypes and act heroically. 
Of course, in its own way this view is as naive as the hierarchy enacted by 
rationalism. When officials scorn bureaucracy they mirror the arguments set out in 
Chapter Five about the perceived evils of bureaucratic government and implicitly 
support the many public sector reforms designed to eradicate bureaucracy and 
encourage entrepreneurship. Yet this may be short sighted. Defenders of 
bureaucracy such as Goodsell (1983), Du Gay (2000,2002) and Rohr (1998) have 
argued that the campaign to eradicate bureaucratic principles in favour of 
managerialism and entrepreneurship risks losing the positive attributes of 
bureaucratic government that are often overlooked. One example of this is the 
demand for responsiveness in the civil service. As Du Gay (2002) argues, the very 
notion of a responsive bureaucracy is tautological because the bureaucracy is an 
institutionalised expression of neutrality that is, in essence, unresponsive to public 
opinion and political will. Making the bureaucracy more responsive necessarily 
means diminishing its neutrality, with the possible consequence that the 
government comes to see the civil service merely as an extension of itself, as Du 
Gay (2007) argues was already evident in the findings of the Hutton and Butler 
inquiries. The supposedly excessive rules and regulations that hinder 
responsiveness also protect the civil service from fraud, political interference and 
so on. While some reformers advocate running the civil service along business 
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principles, the bureaucracy is not able, as businesses are, to simply discard 
/ 
practices that seem inefficient or outdated. Offen these practices serve a. 
safeguarding function, and the encouragement of risk-taking rather than rule-
following is potentially damaging. As Du Gay (2007) suggests, those who 
promote entrepreneurship and managerialism in the civil service "come perilously 
close to opening up the door to corruption. And they do so precisely because the 
oppositions they establish between 'bureaucracy' and 'enterprise' - a bad old past 
and a bright innovative future - have the effect of evacuating public 
administration of its determinate content." 
Bureaucracy and expediency as modes of ordering must co-exist in an economy of 
sensemaking. Without opportunities for heroism and entrepreneurship, Defra 
officials would bec~me disillusioned by the frustrations they encounter in their 
peace-time operations and the rapid staff turnover that already exists in this 
unpopular and potentially career-stalling division of Defra would be exacerbated. 
Yet for Defra to embrace unreservedly an entrepreneurial ethic would be to open 
itself to bias and corruption, and crave continual crisis. Disease outbreaks are 
good for Defra: they shake up stagnant working practices, reconfigure hierarchies, 
and give officials a renewed sense of purpose. But to advocate expediency as the 
normal organizational form would lead to a civil service perpetually responding to 
a state of crisis - and so in crisis itself - able only to fire-fight the latest policy 
problems. Departments functioning in crisis mode, while they almost certainly 
achieve results, are not able to sustain coherent policy development. Although 
they are responsive to the emergency at hand, they are increasingly unresponsive 
to macro-level demands such as strategic decision-making, effective budgeting 
and horizon scanning. Expediency succeeds because normal organizational forms 
are suspended: hierarchies are flattened, chains of command shortened, 
consultations restricted. Between times of crisis, however, it is these structures 
that sustain the organization. Modes of ordering and organizational stories create a 
form of corporate memory and without this memory, or 'institutional literacy' to 
use Rohr's (1998) term, policy-makers lose the knowledge of their constitutional 
context, Departmental history, and awareness of which policies have succeeded 
and failed in the past. This corporate memory - understanding of procedures, 
history, and context - is maintained by bureaucracy, and drawn upon in times of 
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expediency. Policy-makers can behave in an ad hoc fashion at times because they 
are versed in and surrounded by bureaucratic norms:/ 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described three modes of ordering that can be identified in 
Defra: rationalism, bureaucracy, and expediency. The rational mode of ordering 
arises from policy-makers' belief that they should be first and foremost decision-
makers, and that these decisions should be based upon information gathered from 
independent experts. They separate science from policy because they make 
arrangements to fit in with this understanding of how policy-making should work. 
At the same time, however, they acknowledge that in reality science and policy 
are not entirely separate, that policy-making does not pass through discrete stages, 
and that decisions are not really the focus of everyday life as a civil servant. Here 
the explanatory power of bureaucracy comes to the fore. Bureaucracy enables 
policy-makers to account for their lack of power to make effective decisions, to 
distance themselves from failure, and to find their place within a large and 
complex organization. And yet bureaucracy alone is also not enough to explain 
life in Defra, as action takes place despite the constraints of bureaucratic 
procedure. Expediency is put forward as a third mode of ordering, as policy-
makers and scientists cite their duty to work effectively as a reason for rejecting 
bureaucratic principles. They want to meet their departmental objectives and deal 
with emergencies and this entails rejection of conventional hierarchy and 
procedure. 
Each mode of ordering is incomplete, contradictory and contingent and yet each 
tells and performs how the organization and its members should be. Law (1994 
p2S0) describes 'the organization' as "a multidiscursive and precarious effect or 
product" that survives by jumping contingently between organizational narratives. 
In this chapter I have argued that Defra, as an organization, shapes and is shaped 
by the multiple narratives told by its staff. These narratives are not mere talk; they 
actively bring into being different organizational forms. Thus, rationalism 
encourages the separation of scientists from policy-makers, bureaucracy supports 
the creation of newer and more complex information storage systems, and 
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expediency promotes the cultivation of informal communication networks. These 
modes of ordering also enact hierarchies that influence the ways in which policy- . 
makers and advisers relate to one other. Consequently the rationalism mode of 
ordering encourages policy-makers and scientists to see each other as 'opposite 
camps' and for policy-makers to stratify into levels of hierarchy with 
corresponding tasks in the decision-making process. Expediency, by contrast, 
frames individuals as holders of expertise and as equal participants in the 'war' on 
whatever problem they are facing at the time while denigrating those who choose 
to act in a bureaucratic manner. Ultimately, all three modes of ordering have a 




The way that we talk about an object is inextricably linked to the way we think 
about it. The intellectual framework that we as academics start out from and the 
concepts we inherit from previous scholars have a significant influence on our 
own methods for study. Grant Jordan (1994 pI), writing about the British 
administrative system, asks: 
If the usual tool-kit of terms did not already exist, and if we were 
starting an account of British policy-making without an 
encumbrance of intellectual baggage, would we really find it 
helpful to use as starting positions labels such as Cabinet 
Government? Would we really start descriptions of what happens 
when things go wrong in Government by explaining what should 
happen if Ministers really believed in a Back to Basics version of 
Ministerial Responsibility? 
The same questions can be asked of policy-making, the study of which has a long 
intellectual heritage and a well-established mode of inquiry. The conventional 
language of policy-making speaks of problem formulation, consultation, evidence 
gathering, decision-making and implementation. Rooted in early systems theory 
approaches to decision-making, and developed over time into a more explicitly 
'political' model, the traditional conception of policy-making is one of sequential 
processes and formulas. This language is a powerful one: powerful enough, as I 
have argued in this thesis, that policy-makers themselves have adopted and 
perpetuated it. It makes the policy process seem bounded and rational; problems 
can be analysed by locating the stage at which the process deviated from the 
standard. In this view, all problems are the product of errors within the internal 
logic of the process. But is it the right vocabulary, or does it constantly force us to 
revert to a simplistic notion of decision-making and in doing so erase the spaces 
for irrationalism, informal organization, and other 'non-typical' behaviour? In this 
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thesis I have argued that a new vocabulary is required to analyse policy-making, 
which allows us to talk about previously overlooked actors and activities, and to . 
account for disorder and indecision. 
In the introduction to the thesis, I posed three research questions that this project 
would explore. The first asked how Defra officials find or make order in their 
work. I wanted to know how they create hierarchies, determine priorities, form 
professional relationships, and structure their interactions with experts all within a 
working environment that is disordered and ambiguous. I wanted to understand 
the role of official documentation such as minutes, organization charts, reports 
and so on in creating order, and the influence of departmental culture (if such a 
thing exists) and the values of the individual policy-maker. The second question I 
explored concerned. Defra's scientific and veterinary advisors: how they are 
incorporated into the orders created by policy-makers, and the extent to which 
they shape these orders. I wanted to explore the concept of expertise with respect 
to the negotiation of who is permitted to participate in policy-making. The third 
area of inquiry addressed the changes that take place during disease outbreaks, 
most notably whether order is created differently during 'peace-time' and 'war-
time.' My aim was to explore whether the relationships between officials and 
scientists change during these different states, and if officials view their roles and 
responsibilities differently during times of crisis. 
In seeking to answer these questions, I felt that the conventional approach to 
policy analysis would not be appropriate. It does not have the vocabulary of 
organization, but the language of procedures and outcomes. Where I wanted to 
study the way that policy-makers understand their roles and obligations, and how 
they modify their actions accordingly, conventional approaches only permit us to 
study behaviour within the parameters of the 'correct' model of policy-making. 
Such models prescribe good and bad behaviour, often based on the successfulness 
of policy outcomes. Abandoning the decades of insights that have come from 
conventional policy analysis would be foolish, as well as impossible, but in order 
to answer my research questions I have sought to reorient my study within an 
interpretive, sociological tradition. My thesis attempts to bring together two broad 
and distinctive disciplines - political science and organizational sociology - and 
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finds a common ground between them from which analytical insights can emerge. 
/ 
The interpretive tradition puts an emphasis on understanding meaning, and how 
values and beliefs influence actions. While interpretive policy analysis highlights 
the intersubjective nature of understandings about what a particular policy means 
and how it should be implemented, what I felt was missing was the explanatory 
side of things; how meanings influenced actions. Consequently I was drawn to 
elements of organizational sociology, which overlaps interpretive policy analysis 
in many respects despite the lack of referencing and acknowledgement between 
the two disciplines. 
Organizational sociology offers insights into the way in which meanmg is 
communicated within groups and organizations. Although the terminology varies 
(from storytelling, to narratives, to sensemaking, to modes of ordering), the 
underlying principle is the same: to study talk as a means of organization, linked 
to action and with an interpretive function. I decided to engage with John Law's 
modes of ordering approach as my primary conceptual tool because it has both 
explanatory power and, unlike other approaches (particularly sensemaking), it 
does not focus on retrospective explanation. Law (1994b) sees stories as attempts 
to order the organization; they help individuals and groups to make sense of their 
experiences but also to restructure the organization and reshape their roles within 
it in accordance with the way they would like it to look. These stories are 
therefore termed 'modes of ordering' because they are ways for participants to 
find and create order in their surroundings. Law's approach is also distinctive in 
its inclusion of materials. He argues that stories are not only verbal narratives but 
are embodied in materials. They generate materials and are materially delegated 
into materials to ensure the obduracy of the organization as a composite of 
different ordering attempts. Consequently, then, my approach to the research has 
taken two significant turns: first, towards interpretive policy analysis and 
organizational sociology, and second, towards the work of Law, which goes 
beyond other organizational studies theory by emphasising ordering and materials. 
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Addressing the research questions 
As a consequence of engaging with the concept of modes of ordering as my 
primary analytical tool, I set about answering the research questions by searching 
for the interpretations and narratives created by officials and advisers in Defra. 
The first part of my empirical work was to collect the stories they told, and to 
observe their actions and generation of materials. In Chapters Five and Six I 
reported some of the stories I had gathered, grouped into two sets: the first about 
policy-making and the second about giving expert advice. In the former, policy-
makers talked about the burdens of bureaucracy, the rare opportunities for 
heroism, and the difficulty of managing all the conflicting demands on their time 
and resources in an atmosphere of intense scrutiny. In the latter, Defra's advisers 
discussed the fine b~lance between fulfilling expectations and acting as impartial 
and objective advisers to policy and the contrary pull towards taking political and 
economic factors into account when making recommendations. They talked of 
their precarious positions as 'experts' to Defra, maintaining this position by 
cultivating credibility and forming a network of contacts within the division. From 
these stories I identified three modes of ordering, meta-narratives that show how 
the beliefs and attitudes voiced are actually put into practice as ordering attempts. 
In the following section I will explain how this approach has helped me to answer 
the three research questions. 
1. How is policy-making organized? 
I have identified three modes of ordering in Defra that serve to organize people 
and materials. The three ordering attempts proposed are rationalism, bureaucracy 
and expediency. Under the rational mode of ordering, officials explain their role 
as decision-makers, and assume that everything they do should be directed 
towards this end. Consequently, they see meetings as sites of decision-making, 
and the decision-making process as one of logical sequential steps similar to those 
expressed in conventional academic models of policy-making. Everyone has a 
distinctive contribution to make at the appropriate point in the process; as a result 
scientists are consulted to find the answers to problems posed by officials. In this 
view, there is a rigid separation of science and policy in the belief that policy-
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making should be detached from the details of scientific inquiry, and scientists 
should give impartial advice not affected by political or policy discussions. This. 
vision of the role of policy-makers is reinforced by the many documents on 'best 
practice' in policy-making and specifically on evidence-based policy-making that 
are written about the civil service and circulated to officials. However, rationalism 
is supported in other ways too, particularly through the creation of 'experts 
groups', the maintenance of databases of "evidence", and the conduct of scientific 
programmes. 
When expectations are challenged by contradictory experiences, a mode of 
ordering may lose its explanatory power, and other modes may emerge in its 
place. In the case of rationalism, it is challenged by the fact that decisions are 
often not made at. meetings, and activity is not explicitly directed towards 
particular ends or organized into logical work parcels. One of the most obvious 
challenges to rationalism is the amount of time spent on apparently 'meaningless' 
activity, such as producing reports that will not be read because they are a 
requirement of a procedure, or attending meetings that exist solely for information 
exchange and not to develop projects further. In order to make sense of these 
experiences, Defra staff have deVeloped a second mode of ordering that I have 
termed bureaucracy. The bureaucratic mode of ordering portrays these 
characteristics of work - endless meetings, inconsequential reports - as symptoms 
of working in central government. This order removes agency from the officials 
and advisers: an out-of-touch management foists these fruitless activities upon 
them, and they are unable to refuse. It is thus a potent device for helping officials 
to understand why they are not always the effective, efficient and rational 
decision-makers they expect to be. It also gives them something to concentrate on 
(Le. a procedure to follow, a hierarchy to observe) when tangible or achievable 
goals are unclear. This image of bureaucracy is supported by the popular 
sentiment of negative feelings about the civil service, but it is also reinforced by 
some of the practices in Defra such as the leviathan administrative system into 
which minutes and agenda for every meeting must be logged. 
These two modes of ordering dominate 'peace-time', when there are no disease 
outbreaks to be dealt with. When disease outbreaks occur, a third mode of 
222 
ordering comes into play: expediency. Expedient behaviour, in the sense that I am 
using it, means finding the fastest and most direct means of achieving a solution. 
to the problems thrown up by the outbreak of disease. In practical terms this 
means not spending time in unnecessary meetings, only writing up minutes where 
they will directly contribute to future action, and bypassing procedures that 
constrain rapid action. Expediency helps to navigate between a sense of duty to 
Defra's many policy 'stakeholders' (induding the government, taxpayers, 
farmers, welfare groups and so on) and an obligation to maintain the good 
reputation of the Department, rather than ruin it as disease outbreaks have done in 
the past. Of course, Defra officials are always engaging with stakeholders in some 
form, but during emergencies this is not in the sense of 'tick box' exercises such 
as large-scale consultations, but in the form of a strong obligation to act decisively 
while balancing the~e many interests. As a result of the desire for expediency, 
new practices and materials have emerged, induding the use of 'bird tables' with 
their special format, their laminated maps and special vocabulary, and the use of 
war metaphors and terminology to engender a feeling of battle against disease. 
Expediency is useful not only in motivating officials and scientists to work hard 
during times of crisis, but also in providing hope during times of bureaucratic 
inertia. 
These three orders interact creatively, each providing explanatory power in tum 
when another fails. In this sense they are all necessary; multiplicity is an essential 
strategy for guaranteeing the survival of the organization. Were Defra to rely 
solely on rationalism, the organization would fail because policy-making is not 
the rational activity that this model portrays it: officials are often working with 
ambiguous goals, limited resources and imperfect information. However, if 
bureaucracy were the main mode of ordering staff would become disillusioned as 
a result of their failure to achieve results and do meaningful work. Finally, if 
expediency were the dominant order the division would be in a state of perpetual 
crisis because expediency does not entail long-term planning or sustainable forms 
of work. An economy of sensemaking is created instead, where one can make 
sense of conflicting experiences using different interpretations, and different ideal 
orders temporarily enacted to govern relations and actions. Material delegation is 
essential, too, for the survival of these modes of ordering and thus the 
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organization. As is implicit in the summaries above, each mode of ordering 
generates its own materials and artefacts that make both the mode of ordering and. 
the organization more durable. Rationalism generates separate meetings for 
scientists, diagrams of better policy-making and 'work areas' on different floors 
of the building; bureaucracy generates complex filing systems and minutes of 
meetings and long lunches; expediency generates laminated 'battle' maps, red 
alerts and contingency plans. It is not an abstract concept of 'policy' that is being 
organized here, but people and materials and talk. 
2. How is science organized? 
The second question I wanted to address in this research was how scientific 
advice is organized ~n Defra. Conventional approaches would derive from a model 
of evidence-based policy that sees science as a tool to assist policy-making. 
Within this approach there are those who advocate the use of science from the 
outset to frame questions, and those who take a more sceptical view and argue 
that some forms of advice or particular advisers are deliberately excluded from 
policy-making. None, however, contradict the view that science is discrete from 
policy. As I have demonstrated in my analysis, this model of evidence-based 
policy-making is far from irrelevant, as officials have adopted it as part of their 
rational mode of ordering. I have argued, however, that it is not a neutral vision of 
how policy and science should be ordered. It enacts a hierarchy in which scientists 
are seen as less important than the policy-makers, because rationalism is a policy-
centred mode of ordering in which the ultimate goal is decision-making. Scientists 
by this understanding are incapable of decision-making; their role is as auxiliaries, 
and they are there only to the extent that they support the policy-makers' capacity 
to reach decisions. Within the rational mode of ordering, the scientists are 
performed into roles by the policy-makers where there is little room for them to 
contribute to broader policy issues such as framing problems, advocating new 
approaches, or cautioning against action because of the uncertainty of science in 
that particular area. 
Bureaucracy and expediency both enact the hierarchy between policy-makers and 
scientists somewhat differently to rationalism. These two modes of ordering 
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esteem those who strive to be expedient and denigrate those who prefer to act 
/ .-
bureaucratically, regardless of whether they are policy-makers or scientists. Status 
does not depend on belonging to the category of policy-maker or adviser, or 
having a particular place in the organizational hierarchy, but on the desire to 
contribute to the battle against disease. Therefore in disease outbreaks, scientists 
that have information to offer are as highly esteemed as their policy colleagues. 
Their advice is more likely to be incorporated into policy discussions, because 
they are giving current information, rather than abstract expertise. They are being 
asked to comment on specific situations, making it easier for scientists to give 
usable advice than when they are expected to contribute to less goal-directed 
discussions in peace-time. The differences observed in the way that scientists are 
valued and utilised in peace-time and war-time emphasise the problems caused by 
studying crises alon~ to arrive at conclusions about evidence-based policy-making 
in Defra. Moreover, it is not possible to draw simple conclusions such as 
'scientists are ignored in peace-time and utilised in war-time' because in both 
instances there are still issues of credibility and expertise that must be negotiated. 
As Chapter Six demonstrated, the proximity of scientists to the policy process 
depends on many factors, including their ability to communicate effectively with 
policy colleagues, their knowledge of wider social and political factors, and their 
informal relationships within the organization. 
3. How do they change in peace- and war-time? 
This question has largely been answered in the sections above, as crises pervade 
life in Defra and cannot be treated separately from general policy-making. As I 
have explained, the operative modes of ordering change significantly when a 
disease outbreak occurs; expediency becomes prominent because the conditions 
allow this behaviour to occur: goals are clear, work is pressured, and the officials 
feel a sense of obligation to many stakeholders to work effectively. The way that 
hierarchy is enacted changes too, with a more meritocratic order that privileges 
those who desire or choose to act expediently. But there is more to say about 
crises in Defra. Defra is a government department that constantly anticipates or 
deals with crisis. Of course all departments have crises; scandals happen, errors of 
judgement occur, politicians announce drastic budgetary cuts that threaten the 
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very viability of parts of the civil service. But these are not of the same order as 
the exotic disease division's crises. Their crises are" ~ot only more frequent, but. 
are anticipated by officials, both in the sense that they are expected to happen, and 
in the sense that officials look forward to them for the clarity of purpose and break 
from routine that they bring. The flip between abstract policy-making and actually 
doing something happens on a much more frequent basis that in other 
departments. Defra has, as a result of this characteristic, developed a highly 
evolved crisis response with its own vocabulary, technologies and procedures. 
The distinctiveness of Defra and the implications for drawing further conclusions 
is discussed below. 
Implications of the findings 
Having found some answers to my research questions, what conclusions can be 
drawn from this study of policy-making, and what may be the wider significance 
of my findings? As I suggested at the beginning of this conclusion, the way we 
talk about the phenomenon of policy-making and the nature of policy-making 
itself are intertwined, so my conclusions relate to both policy-making and how we 
should study it. I propose three broad points: that policy-making is an act of 
interpretation, that policy-making is a product of organization, and that these 
processes of interpretation and organization should be studied using an 
ethnographic approach. 
The most important point to be drawn from my study is that policy-making must 
be seen as an act of interpretation. As I suggested at the start of this thesis, 
conventional policy analysis considers the process to be a rational and sequential 
one. Even where external factors are taken into account - for example, lobbying 
by pressure groups - this is still dealt with in a rational way: groups with more 
"resources" will have more bargaining power with officials, and officials are 
ultimately the arbiter of who will and will not be listened to. Likewise, scientific 
evidence is conceptualised as discrete chunks of information that may be slotted 
into the decision-making process at convenient intervals. My findings have been 
very different, but they are also complex. Policy-making is not simply goal-
directed action, the end point of which is making a decision and giving this 
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decision to others to be implemented. The rational model of policy-making does 
have an important place in policy-making, but not it{ the way that we might have 
expected. It is itself an interpretation of events, an attempt to make sense of what 
is expected and what actually happens in the course of working in Defra. It 
competes with other interpretations, including bureaucracy and expediency. The 
way that policy-makers interpret a situation or event affects the way they act, 
meaning that the same people may make policy very differently if they believe 
their duties or capabilities to be altered in some way. 
I have argued that the form that policy-making takes is determined, at least in part, 
by the organization of people and artefacts. Thus in 'peace-time', the hierarchy 
between policy-makers and scientists enacted by the rational mode of ordering 
privileges policy c?lleagues, meaning that advice must be given in a more 
targeted and policy-conscious fashion if it is to be accepted. In 'war-time', by 
contrast, scientific advice is incorporated with much less resistance because 
scientists with information to offer are afforded greater status and credibility. 
Likewise, the arrangement of office space into designated work areas for 
colleagues working on particular projects to sit together facilitates 'rational', silo-
mentality policy-making, the flexible and inclusive space used for emergency 
'bird table' meetings encourages expediency through open communication and 
rapid transmission of information between everyone. The relationship between 
organization and policy-making is not a straightforward one. I have argued that 
staff arrange their office spaces and create hierarchies based on the way they have 
made sense of their circumstances at the time. In this sense, their view of what 
policy-making should be patterns the organization. But, in a reciprocal fashion, 
the creation of these organizational forms and artefacts endures to influence and 
pattern policy-making in the future. In summary, policy-making is an act of 
interpretation, which takes place within an organization, .. which shapes 
organization, and which is a product of organization. 
These findings have implications for the study of policy-making, and I would like 
to suggest four implications here: that policy-making should be studied with a 
present orientation; that policy-making must be studied using an inclusive 
approach that does not privilege those of 'official' organizational status and 
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power; that the potential for interpretation should be acknowledged at every level 
of the organization and in every fonn of policy work; and that appraisal of policy- . 
making should be non-judgemental. I will explain each of these points in the 
following section. 
New approaches to policy-making 
The study of policy-making should have a present orientation, by which I mean 
studying officials as they conduct their business rather than retrospectively 
piecing together what happened from a particular point (usually a decision being 
made). In this project, I have taken such a 'real time' approach; rather than 
starting with a decision or policy and working backwards to trace the people and 
ideas involved, I h~ve started with the people and worked forward, following 
them in their work to understand how decisions and policies emerge. The policy 
is, in some sense, an inconsequential by-product, as it seems that officials are 
generally not working towards producing one decision or another. Therefore, what 
I have studied is not the policies but the organization that (occasionally) produces 
them. Beginning from the people and not the policy, brings about a complete 
change in perspective. It prompted me to emphasise the role of middle-ranking 
officials because, in my observation of the Department, not only did these 
officials comprise the bulk of the people involved, but they also appeared to be 
instrumental in running Defra. Studies that start from policy decisions generally 
focus on the top stratum of the organization whereas my study had no such 
assumptions and consequently turned out very differently. Studying policy from 
an organizational perspective also caused me to see the importance of examining 
both peace-time and war-time work. During my observation of the division, the 
vast majority of the time was 'peace-time' with only a small proportion devoted to 
fighting a disease outbreak. Consequently the greater proportion of my 
observations were of peace-time work and I came to realise that studying the 
difference between the two gives much greater insight than· simply comparing 
outbreaks. Finally, beginning from the organization, not the decisions, highlights 
the irrationality of policy-making as it becomes evident that people are not 
working towards a particular end all the time but are engaged in a wide variety of 
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activities, some of which may at some point be drawn in to inform a 'big' policy 
announcement. 
I have already intimated that the accounts of higher-ranking civil servants should 
not be privileged over those of lower-ranking officials. Others have already made 
this proposal, either from the point of view that middle-ranking officials have an 
important role in setting technical details that can affect the overall direction of 
policy (Page 2001; Page and Jenkins 2005) or because 'street-level bureaucrats' 
have such discretion in their implementation work that they are able to alter 
significantly the way that a policy is put into practice (Lipsky 1980; Maynard-
Moody and Musheno 2003). My argument is somewhat different. My reason for 
advocating an inclusive approach is that processes of ordering and sensemaking 
have the potential t.o involve everyone as equal participants. Management staff 
may dictate a new working arrangement, or new directive to be followed, but 
everyone is able to reinterpret these commands and either incorporate them into 
existing orders or create new orders to understand the changes. No group is 
entirely isolated from all others, and although my thesis has focused on middle-
ranking officials, I have indicated ways in which they are prompted by senior civil 
servants, official documents and so on in order to inform their sensemaking 
processes. I have not discussed the relationship between the middle-ranking 
officials and their lower-ranking colleagues (such as administrative officers) but 
there is undoubtedly interplay of ideas and interpretations in that dimension too. 
A related point is that studies of policy-making should acknowledge the potential 
for interpretation not only by all members of the organization, but in every field of 
work and type of activity. This is in contrast to the assumption of rationality that 
is so commonly made. To return to the example of decisions imposed by 
management, it is my argument that we should not assume that officials will 
respond rationally to commands given by others. As was the case with the Renew 
Defra reform initiative (see Chapter Seven), officials sought ways to understand 
the changes that had been made to the organization by placing it in their existing 
frameworks of understanding and trying to assimilate the novel aspects of their 
new working arrangements so as to minimise disruption. It should never be taken 
for granted that changes to the formal organization will simply be adopted in the 
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fonn they were intended and the impact that such changes have on policy-making 
and on Defra officials should also be seen as acts of interpretation. It has already 
been largely accepted that policy-makers interpret policy problems, that is, they 
do not objectively 'discover' a problem that needs fixing and likewise 'discover' a 
solution. Suggestions that problems, or the solutions available, are framed in a 
particular way depending on the agenda of politicians have been circulating for 
decades (e.g. Cohen et al 1972, Kingdon 1995). However, my contention is that 
we need to look more widely at policy-making and see not only the framing of 
policy problems, but the interpretations that officials make about every aspect of 
their work: of their roles within their Department, of the role of the Department 
itself, of their relationships with others. 
Because I am argui~g that policy-making is an act of interpretation, I also want to 
suggest that studies of the policy-making process should be non-judgemental. 
That is, I want to argue against pronouncements of what constitutes 'good' and 
'bad' policy-making. Evidence-based policy-making is a useful example to 
illustrate this point. Studies of evidence-based policy-making often attempt to 
measure the 'amount' of science that has been used as the basis for a decision, and 
seek to identify possible biases, either on the part of policy-makers or scientists, to 
understand why particular types of advice have been used and not others. Some 
decisions are judged to be "evidence-based" while other fonns of decision-making 
are denigrated as "policy-based evidence-making" (e.g. Marmot 2004), the 
implication being that science has not been objectively commissioned and used. 
Yet the situation I observed in Defra is much more nuanced than this. The 
relationship between policy and science is governed by many factors, including 
the policy-makers' judgements about the nature of the. problem, the need for 
urgency, the credibility of the scientists, their own personal connections with 
scientific colleagues, and their ability to take action. For the scientists, too, many 
interpretations must be made regarding the type of advice required, their ability to 
give it, and the likelihood of their favoured proposals being accepted. The nature 
of evidence-based policy-making is very different between peace-time (when 
officials feel compelled to seek out objective advice and give it a place in some 
rational decision-making system) and war-time (when officials urgently want 
relevant infonnation and seek it from the nearest trusted sources). Who is to say 
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that one form of evidence use is "better" than anoth~r? This is only po~sible by 
recourse to the rational model of policy-making that I have already argued is 
discredited. 
Arguments about whether or not interpretivists have the capacity to be critical 
have taken place elsewhere (Schwandt 1994, Bevir and Rhodes 2003 pp41-42). 
Descriptive techniques, it has been argued, privilege the views of actors and 
uncritically accept their stories about their experiences (Schwandt 1994 p 130). 
This may mask inequalities and perpetuate discourses of the powerful, because it 
fails to question the reasons why some interpretations are more successful than 
others. As Hudson argues in his criticism of Lipsky's (1980) Street Level 
Bureaucracy, "The main danger of Lipsky's phenomenological approach is that it 
can be construed as.a form of ideological relativism, largely ignoring the question 
of why one 'weltanschauung' is considered more legitimate than another. Such 
studies usually operate at a level of analysis which is divorced from any notion of 
power in social relations" (Hudson 1989 p52). Other critics of interpretivism have 
suggested that researchers are liable to be misled if they privilege the accounts of 
their participants over their own opinions and judgements because actors will 
always see their own actions in the best light and may actively deceive researchers 
as to their actions, whether for personal, political or organizational purposes 
(Dowding 2004 pp137-138). The remedy, Dowding argues, is to weigh their 
comments alongside other "evidence" to check the veracity of their claims. 
Dowding's criticisms, viewed in the light of the approach taken in this thesis, miss 
the point in spectacular fashion. The very point of interpreting talk is to 
understand how actors understand and communicate meaning about themselves 
and their circumstances; if they choose to talk about their actions in a purely 
positive light, this can tell us something about how their perceive themselves and 
their role. Comparing what they say against other 'evidence' (presumably 
Dowding means records of what 'actually' happened, policy documents and so 
on) is misleading because it is precisely these 'facts' that are being interpreted by 
actors. 
In this thesis, I have not sought to be 'critical' of Defra in the sense of finding 
fault with their policy-making process. Partly this is because it would be 
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nonsensical to do so; as I have already argued, I do not believe that evidence 
based policy-making can be neatly divided into 'good' and 'bad' examples. But it 
is also difficult to be critical because of my sympathy with the people involved: as 
others have identified, it is difficult to write consciously something that may 
damage the people who have participated in the research (leading to a 
proliferation of what Van Maanen (1988) calls 'confessional' ethnographic 
writing e.g. Fine and Weis 1996; Ceglowski 2002; Law 1994b pp38-39). In 
addition, and again like many who study sensitive contexts, I agreed that all those 
whose interview data was included would be allowed to see the relevant chapters 
and give or refuse permission for data to be used. This could be perceived as 
further encouraging an uncritical perspective by allowing Defra officials to 
modify their accounts, although none of the participants objected to their words 
being used, or want~d to disagree with my portrayal of their opinions and actions. 
However, I also attained critical distance because of the time elapsed between the 
initial fieldwork and the writing of the thesis, and the fact that I do not work for 
the Department nor have any obligations to it as a result of funding, for example. 
And, despite not wanting to criticise the officials themselves, I believe that I have 
said something about how and why certain ~eltanschauung or modes of ordering 
come to dominate. I have sought to be critical in the sense of asking questions 
about why certain arrangements of people and spaces have come about, and 
whether there is potential for change or resistance by the people concerned. 
Latour (2005a, 2005b) offers an alternative way of thinking about the capacity for 
criticism in social research. He argues that it should be the object that is rendered 
critical, in the sense of reaching a 'critical mass' of debate and ideas. For Latour, 
then, the role of the social researcher is to contribute to debates and this is best 
done through attention to the small scale, being immersed in the detail of the 
situation and its problems. Critical distance, for Latour, implies the notion that the 
researcher can stand outside of the group being studied, and also that the actors 
involved are unreflexive, and unable to see the context in which they are situated 
(2005b p33). This type of critical distance also involves appeals to the 'old 
enemies' of empire, corporations, and nation states. Latour denounces the 'utter 
vacuity' of this wholesale critique. He argues that being critical- being political-
is only possible in world that is not totalising, which does not try to seek external 
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truths or indeed the 'big' enemies such as state and corporation (20g5a). He 
argues that one's actions make a difference in--~ world of differences, and 
therefore seeking a unified 'truth' about the way the world is will not facilitate 
criticality. Latour therefore advocates not critical distance but critical proximity: 
not trying to step outside of the situation but continuing to open up black boxes 
and identify the taken-for-granted beliefs (2005b p253). He advocates 'passionate 
interest for an uncertain and surprising solution', through looking for tiny and 
unexpected differences. It should not be about 'feeling critical' but inducing 
criticality (2005a). Seen in this light, my research contributes to debates about the 
nature of policy-making without seeking to criticise officials on the grounds of 
well-worn allegations of industry influence, the tyranny of bureaucracy and so on. 
My research suggests a different direction for discussions of policy-making to 
take. 
I have argued that studies of policy-making need to take into account 
organizational context and the potential for interpretation while broadening the 
focus of research to include the widest possible range of actors and activities. 
Finally, then, I want to make the case again for ethnography as the primary tool 
for this type of research. It may seem that it is unnecessary to make such an 
argument, as ethnography is so evidently appropriate for the study of actors in 
context. However, ethnography as a tool of political research remains staggeringly 
marginal. Recently, a US scholar pointed out that over the last decade, of the 938 
articles published in two leading political science journals, American Journal of 
Political Science and American Political Science Review, only one article relies 
on ethnography as a data production technique. Of the 215 articles published in 
the leading ethnography journal, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, only 15 
focus on politics as their main subject (Auyero 2006). Searching for British 
examples reveals that even among self-identifying interpretivists ethnography 
remains a rare tool. For example, Orr (2005) undertakes textual analysis of 
academic commentaries on local government refonn, Needham (2009) conducts a 
content analysis, searching for keywords in Prime Ministerial speeches and 
command papers, while Rhodes' (2005) Everyday life in a Ministry includes only 
seven days of non-participant observation, the remainder of the data coming from 
interviews and content analysis of Ministers' diaries. Longer-tenn ethnographic 
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fieldwork is difficult to find (although there are excellent studies with an 
ethnographic component, mainly from studies of policy implementation e.g. 
Durose 2009, Sullivan 2007). 
The lack of ethnographic research is remarkable when one reflects on the unique 
access it gives to actors' meanings, and, more particularly, to meanings in action: 
how people understand what they do as they do it. Ethnographic research is also 
an excellent way of observing policy-making in 'real time', from the perspective 
of those doing the work, and a way of gaining access to those who would 
normally be difficult to interview (such as administrative staff, technicians etc). 
And, although it is common to rely on a small number of individuals for 
information and help during ethnographic research, it is primarily a tool for 
studying groups in ~ontext, whereas other methods, particularly interviewing, can 
only give insight into the thoughts and actions of one person at a time. 
Ethnography was also crucial to that part of my analysis, which differed from the 
usual interpretive policy analysis approach: the inclusion of materials. My 
knowledge of the materiality of policy-making (office plans, maps, signs, 
administrative systems) would have been non-existent had I not worked in Defra, 
and it is unlikely that interviewees would have spontaneously mentioned them 
given the unremarkable and everyday nature of workplace objects and 
arrangements. 
Status of my claims 
The three modes of ordering that I have identified in this thesis are my 
interpretations of the accounts given to me by Defra officials and advisers, 
coupled with my observations of policy-making. But what is the status of these 
interpretations? I am certainly not claiming to have produced a definitive account 
of the organization of Defra; there are without doubt other modes of ordering that 
would have become apparent had I spoken to different people, observed the 
Department for longer, or been a witness to events other than the ones I observed. 
But, of the three modes of ordering that I have identified, what can be said about 
their authority? It is difficult to say anything meaningful because the language of 
validity and authority inevitably slips into the positivist lexicon of testing, 
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measurement, and reliability, about which interpretivism has little to ~ay. But, 
nevertheless, some sort of position statement should be attempted. Therefore I am 
going to explore some common criticisms made of the 'authority' of interpretive 
research and set out how I think my own approach can respond to them. 
Firstly, it is sometimes suggested that interpretive research lacks authority 
because the author's interpretation is simply one interpretation among many, and 
because social researchers appear to 'guess' what actors' beliefs are rather than 
finding evidence for them (on the latter point see Brown, 2002). Because there is a 
common principle of treating all interpretations as equal, at least as far as 
participants are concerned (in other words, interpretive research does not privilege 
the discourses of the powerful, or seek out 'true' interpretations and discard 
'false' ones), then .the researcher's interpretation must be treated likewise. To 
suggest otherwise is to imply that the researcher has some kind of "external" 
viewpoint by which he or she is able to understand more about the participants 
actions and beliefs than they do themselves. Critics are made uneasy by the 
apparent lack of objective measures for testing the 'truthfulness' of an 
interpretation. As Schwandt (1994 p130) puts it, in the absence of some set of 
criteria, interpretive accounts "are subject to the charges of solipsism (they are 
only my accounts) and relativism (all accounts are equally good or bad, worthy or 
unworthy, true or false, and so on.)" The lack of critical function in interpretive 
research, as described earlier, is also perceived to contribute to this lack of 
authority as an outside observer. This desire for certainty and veracity is, perhaps, 
more prevalent in political science than in other disciplines where interpretive 
approaches have flourished more readily. Dowding (2004 p137), in his critique of 
interpretive policy studies, argues that the central aim of political science is "to 
sift through competing claims to examine evidence both theoretically and 
empirically in order to distinguish true claims from false ones" and this view is 
part of the tradition of policy analysis being conducted to provide government 
officials with advice on how to improve policy-making. 
There are various responses that can be made to these criticisms. The first type are 
the "methods textbook" body of responses, which emphasise the importance of 
rigour in data collection and multiple data sources. For example, Yanow (2000) 
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argues that criteria for assessing the "goodness" of interpretations do e.xist, and 
that they are similar to those of a good story: intem~l consistency, a logical flow, 
and a wealth of details which "persuade the reader or listener that the interpreter 
knows intimately what happened, has an insider's understanding and a plausible 
explanation" (Yanow 2000 pp57-58). For others, such as Sandberg, the authority 
of interpretive accounts relies upon "control" over the data: "researchers must 
demonstrate how they have controlled and checked their interpretations 
throughout the research process: from formulating the research question, selecting 
individuals to be studied, obtaining data from those individuals, analysing the data 
obtained, and reporting the results" (Sandberg 2005 p59). By doing this, readers 
can make their own judgments about the quality of the research and subsequently 
the interpretations made from it. Respondent validation - asking research subjects 
to give feedback on. the written account - has also been suggested as a means of 
checking the validity of the interpretations made, although others have cautioned 
that second-order interpretations (which may use complex terminology or 
impersonal reporting styles) may not be understood by respondents (Bryman 1988 
p79) and that feedback should not be taken as 'proof that an interpretation is 
correct or incorrect. Rather, it should be treated as another source of data and 
insight (Fielding and Fielding 1986 p43). 
I do not wish to denigrate these types of response; rigorous and reflexive research 
methods are to be applauded, provided they do not lead to positivist assumptions 
that truth can be accessed if only the 'right' method of inquiry is used. However, I 
see the issue of the status of modes of ordering as a more theoretical question. It is 
something that Law (1994b) addresses in part when discussing how many modes 
of ordering can theoretically exist. For Law, ordering is a conditional and 
uncertain process, not something that necessarily happens or is achieved forever 
and therefore the role of the sociologist should be to try "to occupy the precarious 
place where time has not been turned into cause or reduction, and where relations 
have not been frozen into the snapshot of syncronicity" (Law 1994b p13). The 
researcher makes and remakes this precarious place by telling stories, offering 
metaphysical redescriptions, ethnographies, histories and 'thick descriptions' 
(Law 1994b p14). Law terms this "modest sociology" because it does not try to 
make totalising claims about the results but acknowledges their contingency and 
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incompleteness. Any orders found should be treated with caution for as Law says, 
"if there appear to be pools of order it wHl treat these as ordering 
accomplishments and illusions. It will try to think of them as effects that have for 
a moment concealed the processes through which they were generated" (Law 
1994b pIS). Therefore, the approach I am advocating does not strive to 
definitively identify all possible orders in an organization, but to identify some, 
studying their emergence, the differences between them, and the realities they 
enact to gain insight into the organization as a whole. 
Despite the goals of 'modest sociology' to acknowledge contingency, this does 
not mean that attempts to identify modes of ordering should be abandoned 
because nothing meaningful can be said. Law goes on to say that he is arguing 
that the laboratory ."was" a particular way when he observed it, and I want to 
expand on this point to clarify my own claims. It is not my ambition to replace the 
models of the textbook theory with my own prescriptions about what policy-
making 'looks' like. However, at the same time, my claims are rooted in 
observation, inquiry and triangulation. They are not mere speCUlation. I would like 
to say, then, that my analysis of policy-making in Defra is based upon the stories 
told to me by Defra staff and the actions that I observed during a period of 
participant observation. The three labels that I have attached to their words during 
my analysis (rationalism, bureaucracy, and expediency) are not their terms, but 
they are directly drawn from the data. And although there are undoubtedly other 
modes of ordering that I did not observe, stories that were not told to me, either on 
purpose or because I did not think to ask, the three interpretations I have talked 
about do have a real influence on the way that Defra officials think and behave. 
Future research questions 
There are several questions that were not within the scope of my doctoral 
research, but which would enable greater understanding of both the potential of 
the ordering concept as a means of studying Defra, and of the culture of the 
Department itself. The m~in questions that I would like to raise concern the 
emergence and evolution of modes of ordering, which could not be studied in the 
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short space of my research, and the extent to which Defra has a distinctive 
organizational culture, which requires comparative study. 
How do modes of ordering appear, change, and disappear? 
There are still puzzles to be solved before this approach can more fully explain the 
organization of policy-making. Most notably, it is difficult to say how modes of 
ordering change over time.· It is not clear how we could observe the creation or 
modification of a mode of ordering. Although ordering should be seen as a verb, 
as an ongoing process, researching these processes means taking a snapshot in 
time. 17 Even researchers fortunate enough to be able to spend a long time in the 
field are unlikely to discover a new mode of ordering emerging or an old one 
disappearing. This .is so for a number of reasons. Although one observes the 
actions of people in the present, one asks them about their interpretations in the 
past tense. It seems likely that this forces participants to make a more coherent 
narrative than is necessarily the case. Consider for example Weick's (1995) 
argument about the emergence of battered child syndrome. He states that doctors 
started to notice anomalous symptoms in children over a long period of time but it 
was not possible for them to make sense of the symptoms until many others had 
noticed them - a critical mass, perhaps - and then it retrospectively became a 
recognised narrative in medical history. So, at the time of doing participant 
observation, however observant one is, it may be impossible to 'see' emerging 
narratives because they become stronger retrospectively. 
Modes of ordering must surely be long-term phenomena, given the time it takes to 
establish common understandings and anchor them in materials. It is interesting to 
note that the research that informed Law's study took place 18 years before my 
own doctoral project and yet the modes of ordering, the pressures. and aspirations 
of the organization, share similarities. The factors that Law argues shaped the 
mode of ordering he termed 'enterprise', for example (Thatcherite values of 
competition, efficiency and so on), persist in central government today. This lack 
17 Indeed, this very process of taking a 'snapshot' through writing research fmdings has a tendency 
to reify the verb of 'ordering', turning it into the noun of 'order', and implying a permanence that 
does not exist. 
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of empirical and theoretical insight into how orders change is an impOl:1:ant one 
given the very frequent pace of restructuring that oc~urs in Defra and its agencies. 
For example, the introduction of 'responsibility and cost sharing' to Defra's exotic 
disease division is potentially very important, not only because it changes the 
nature of some of the work they have to do but because it has an impact on some 
of the drivers that shape expediency as a mode of ordering. I argued above that 
expediency is driven by a sense of obligations to different groups, one of which is 
to protect farmers from disease. Under the 'responsibility and cost sharing' 
agreement farmers will have to take more responsibility for preventing the spread 
of disease, and receive less financial support from Defra in the case of disease 
outbreaks. While Defra will still have a statutory obligation to eradicate exotic 
disease when it occurs, one of the significant obligations to farmers will be 
diminished. Moreo~er, it is likely that a new agency or non-departmental public 
body will be created to handle 'responsibility and cost sharing', taking an 
important part of work away from the Exotic Disease Division. This could be seen 
as an attempt to remove expediency from core Defra and delegate it into another 
body. Opportunities such as this offer potential for a longitudinal approach to see 
the extent of reactions to new policy imperatives. 
How distinctive is Defra? 
During the course of my research, my interest in the organization of policy has 
necessarily led me towards exploring the importance of organizational culture. 
Indeed, as the modes of ordering approach has demonstrated, culture (in the sense 
of the way that employees collectively respond· to stimuli, are conditioned to 
behave, condition one another to behave, the materials that are produced, the 
values and objectives of the organization etc.) is paramount to understanding why 
certain modes of ordering come into being. This begs an important question that 
falls beyond the scope of this thesis, namely, am I saying that Defra has a 
different organizational culture than other central government departments? That 
is a question I cannot fully answer without further research. 
My tentative suggestion here, however, is that the history and culture of the 
department, as well as the area of policy with which its officials are dealing, has a 
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very significant impact on the modes of ordering that emerge ther~in. The 
consequence for students of policy-making is that it would therefore be futile 
trying to arrive at any general theories or models of policy-making because each 
department would have some aspects of culture that are distinctive owing to their 
differences in policy 'customers' and history of restructuring, prestige and 
reputation. Each will deal with crises to a greater or lesser extent, and there are 
practical considerations such as the size of the department and their physical 
organization. Context is crucial not only to understanding what the different 
orders are and how they operate but where they have come from: to what they are 
resistances or responses. Defra is as much subject to attempts by management 
consultants to engender a feeling of shared organizational culture as any other 
large organization. Consider the recent story of staff at the newly-created Animal 
Health agency bein~ encouraged to bang drums on an away-day to demonstrate 
"how people working together can build up a rhythm" (Bingham 2009). Much 
could be learned from organization studies to understand the impact of 
departmental culture on policy-making. 
The study of cultural-level phenomena is also important because, as I have argued 
in this thesis, policy-makers need lots of different stories to tell themselves, and 
the organization (in this case the government department) needs multiple 
interpretations of itself if it is to survive. The three identified in this thesis all 
interact, and indeed the organization would fail if it relied on only one. Thus, 
when I state that policy-making is an act of interpretation it is important to note 
that this means not one but many competing or complementary interpretations. 
There is no single process by which policy is 'made' but many different 
interpretations that guide officials' actions, and many different ways by which 
past events are made sense of in order to guide future action. Consequently, 
studying either a single policy area (for example, FMD policy) or only a crisis 
such as a disease outbreak would be very misleading to the policy analyst. As I 
have argued in this thesis, a particular interpretation may dominate when talking 
about a specific decision or policy field, and different interpretations also 
dominate during peace-time and war-time. Policy analysis therefore needs to take 
a broader and less decision-focused approach, and this is why the organization-
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level analysis has so much to contribute. A comparative study of goyernment 
departments would undoubtedly be a profitable area for future research. 
Conclusion 
My thesis argues for, and demonstrates the value of, developing an interpretive 
approach to the study of policy-making. By observing Defra, I found that policy-
makers do not exclusively follow rational models of action but constantly 
interpret their experiences in recursive processes of sensemaking. To analyse the 
interpretations of policy-makers, my research has drawn upon theoretical insights 
from organizational sociology. The key findings of my research are that policy-
making is organized in three different ways, which I have termed rationalism, 
bureaucracy and e~pediency. These three modes of ordering each affect the 
hierarchy of staff in the division, the way that scientific expertise is used, and 
consequently the way in which policy is formulated. In addition to this new 
conceptual approach to the study of policy-making, my research is empirically 
distinctive in looking at both peace-time and war-time, and at middle-ranking 
officials and advisers. As a consequence, it takes a more comprehensive view of 
policy-making than studies that are confined to outbreaks or single disease issues, 
and those that focus only on senior civil servants. The ethnographic method by 
which the data was gathered is emerging as a technique in policy studies, and my 
contribution emphasises the insights into policy-makers' behaviour and 
interpretations that can be gained by this approach. 
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Appendix One 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) is a neurological disease of cattle that 
was first discovered by pathologists at MAFF's Central Veterinary Laboratory 
(CVL) in 1986. It is a Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) 
transmitted by abnormal forms of protein known as prions. The more widespread 
ovine disease, scrapie, also belongs to this group. TSEs are untreatable, invariably 
fatal and poorly understood; research is difficult and expensive because it is not 
possible to test for the disease before clinical symptoms show (van Zwanenberg 
and Millstone 2005 p72). 
In 1986, six cases were confirmed in the South West of England. The CVL's 
senior epidemiologist discovered that the use of commercial cattle feed was the 
only factor common to all the affected farms, and concluded that feed prepared 
with rendered slaughterhouse waste contaminated with a TSE agent was the 
source of the disease. The wastes discharged from abattoirs from sheep, cattle and 
other animals were at this time routinely rendered into saleable products by 
crushing and heating the carcass in order to produce fat (tallow) and a solid 
animal protein residue known as meat and bone meal (MBM). Both were 
incorporated into concentrates in order to provide a protein-rich nutritional 
supplement to animal feed. The diets of nearly all UK cattle were supplemented 
by commercial feed, although dairy cows typically received the largest quantities 
to boost milk yields. Despite the breakthrough in identifying the cause of the 
disease, no-one knew the source of the TSE agent which was contaminating the 
feed and the feed itself could not be tested for the presence of a TSE (van 
Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005 p75). By January 1989, 2,296 cases of BSE had 
been confirmed on 1,742 farms. 
Initial advice to the government stated that BSE was unlikely to pose a threat to 
humans, based on the similarities with scrapie which has not jumped species. To 
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make a decision on dealing with the disease, policy makers had to choose either to 
-----accept this advice and do nothing, or to allow for a risk to human health, which 
would require a significant regulatory response. In the case of such a risk existing, 
policy options included excluding all animals known to be susceptible to BSE 
from the food chain, or slaughtering and restocking the entire national herd at an 
estimated cost of £20 billion at 2000 prices (National Audit Office, 1998). Given 
the disruption to markets either policy would cause, Ministers chose to wait for 
further developments in scientific understanding. The Chief Medical Officer was 
not notified for a further two years, reflecting the low priority given to the disease. 
In 1988, as the number of reported cases continued to rise, a compulsory slaughter 
programme was introduced for infected animals which paid compensation to 
affected farmers and a ban was imposed on the use of ruminant-derived protein in 
animal feed. Despite these measures the number of confirmed cases increased, 
suspected to be due in part to the 'grace period' given for retailers and farmers to 
use up existing feed stocks. The Southwood Working Party was established with 
the remit to examine the implications of BSE for both animal and human health 
(although the role of the group later came under criticism for the ambiguity in its 
terms of reference regarding whether it should be providing advice on science or 
policy). The advice provided by the party was presented as the most authoritative 
available, but experts on TSEs had been deliberately excluded from the group on 
the grounds that they may hold prejudices about the disease and fail to consider 
new points of view. The report they published a year later, in 1989, was relied 
upon for years as a definitive answer to the policy problem. The report claimed 
that "from the present evidence, it is [ ... ] most unlikely that BSE will have any 
implications for human health" which was widely cited as proof that the 
government was pursuing the right course of action. However, they also warned 
that "if our assessments of these likelihoods are incorrect, the implications would 
be extremely serious" (Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and FoodlDepartment of 
Health 1989). 
In 1989, on the recommendation of the Southwood Working Party, the Specified 
Bovine Offals (SBO) ban was enacted to prevent the most potentially infectious 
parts of cattle (for example, spinal cord and brain) from entering the human food 
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chain, and the human consumption of meat from clinically infected animals was 
banned (until this point, meat from animals known~to have died from BSE could 
have been lawfully sold for this purpose). The EU simultaneously banned the 
export of UK cattle born before July 1988 and of the offspring of affected or 
suspected females. This apparent admission of a risk to human health from eating 
beef was accompanied by the discovery in May 1990 that BSE had 'jumped' 
species to a domestic cat. This result was significant for the government because it 
raised the possibility that BSE was virulent in a way which scrapie was not, 
because transmission studies had failed to transmit scrapie to cats by intracerebral 
inoculation (Jensen 2004 p41S). Media commentators hypothesised that humans 
would also be susceptible to the disease; Humberside Education Authority banned 
beef from school meals and other Authorities threatened to follow their lead 
(Phillips et al 2000). By the end of 1990, 24,396 cases of BSE had been confirmed 
in the United Kingdom. The Government embarked on a campaign of 
reassurance, with John Gummer MP infamously feeding his daughter a beefburger 
in a misguided PR stunt. Throughout the early 1990s, public fears of the health 
implications grew, along with a suspicion that they were being kept in the dark 
about the seriousness of the disease. 
Several advisory groups were created including the Tyrrell Committee which took 
over from the Southwood Working Party in 1989 to advise on research in relation 
to BSE and the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) created 
in 1990. SEAC had a wider membership and a wider remit than the Tyrell 
Committee; its task was to advise the MAFF and the Department of Health on 
matters relating to spongiform encephalopathies. The Permanent Secretary at the 
time, Richard Packer, later claimed that "Because of the positions and reputations 
of its members and the fact that most were seen to be outside government, it had 
prestige and was viewed as independent [ ... ] Ministers quickly recognized that 
they could not act against SEAC advice. To be more precise, they recognized that 
they could not take fewer precautions than SEAC had recommended" (Packer 
2006 p48). 
A critical development in this period was the emergence of BSE-infected animals 
born after the feed ban, thought to be a consequence of the 'grace period' 
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described above and the lack of concerted effort to decontaminate the manufacture 
and storage of feedstuffs as soon as the ban was put in place. Responsibility for 
enforcing the ban fell to local authorities and MAFF itself had no powers to enter 
or inspect slaughterhouses, rendering plants or feedmills until 1994 when MAFF, 
"sufficiently alarmed largely to sweep aside doubts about the legal position which 
had inhibited them earlier, started testing samples" (Packer 2006 p74). In 1995 the 
Meat Hygiene Service was created and took over responsibility for enforcing the 
rules in slaughterhouses with threatened prosecutions in cases of non-compliance, 
and by 1996 infringements had fallen dramatically. 
A turning point for policy-makers came in 1993 when a 13 year old girl was 
diagnosed with Creuzfeld-Jakob Disease (CJD), a TSE which is usually confined 
to older adults. By 1995 there were 14 suspected cases including young people 
and farmers whose herds had suffered BSE. The disease was recognised as a new 
variant of CJD (nvCJD or vCJD), the primary difference being that the average 
age of death from vCJD is 29 years, compared with 65 for CJD. Like BSE, vCJD 
is invariably fatal, and the disease claims the life of its victims one year from the 
onset of symptoms on average (Department of Health 2009). On the 20 March 
1996 SEAC made a statement that in their opinion: "on current data and in the 
absence of any credible alternative the most likely explanation at present is that 
these cases [ofvCJD] are linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of the 
ban on specified bovine offals in 1989. This is a cause of great concern" 
(Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee 1996). BSE became the 
number one political issue for months, keeping on the front pages of newspapers 
for 20 consecutive days and creating an economic crisis as consumption of beef 
declined rapidly (Packer 2006 pI58). The Government announced its intention to 
adopt further precautionary measures in accordance with SEAC's advice: 
carcasses from cattle aged over 30 months must be deboned and the feeding of 
MBM to all farm animals would be banned. Within two weeks, however, public 
pressure was so great that these measures were replaced with a total ban on cattle 
over the age of 30 months being used for human food or animal feed. 
In May 1997, the Conservative Party lost the general election and was replaced by 
a Labour Government. One of the first actions of the new administration was the 
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announcement of an inquiry into the history of the emergence and identification of 
--/ 
BSE and new variant CJD in the UK, and of the action taken in response to it up 
to 20 March 1996. Lord Phillips, chair of the inquiry, said that his task was "not to 
attribute blame for what occurred, but to identify what went wrong and why, and 
to see what lessons can be learnt" (cited in Greer 1999 p598). The report of the 
inquiry, published in 2000, did none of the 'naming and shaming' that critics of 
the Conservative government had expected, but concluded instead that Ministers 
"did not lie to the public about BSE" and in downplaying the scale of the problem 
the Government was "preoccupied with preventing an alarmist over-reaction to 
BSE because it believed that the risk [to humans] was remote" (Phillips et al2000 
pxviii). Other aspects of the way in which the disease had been managed were 
heavily criticised, however, particularly the failure to communicate with 
departments other ~han MAFF and with local authorities, and the lack of 
prioritisation for scientific research and advice. The unique position of MAFF in 
both promoting agriculture and regulating the industry was blamed for many of 
the difficulties in handling the disease, and as a consequence the Food Standards 
Agency was created in 2000 to act as a non-political regulatory body with a 
stakeholder-style board to ensure consumer representation. 
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Appendix Two 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 
Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) is an infectious disease affecting cloven-hoofed 
animals, in particular cattle, sheep, pigs, goats and deer. While FMD is not 
normally fatal to adult animals, it is debilitating and causes significant loss of 
productivity; for example milk yields may drop or the animals may become lame. 
Livestock can be infected either by direct contact with an another infected animal 
or by contact with foodstuffs or other things which have been contaminated by 
such an animal, or by eating or coming into contact with some part of an infected 
carcase. In the past, outbreaks of the disease have been linked with the 
importation of infected meat and meat products. FMD may, in exceptional 
circumstances, cause infection in humans, but the risk of transmission is low. 
The disease is exotic to the UK but widespread in other parts of the world, and 
sporadic incursions occurred in this country throughout the twentieth century. A 
significant outbreak of FMD occurred in 1968, resulting in the slaughter of around 
400,000 animals. In contrast, the next major outbreak, in 2001, saw over 4 million 
livestock culled in what was the largest slaughter of its kind in history. The 
mishandling of this outbreak led to a series of inquiries and contributed to the 
break-up of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. 
Controlling the disease 
Provisions for the control of FMD in the UK are subject to EU regulation. A 
number of directives (designed with the international trade regimes in mind) 
define the actions to be taken in the event of an FMD outbreak. Directive 
64/432/EEC (as amended by 89/662/EEC) deals with the imposition of movement 
restrictions between Member States for animal disease control. Specific European 
measures to control FMD were introduced with Directive 85/5111EEC, 
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subsequently amended by Directive 90/423/EEC to take into account the EU-
~/ 
wide cessation of prophylactic vaccination (AVIS, undated). 
Article 5 of Directive 90/423 laid down the requirement for all Member States to 
have an FMD contingency plan. In 2001, the UK's contingency plan had been 
submitted to - and endorsed by - the Commission in 1992. It was based largely 
on the findings and conclusions of the Northumberland Inquiry, held after the 
previous serious outbreak of FMD in the UK in 1967/8. The main instrument 
specified for disease control was the culling of all livestock on infected premises 
and movement restrictions on the surrounding area. The contingency planning 
had been based on a worst case scenario of having to deal with ten infected 
premises at anyone time. However, at the height of the 2001 epidemic - in mid 
March - up to fifty new cases were being declared in one day. In 2006, a revised 
contingency plan was laid before Parliament covering generic arrangements for 
FMD as well as Avian Influenza, Classical Swine Fever, African Swine Fever, 
Swine Vesicular Disease and Newcastle Disease. 
Recent Outbreaks 
On February 19th 2001, a Veterinary Inspector with the Meat Hygiene Service 
spotted symptoms of FMD in pigs at an abattoir in Essex. Subsequent analysis 
has shown that by the time the symptoms were first seen, 57 farms had already 
been 'seeded' with the infection (Defra 2002) as far afield as the North East and 
South West of England. A pig unit in Northumberland in North East England was 
judged to be the initial source of the infection. As well as having sent animals to 
the abattoir in Essex, it had also infected nearby farms by air borne viral plumes. 
On the day following being notified of the FMD outbreak, February 21 st, in 
accordance with EU control legislation, the European Commission banned all 
meat and live animal exports from the UK. A ban was imposed on the movement 
of all livestock in Great Britain. As a total ban, it was in place for ten days. Then, 
from early March, the transport of some animals to slaughter was permitted, but 
only under licence. Local authorities were given additional powers to close public 
footpaths; County Councils immediately closed rights of way and issued 'path 
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closed' notices to livestock farmers. There was, howe}er, no evidence tosuggest 
/ 
that members of the public walking in the countryside played a part in the spread· 
of the disease. The 'closure of the countryside' was admitted to have been an 
ultra-precautionary step that could not be justified as a practical preventative 
measure (Defra 2001 p24) and there were soon reports of a damaging impact on 
rural tourism and other businesses. 
There was a rapid acceleration of the number of confirmed cases, and it became 
apparent that the disease had taken a hold in certain areas. In response, in mid to 
late March a number of steps were taken to speed up and extend the scope of the 
cull, to try to get on top of the disease. In certain areas, a policy of contiguous 
culling - the slaughter of all animals on farms adjacent to an infected site - was to 
be applied. From the 21 st March, the Prime Minister exercised personal control of 
disease control policy and the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) was 
opened, bringing together departmental representatives to oversee the control 
strategy. The Government's CSA was asked to set up an independent FMD 
Science Group to advise policy. The core of that group was a small circle of 
epidemiologists convened to model and predict the spread of the outbreak. Part of 
that group, a team of modellers from Imperial College, demonstrated a need to 
drastically reduce the time between report and slaughter. Their predictions 
suggested that a I.Skm cull and a 24 hour report-to-slaughter time would bring the 
disease under control and the so-called '24/48' slaughter policy was announced on 
March 27th• The army was brought in to manage the slaughter and disposal of the 
animals. At the height of the cull in April, around 100,000 animals were being 
killed daily. 
Slaughter on this scale provoked widespread opposition and public misgivings 
which led to questioning of the disease control strategy. Hastily constructed burial 
pits began 'weeping' into water supplies, and animal corpses had to be exhumed. 
Horrific tales - of incompetent slaughtermen, live animals crawling out of burial 
pits, and wagons transporting corpses leaking blood onto roads - abounded in the 
media. While the footpath c~osures had deterred tourists from visiting rural areas, 
television images of burning carcasses deterred international tourists from coming 
to Britain at all. What had begun as a crisis for farmers soon escalated into a crisis 
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which cut across many economic sectors. The direct economic effects of FMD in 
the years 2001-2005 were estimated at a £355 million loss to the agricultural 
sector, compared with a loss of £2180 million to tourism (DefraiDepartment for 
Culture, Media and Sport 2002 para.16). 
Opponents of the cull pressed the case for a shift to the use of vaccination. The 
Northumberland report had recommended vaccination under certain 
circumstances in future outbreaks, and vaccination had been used effectively in 
several member states. There were two vaccination options open to the 
government: protective vaccination - to safeguard a limited number of animals in 
a restricted area (such as the distinctive Herdwick sheep of the Lake District); and 
suppressive vaccination, on a much larger scale but where the inoculated livestock 
would eventually be.culled. A critical issue for commercial producer interests was 
the different lengths of time required to regain recognition of disease-free status 
and the freedom to export: a 12 month delay was required following vaccination, 
as opposed to 3 months following completion of stamping out through slaughter. 
Some 500,000 doses of the FMD vaccine were reserved from the EU vaccine 
bank and the European Commission fonnally authorised its contingent use. 156 
'vaccination teams' were recruited and kept on three-day standby, and fanners 
were sent infonnation leaflets explaining what a change of strategy would imply 
(Anderson 2002 p 126). However, the rate of the spread of disease began to slow 
and then fall sharply in April. Less than three weeks after the vaccine was made 
available the last of the pyres was lit. On May 9th Tony Blair declared the disease 
had been beaten and called the general election, which he had postponed because 
of the outbreak, for June 7th• International recognition of the UK's disease-free 
status was officially regained on 22nd January 2002 with the OlE's imprimatur. 
In August 2007, an outbreak of FMD occurred in Surrey, with the source of the 
disease being traced to Pirbright, Surrey, where the Institute for Animal Health 
(lAH) and two private companies, Merial Animal Health Ltd and Stabilitech share 
a site. All three work with. the FMD virus in high-containment facilities. It is 
thought that the virus leaked from drainage pipes that had not been adequately 
maintained, partly as a result of disagreement between IAH and Merial as to 
275 
responsibility for such maintenance (HSE 2007). Overall 2160 animals were 
slaughtered in the two phases of the outbreak. while the disease was relatively 
well contained, and Defra praised for its readiness and capacity in comparison 
with 2001, the outbreak led to significant divisions between Westminster and the 
devolved administrations. Great Britain-wide movement restrictions had a 
significant impact on the Scottish and Welsh farming industries despite their 
geographical remoteness from the site of the outbreak and London-based officials 
were perceived to be delaying relaxations that would help the devolved regions to 
recover (Anderson 2008 p12). 
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Appendix Three 
Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) 
Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) is caused by the bacterium Mycobacterium bovis (M 
bovis). It remains a relatively uncommon disease in Great Britain, and for many 
years was largely confined to the South West of England, where new cases occur 
in more than 1 % of herds each year. However, since 1988 the level of bTB has 
been increasing, and the long term trend has been an incidence rate increase of 
18% p.a. This is accompanied by a 20% increase in the number of cattle culled 
following a positive result to the skin test (Defra 2005 p 15). The disease has 
spread geographically to Wales and the West Midlands, and sporadic cases occur 
throughout Britain. Due to the pasteurisation of milk and tuberculin testing of 
cattle, M bovis is currently a negligible risk to humans but the potential to 
become a significant health risk remains. At present, less than 1 % of confirmed 
cases of TB were attributed to M. bovis. However, the greater source of concern is 
the impact of the disease upon the livestock industry and, by extension, the 
taxpayer. 
From the farmers' perspective, a bTB breakdown (the term given to a herd when 
an animal from that herd tests positive for bTB) has many consequences. The 
disease causes reduced productivity and premature death in animals, thus 
affecting both animal welfare and the economic output of affected farms (Krebs 
1997 pI3). A survey by Reading University in 2004 found that 79% of dairy 
farmers and 65% of beef farmers suffered net losses from a TB breakdown of up 
to £ 17, 000 per farm (Defra 2005 p26). In addition to the costs borne by 
taxpayers, Defra estimates that the net costs to farmers will be £20m p.a. if the 
disease continues at its present levels. This figure includes £ 13m in costs of TB 
breakdown plus £7m in costs to cover cattle handling and vets (Defra 2005 p 17). 
Other impacts include accommodation and welfare problems for all animals on 
the farm, arising from the over-stocking that movement restrictions can lead to; 
and personal costs to farmers in terms of uncertainty about the duration of 
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restrictions, the difficulty of business planning and the emotional trauma of losing 
animals. There are also feelings of acute frustration amongst farmers about losing . 
their animals when they see insufficient (in their view) action being taken to 
tackle badgers, which they believe are the cause of the bTB spread (NAO Wales 
2003 p2). 
The disease is equally problematic for government. Total Government 
expenditure on tackling TB in cattle has risen from £38.2m in 1999/2000 to 
£90.5m in 2004/05. By far the largest proportion of spending went on cattle 
testing and compensation; in 1999/2000 this amounted to 79% of the total spend 
(Defra 2005 p 16). The number of cattle compulsorily slaughtered in connection 
with bTB has risen from 638 in 1986 to 5884 in 1998 and 22,571 in 2004 (Defra 
2005 p 15). Until December 2005, animals slaughtered in this way were valued 
individually and compensation awarded accordingly. As a result, many 
overpayments were made, with some farms making a net profit following a 
breakdown. A National Audit Office inquiry was conducted in Wales which 
concluded that in 2002 alone the Welsh Assembly paid an estimated £2.6 million 
in compensation payments more than it would have done had valuations been 
consistent with market values (NAO Wales 2003 p3). The compensation scheme 
has been recently reformed, but long term financial burdens can only be prevented 
by stopping the spread of the disease. 
In the 1950s, when the disease reached significant levels in the UK cattle 
population, a compulsory eradication programme began, which involved 
slaughtering herds in the least badly affected areas in order to facilitate subsequent 
restocking in the worst affected areas. However, it became evident in the 1960s 
and 70s that the prevalence ofbTB remained high in South West England despite 
the slaughter programme, and MAFF began to seek other sources of the bacteria 
which could account for the continuing spread of infection of cattle. A link 
between badgers and the spread of bovine TB was first suspected in 1971 when a 
dead badger infected with TB was found on a Gloucestershire farm which had 
recently suffered a bTB outbreak (Enticott 2001 p54). Although no firm 
conclusions could be drawn about the mode of transmission, experiments in which 
badgers and cattle were housed together to ascertain whether badgers could pass 
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the disease to cattle led MAFF to conclude that they were the single most 
/ -
significant source of the problem, and in 1973 MAFF resolved to deal with . 
badgers where they posed a threat to the health of cattle. Although several reviews 
were conducted in the 1970s and 80s, these led only to changes in the means of 
culling badgers, and the efficacy of the strategy was not seriously challenged until 
the publication of a report by Sir John Krebs in 1996 . 
Krebs highlighted the flaws of previous experiments and proposed a new 
approach, involving systematic culling, known as the Randomised Badger Culling 
Trials (RBCT) or 'Krebs Trials'. The Independent Scientific Oroup on Cattle TB 
(ISO) was set up to design the RBCT, under the Oovernment's objectives of 
identifying "a sustainable policy to control bovine tuberculosis, based on sound 
science" and to clarify any link between badgers and bTB using scientific 
evidence rather than "folklore and guesswork" (Agriculture Select Committee 
1999 para 2). The RBCT investigated 10 matched triplets each consisting of three 
trial areas of approximately 100 square kilometres located in areas of the highest 
TB incidence in cattle in England. Within each triplet, trial areas were randomly 
allocated to one of three experimental treatments: proactive culling; localised 
reactive culling in response to TB being confirmed in a cattle herd; or no badger 
culling (this being the scientific control against which the findings of the other 
two treatments are measured). The badger culling programme ended in 2005 and 
the final trial surveys are currently in progress (ISO 1998, 2006b). 
In 2005, Defra announced a new set of measures to tackle bTB: the introduction 
of pre-movement testing, aimed at reducing cattle-to-cattle transmission of the 
disease, and a new valuation and compensation scheme following findings that the 
current scheme was making serious overpayments to farmers. The pre-movement 
tests are accompanied by a cost sharing agreement under which the government 
pays for routine herd surveillance tests and the costs of any further tests are paid 
for by the animals' owner. In addition, a public consultation on the principle and 
method of badger culling ran until March 2006 and generated over 47, 000 
submissions. Only 4% of the total number of responses received were in support 
of using a cull of badgers as part of the strategy to control bTB, with 95.6% 
opposed and 0.4% neutral (PKFlDefra 2006). Defra responded by stating that 
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"Ministers have said that they will base a decision on badger culling on a sound 
~' 
scientific and practical foundation and are not yet in a position to do this" (Defra . 
2006a). In 2008, Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Hilary Benn announced that £20 million would be spent on bTB research over the 
following three years, and that an injectable badger vaccine will be used from 
2010. 
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